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Executive Summary
This report proposes an alternative U.S. military force for the firstquarter of  the 21st century. The force is designed to execute a newinternational security strategy that attempts to respond to the chal-
lenges of  a changing world and also shape what that world will look like in
2025. Principal findings and recommendations of  the report include:
• The U.S. military will face new military scenarios and new forms of
warfare in the next quarter century, yet change in strategy and forces
has been slow. Reshaping of  the military to respond to the changing
face of warfare needs to be accelerated.
• Intervening in complex civil wars, internal violence, peacekeeping op-
erations – “smaller-scale contingencies” – has become a frequent mis-
sion for the military. These missions are increasingly likely to feature
asymmetric warfare that bypasses the U.S. military’s current strength –
industrial age warfare of  destructive attrition on the battlefield – and
attacks its weaknesses.
• The dominant diplomatic and military role that the United States will
continue to play in world affairs will generate resentment and resistance
as well as support, which the United States must nurture and expand.
This approach presupposes restraint on the unilateral use of force by
the United States in its pursuit of global stability and other national
interests, and elevates the principle of  multinational response.
• This study takes the approach of  trying to produce a more desirable
world by 2025 rather than trying to predict what it will be. The ap-
proach suggests that shaping the future requires building a more flex-
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ible and agile military. The study looks at what strategies might help
reach a desired 2025 world, and proposes forces to execute the strate-
gies. The study rests on several assumptions about the world, which, if
unrealized, would lead to different recommendations.
• A key to a 2025 world in which American values predominate and in
which America remains a leader is the rebalancing of  the application of
the elements of  national power. Military power, which over the last 60
years has been the dominant element in U.S. international relations,
must be recast into its essentially supporting role as a complement and
backup to the political, economic, social, and informational components
of  national security. Broad national security strategy should pay more
attention to foreign perceptions and political views of  the United States
– and explore threat reduction by using all the components of  national
power to deal with those perceptions.
• The report supports conducting military operations in carefully selected
humanitarian or peace enforcement cases even where the United States
may not have a clear vital national interest. The United States can and
should play a useful role in ameliorating the worst cases of  violence, de-
struction, and abuse in civil wars, “failed states,” and similar situations.
• The study calls for a strategy that will:
· Broaden national security tools to include stronger political, economic,
and social components.
· Integrate with allies and partners to improve multinational military
capabilities, collectively engage with areas of  conflict – heading off
conflict if  possible and jointly intervening in selected cases if  not.
· Quicken military forces and refocus some of  them on smaller-scale
contingencies – in which they are likely to face challenging asym-
metric or “fourth-generation” warfare – by improving their mobil-
ity, agility, flexibility, and strategy and decision-making speed.
• The study proposes making U.S. forces more “expeditionary,” on the
assumption that expanding bilateral and multinational training, exer-
cises, rotational deployments to “show the flag,” and other military-to-
military contacts will credibly indicate continued U.S. engagement in a
similar way to permanent forward stationing of  large, heavy U.S. forces.
• In contrast to trends in the Defense Department, this report empha-
sizes: preparation for the new challenges the military faces right now;
Executive Summary   |   11
fixing personnel issues and doctrine before buying new hardware; and
seizing the opportunity for expanded multinational action. Although
the results of  Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s strategy reviews
are coming out slowly, the Defense Department has tended to focus on:
future challenges from a superpower competitor; high-tech hardware;
and U.S. capabilities to act unilaterally.
• The report suggests that choosing specific weapon programs is the least
important component of  a defense review. The most important thing is
to ensure that personnel policies create a force of  cohesive units with
agile, initiative-taking leaders. Some key reforms to personnel policies
are outlined in the report.
• The report also proposes a force structure that, over time, is:
· smaller, with reductions in the active forces of  three Army divisions,
three aircraft carrier battle groups, and close to four fighter wings;
· partly refocused on smaller-scale contingencies, peacekeeping, and
peace enforcement operations;
· composed of  more transformed, lighter, smaller, higher mobility units;
· oriented towards broader jointness in developing force requirements
and in operations with allies, friends, civilian agencies, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations; and
· prepared to handle potential larger challenges in the future with a
robust heavy reserve force and, in the longer run, a healthier defense
industrial base.
• The report also calls for accelerated efforts to:
· Transform some of  the active heavy armored forces into “expedition-
ary” forces more suited to smaller-scale contingencies. Prepare to work
more with other nations and non-governmental or international orga-
nizations in such contingencies. Deal with chronic transnational prob-
lems such as drug trafficking, illegal migration, and crime by integrat-
ing operations better with U.S. civilian agencies whose primary mis-
sions and core competencies are in these areas.
· Boost the human intelligence capabilities that improve knowledge
and understanding of  foreign cultures and governments.
· Focus transformation and funding on agile forces such as: light- and
medium-weight Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations; littoral
Navy; lift, close air support, and interdiction Air Force; and defen-
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sive nuclear, biological, and chemical forces and equipment. Help
fund the re-orientation with moderate reductions in the forces that
are already overwhelmingly dominant in force-on-force combat such
as: heavy active Army, open-ocean Navy, nuclear and air superiority
Air Force, and offensive nuclear forces.
· Improve ability to conduct new “asymmetric,” “maneuver,” or
“third/fourth-generation” warfare by creating agile and flexible
forces. Strengthen joint capabilities by expanding the role of  war-
fighting commanders and the Joint Staff  in planning, budgeting, and
procurement.
I. Introduction
T his volume is the full version of  the report. A condensed version is alsoavailable. In addition to the full report, several background papers onspecific topics were prepared and are mentioned in the text. All of  the
reports are available from the Center for Defense Information in hard copy or
through its website, www.cdi.org.
To develop a U.S. military force structure for the first quarter of  the 21st
century, this report took the classic approach of  looking at potential U.S. goals,
developing strategies to reach those goals, and then proposing forces to ex-
ecute the strategies. Although the report concludes that moderate force re-
ductions – and hence moderate military spending reductions after a transi-
tion period – are possible, its methodology did not start with lower spending
as a goal in and of itself.
The study attempts to serve as a discussion catalyst rather than as a de-
tailed blueprint of  future military forces. Several issues, strategies, and rec-
ommendations are raised that point to areas for more detailed exploration.
Although this effort is similar in concept to the Defense Department’s official
Quadrennial Defense Review, the absence of  several hundred comparable
staffers and officers to perform detailed analysis in this effort has limited its
scope. The goal was to contribute concepts and perspectives to the debate,
rather than produce the last word in analysis. Hopefully, the study makes up
in conceptual unity and freshness of  view what it lacks in detail.
The proposed strategy takes the approach of  outlining a desired 2025 world,
rather than a predicted one. It suggests that to reach such a desired world,
there is a need to broaden the non-military components of  national security –
political, economic, informational, and social – by giving them a greater role
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and allocating more resources to improve their effectiveness. The report finds
that the best way to win conflicts is to head off  potential threats before they
even develop and suggests that non-military components can contribute sub-
stantially to such threat reduction.
The strategy rests on several assumptions about what conditions in the
world will be. These foundational assumptions likely lead to different con-
clusions than other studies in this area. Although there are several hedges in
this proposal, if  the assumptions turn out to be too far from reality, the rec-
ommendations would need revision. For example, a pivotal element of  the
strategy is a much-expanded role for allies, friends, and partners in future
military operations, both to take advantage of  their potential capabilities, and
to share the responsibilities and liabilities of  global leadership. U.S. forces
would better integrate with allied and coalition forces to collectively engage
with areas of  conflict. This rests on an assumption or assessment that the
conditions exist for others to increase their military capabilities and activities.
The paper then makes a prescription for this potential to be realized in the
future – rather than a description that it will be. But if  the appropriate condi-
tions do not even exist, nothing the United States does in its revised strategy
will be able to bring about greater international effort.
II. The Future
UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE
“To know the future would be a blessing and a curse”
The last 10 years have been a decade of  change unprecedented in modern
Western history. The structure of  international relations has changed from
dueling political-military blocs dominated by superpowers to a single, multitier
alliance dominated by the United States. Economically, the 1980s Asian pow-
erhouses have either fallen on hard times or have fallen behind the United
States and Europe in developing and exploiting new technologies. These same
technologies have revolutionized (and continue to transform) the way in which
individuals and societies acquire and share information, albeit the pace of
converting information into knowledge and subsequent action remains de-
pendent on the human brain.
At the same time, most of  the world’s inhabitants have been only margin-
ally affected by these rapid changes. Even where political oppression has been
lifted and new economic systems installed, the age-old problems remain: get-
ting enough to eat, having clean water to drink, being protected against infec-
tious but curable disease, and being reasonably assured that life can be lived
free of  fear.
Another reality affecting the modern national security environment of
developed countries is the interdependence among the elements of  society. In
its Phase I Report, the United States Commission on National Security/21st
Century states that “the international system will be so fluid and complex
that even to think intelligently about military issues will mean taking an inte-
grated view of  political, social, technological, and economic developments.”1
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The Commission believes that “only a broad definition of  national security is
appropriate” in an age in which “the fundamental assumptions that steered
us through the chilly waters of  the Cold War require rethinking.”
Despite the socio-political-military changes of  the past decade, the one
unchanged, overarching reality is the ability of  a few countries – and the ap-
parent willingness of  Russia and the United States among the nuclear powers
– to employ nuclear weapons. In this instance, the first and best line of  de-
fense remains diplomacy in the form of  verifiable arms control/arms reduc-
tion and nonproliferation regimes. At the same time, diplomacy can make
headway in the realm of  conventional arms by advocating greater transpar-
ency in military affairs and a general rollback in worldwide military expendi-
tures and forces to levels that allow for deterrence and self-defense. The ulti-
mate goal of diplomacy ought to be to promote and strengthen a consensus
that peace, not war, is the norm of  international relations.
Traditional Military Approaches
The military dimension of  national security remains a core requirement in
the early 21st century. The administration of  President George W. Bush in-
herited a tripartite National Military Strategy (NMS) that envisions “shaping
the international environment...responding to the full spectrum of
crises...[and] preparing now for an uncertain future.”2  More succinctly, the
Pentagon’s 1997 Concept for Future Joint Operations states that the objec-
tives of  the NMS are to “promote stability and to thwart aggression” through
“peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and [being pre-
pared to] fight and win.”3
One way to shape the environment is through presence – permanently
stationing and rotationally deploying forces around the world, conducting
exercises, and providing “defense cooperation” in the form of  arms sales and
educating foreign military personnel. Being there as opposed to having to get
there is an effective way of  deterring aggression and providing reassurance to
friends. Shaping the environment was singled out by Adm. Dennis Blair, com-
mander in chief  Pacific Command, in March 7, 2000 congressional testimony,
as his most effective tool. In December 2000, forward presence accounted for
the stationing of  some 113,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe (with an
additional 4,000 afloat), 77,000 in Asia (plus 33,000 afloat), and 13,000 in the
Middle East/Persian Gulf  (with 5,000 more afloat).4
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Pentagon doctrine, organizations, and weapon purchases are ostensibly
aimed at meeting the third element of  current military strategy: “preparing
now for an uncertain future.” But moving from Cold War patterns has pro-
gressed slowly. “Mass” still predominates in doctrine even though the lessons
of  the 1991 Persian Gulf  War were not lost on U.S. adversaries, such as
Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo in 1999. Army divisions with large logistics
tails of fuel, food, and ammunition remain the organizational bedrock of land
warfare as the carrier battle group and amphibious ready group are for the
Navy and the wing for the Air Force. Despite the proliferation of  improved
land- and air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles and a shift in emphasis from
deep oceans to shallow littoral seas, the Navy continues to build 90,000-ton
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The Air Force continues to prioritize manned
bombers and fighters even as better air defenses are being developed and the
ability of  “stealthy” aircraft to operate undetected has been called into ques-
tion. Similarly, the Army has been slow off  the mark to examine alternatives
to heavy armor and artillery which strain rapid lift capacity. As difficult as it
is to change equipment, it is even more difficult to transform mindsets about
doctrine and strategy. As the Army’s deputy commanding general for trans-
formation, Maj. Gen. James Dubik noted, “The materiel part is hard, but
human change and cultural change are a lot harder.”5
Fourteen years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the chairman of  the
Joint Chiefs of  Staff  new powers of  coordination and budget formulation,
the greatest impediment to change in the Pentagon continues to be service
rivalry for missions and the money (and therefore influence) that goes with
new endeavors. A recent case in point is the Navy’s full court press to become
an equal player in missile defense even though, by the terms of  the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed not to de-
velop sea-based national missile defenses.
Effective shaping, responding, and preparing require a strategic frame-
work that weaves into a seamless whole the capabilities of  each service in a
fashion that the strengths of  one offset the weaknesses of  the others. But to
the extent that the services and the Pentagon are slow to adapt 20th century
assumptions, modes of  thought, and preparations to the more integrated world
of  the 21st century or develop a culture that rewards innovation and risk-
taking, adversaries may well find where weakness reinforces weakness in an
effort to exploit military deficiencies.
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It is not feasible, prudent, or necessary to try to transform all of  the force
from current doctrine, organization, or equipment. But it is necessary and
prudent in this time of  “strategic pause” to undertake a clear, time-phased
re-evaluation of  foreseeable likely military threats to U.S. interests. This should
be followed by moves to research and develop a range of  complementary,
joint military capabilities that will allow the United States to effectively deter
and, if  necessary, defeat an aggressive nation or sub-national group.
CONTINUING NEED, NEW CHALLENGES
“Philosophers dream worlds, politicians try to organize them, the mili-
tary confronts them”
The Challenge of Violent Conflict to Global Stability
Along with other nations, the United States wants sufficient stability (and
therefore predictability) in global affairs to ensure the continued prosperity
of  the nation. America’s experience, as short as it is, inclines it strongly to the
belief  that global stability is best achieved through a world in which nations
recognize and adhere to democratic ideals and protect the basic human rights
of  all their citizens. On this basis, global stability can be enhanced through a
growing global economy whose benefits extend to all nations. This in turn
implies a community of  states able to create new sources of  wealth; to allo-
cate, when necessary, scarce resources equitably among claimants; and to deal
early and effectively with nations or sub-national groups who refuse to recog-
nize, let alone cooperate in upholding, mutual interests and values.
This last reality justifies the creation and maintenance of  military forces
by nations, even in an era of  relative cooperation. Even so, two significant,
mutually reinforcing changes have emerged in the last decade of  the 20th cen-
tury that are altering war-fighting and the preparations for war-fighting.
New Ways of War
The first is a significant shift from predominantly inter-state to intra-state
conflict – even considering that some intra-state conflicts lead to interven-
tions by coalitions or individual neighboring states intent on ending wide-
spread human rights violations, or containing the violence and refugee flows.
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By its very nature, this shift has lessened the relevance of  defending the terri-
torial integrity of  the state – the traditional justification for large military
forces – in deciding on the nature and structure of  modern military forces.
The overall decline in world military expenditures (from $1.2 trillion in 1985
to $785 billion in 1998) and the reduction in the size of  standing military
forces reflect this change in emphasis. Moreover, the widespread dissolution
of  monetary, trade, and communications barriers, along with the stability pro-
duced by growing political/security integration in some regions, has made
territorial boundaries less significant than at any time since the 17th century.
In turn, a reduction in military force size that has taken place around the
globe reflects a belief  that traditional force-on-force engagements – whether
armies, navies, or air forces – are largely an anachronism. Among the more
technologically advanced nations, the military principle of  mass – whether in
personnel or firepower – is giving way to better-informed, faster, more mo-
bile, self-sustaining, and lethal small units or groups of  forces that can oper-
ate semi-autonomously over greater distances. Speed (including rapid mass-
ing for a specific mission and equally rapid dispersal when the objective is
attained), precision, and rapid adaptability in an inherently more fluid envi-
ronment assume greater relevance. In turn, this places a greater premium on
highly trained, well-equipped personnel able to evaluate situations and make
tactically and technically sound decisions while reducing risks. In this regard,
the small unit operations of  U.S. forces in the Balkans is an apt laboratory for
assessing and developing the skills that key elements of  the future force will
require to be successful over the next quarter century.
Adapting the U.S. Military
In certain other ways, militarily and non-militarily, the 21st century will be like
the 20th. The United States, given its human and natural resources, its power
and size, will continue to play a dominant diplomatic and military role in world
affairs when it chooses to become involved. This, in turn, will generate resent-
ment and resistance from many countries and sub-national groups. This rancor
and opposition will lead to instances of  violence. It will also, however, generate
support, which the United States must nurture and expand whenever and wher-
ever possible. This tack presupposes restraint on the unilateral use of  force by
the United States in its pursuit of  global stability and other national interests,
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and elevates the principle of  multinational response to preclude, or at least con-
trol, instances of  inter-state, intra-state, and terrorist violence.
These world conditions and the changing rationale for the use of  military
force lie behind what some may regard as a radical proposal for restructuring
U.S. military forces over the course of  the next quarter century. But all rec-
ommendations are premised on continued U.S. engagement with other na-
tions diplomatically, economically, environmentally, socially, and militarily
(in ad hoc coalitions or supporting international organizations). And all are
based on the premise that how the United States chooses to exert its power
and prestige over the next quarter century will be a significant, if  not the
determining, factor in the world’s progress toward greater understanding,
greater harmony, and greater prosperity for all nations for the remainder of
the century and beyond.
RECENT DEFENSE REVIEWS
In 1997, the Pentagon conducted the first congressionally mandated Qua-
drennial Defense Review (QDR). This was not the first inventory of  military
policies and programs in the 1990s: between 1989 and 1991, the Pentagon
conducted the Base Force Review and, in 1993, the Bottom-Up Review.
All three reviews made some adjustments to the force structure and the end-
strengths of  the services. While these changes were important, particularly in
light of  the American public’s perception of reduced military dangers, none of
the reviews questioned the underlying basis for the traditional (Cold War-era)
military responses and strategy in light of  the vastly altered international mili-
tary climate and the burgeoning reality of  globalization. Even the independent
National Defense Panel established by Congress to review the 1997 QDR was
unable to influence the Pentagon’s determination to retain a strategy and the
necessary forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars
(MTWs). The result was a force structure and command system essentially
unchanged from the Cold War; the only difference was its smaller size, which
has left it unbalanced for the 21st century challenges.
The military services, which had been preparing for the second QDR for
some months, received a jolt in February 2001 when the Bush administration
announced it would conduct a separate top-down review of  military policy
and programs. This “outside” review, involving top Defense Department ci-
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vilians, retired officers, and defense contractors, is to shape the QDR by re-
ordering service-specific, as well as overall Pentagon, priorities.
Before the Bush review was announced, two foundational studies dealing
with national and military security issues were completed. The first, also con-
gressionally mandated but conducted under the aegis of the Office of the
Secretary of  Defense, was the United States Commission on National Secu-
rity/21st Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its
two co-chairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman). The
Commission’s mandate was to look at all aspects of  national and international
affairs that might influence, for better or worse, the national security of  the
United States in the first quarter of  the new century. In its third and final
report, the Commission made 49 specific recommendations grouped under
five broad headings, of  which only the first and third are military in nature:
• Securing the National Homeland
• Recapitalizing America’s Strengths in Science and Education
• Institutional Redesign
• The Human Requirements for National Security
• The Role of  Congress
The second study was done by a quasi-independent committee, the “NDU
QDR 2001 Working Group,” based at the National Defense University (NDU)
in Washington. The working group analyzed the implications for force struc-
ture of four approaches to national security: the “shape-respond-prepare”
policy of  the Clinton administration; more selective engagement; eliminating
perceived war-fighting shortfalls and reducing operations tempo; and even
greater engagement to shape international events.
Both the Commission on National Security/21st Century and the NDU
QDR Working Group had similar constraints: their constituents ultimately
are the Department of  Defense and the Congress. Thus, as was the case with
the 1997 QDR, while the analysis of  the existing and projected military cli-
mate might point to more than one set of  very reasonable missions, force
strengths, and force structures, the inherent cautiousness of  the Pentagon
leads to a resistance to significant change. A status quo approach increasingly
threatens to undermine the military security of  the United States because it
may result in U.S. forces being improperly structured to meet the threats likely
to evolve during the first quarter of  the century.
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THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE TO DEVELOPING
A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE
One of  the fundamental questions about force size and structure is what drives
their formation. In modern times there seem to be three approaches: threats,
budgets, and strategy.
Identifying and countering threats to vital (and sometimes only impor-
tant) national interests is the traditional rationale for determining force struc-
ture and size. But since the fall of  the Soviet Union, and in the absence as yet
of  any truly significant regional military power able and willing to challenge
the military prowess of  the United States, this method as the primary basis
for determining forces has much less relevance today. This is because the
nature of potential challenges is less predictable and their possible effects less
catastrophic.
Budgets have become the practical determinant of  forces and force struc-
tures even when the traditional threat-based analysis is proclaimed as the driv-
ing rationale behind the annual Pentagon spending proposal. This has mani-
festly been the case since the 1950s, when the Eisenhower “New Look” strat-
egy was inaugurated to offset the conventional war-fighting advantage en-
joyed in Europe by the Soviet Union and, in Asia, by the People’s Republic of
China. During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson’s determination
not to undercut the financing of the “Great Society” was as significant a re-
straint on the way that war was fought, as was Johnson’s need to avoid con-
gressional opposition and large-scale anti-war protests on the streets of
America. And although budgets ballooned during the Reagan years, before
the end of  his second term and throughout the elder Bush administration,
military spending encountered practical limits embodied in the quadrupling
of  the national debt. Indeed, it was almost a condition of  the 1990-91 Persian
Gulf  War that the lion’s share of  the costs be paid by the Gulf  coalition allies,
including nations that did not contribute armed forces.
That leaves strategy. Strategy defines the means to be employed to achieve
identified goals. As the generic process of  determining the most effective ap-
plication of  available instruments, strategy traditionally exists at the “grand”
(involving national interests), the operational (involving large geographical
areas), and the tactical (local) levels.
 In simplified terms, the dominant national strategy for the first 150 years
of  America’s history was what, in retrospect, is called “Manifest Destiny.”
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Together with the Monroe Doctrine’s declaration that the American conti-
nents were not open to further European colonization – a declaration whose
efficacy depended on the power of  the British Navy in most of  the 19th cen-
tury – the concept that Americans were “entitled” to expand westward influ-
enced decisions for war and peace.
Once America reached the Pacific, Manifest Destiny was implemented op-
erationally by a policy of  maritime dominance which rested on the premise that
the territorial integrity and long-term growth and prosperity of  the American
“island-nation” could best be guaranteed through free trade and freedom of
navigation. America’s post-Civil War economic expansion led many (including
President Theodore Roosevelt) to the conclusion that the United States should
not rely on any other nation to protect America’s interests.
Despite the gradual development of  air power as a new aspect of  warfare,
maritime considerations remained dominant in the formulation of  national
strategy. America’s dominance of  the seas made inevitable the defeat of  Japan
and Germany in World War II.
After the war, hoped for internationalism under the U.N. banner quickly
gave way to containment as the guiding principle of  national strategy. At the
operational level, maritime strategy was challenged (unsuccessfully) first by
air power theorists and then (successfully) by atomic/nuclear weapons whose
destructive power added a major new dimension to war-fighting. Eisenhower’s
“New Look” policy relied on “the bomb” to offset the heavy conventional
forces fielded by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of  China.
The domino theory augmented containment, bringing with it an opera-
tional strategy of  “flexible response,” running the war-fighting spectrum from
guerrilla/insurgency/counterinsurgency to nuclear holocaust.
The 1970s augmentation to containment was détente, a “time out” period
in the superpower rivalry. But just as the Monroe Doctrine’s efficacy rested
on the British Navy, the efficacy of  détente depended on the Soviets acting
“responsibly.” The 1979 invasion of  Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was
the final nail in the coffin of  détente. Thus in the early to mid-1980s, contain-
ment again was the order of  the day for the United States, one that changed
slowly over the latter days of  the Reagan administration and the early Bush
years as superpower relations warmed.
But containment of  the Soviet Union became obsolete when the Soviet
Empire disintegrated, and with it the strategic and operational focus. What
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emerged was a construct of  rogue nations credited with a commonality of
overlapping interests, intentions, and capabilities to orchestrate two anti-
American “major theater wars nearly simultaneously.” The reaction carried
containment – and its supporting offensively-oriented maritime, strategic air,
and heavy forward deployment concepts – into the 1990s.
Furthermore, the role of  nuclear weapons was expanded to include the
possibility that they might be used to retaliate for the use of chemical or bio-
logical weapons against U.S. forces or the territory of  the United States.
But actual experience since the 1991 Persian Gulf  War – the last time any
one of  the rogue states attempted to contravene militarily the international
community – suggests that another form of  containment has emerged – that
of  precluding or mitigating conflicts. American forces have been used prima-
rily to preclude or mitigate human and natural disasters or in support of  the
theory in international affairs that draws limits on unrestricted internal state
sovereignty (as in Kosovo).
The implications of  the globalization of  information and financial flows for
nation-states are further eroding the freedom of  states to act with little or no
regard for others. The Clinton administration’s bent toward “engagement and
enlargement” is a recognition on economic grounds of the growing interdepen-
dence of  nations. These changes suggest a requirement for a strategic mindset
and an effective force structure capable of  functioning within changed interna-
tional parameters, while retaining the ability to defend vital national interests.
III. A New Strategy
A DESIRED 2025 WORLD
Rather than rely heavily on predictions of  what the world will be like in 2025
and what the specific threats will be, another approach to strategy is to outline
what world the United States might like to see in 2025, and shape strategy
and forces so as to encourage the realization of  that world instead of  other,
less attractive, scenarios. Such a strategy attempts to produce a world instead
of  predicting it. This study attempts to suggest such a strategy, and empha-
sizes the importance of  improving strategic, operational, and tactical flexibil-
ity in the military so as to be as ready as possible for unpredicted situations
and challenges.
Because in 2001 the predominate component of  U.S. national security is
the military, this element will be the most affected by any transformations
needed to achieve the end-state world of  2025. Thus, this study’s emphasis
falls on military policy, programs, strategy, and forces.
The world of  2025 envisioned here as being the most promising for U.S.
national security is one characterized by:
• recognition that a nation’s social, political, economic, military, informational,
and environmental strengths contribute equally to national security;
• a major reduction (to no more than 500 each) in nuclear warheads and
delivery means in the arsenals of  Russia and the United States, no sig-
nificant increase from current levels in China, and progress towards the
elimination of  all nuclear weapons;
• implementation of  more vigorous verification regimes (and their en-
forcement) for chemical and biological weapons and agents, and for
nuclear weapons;
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• greater use of  targeted diplomatic and economic means to avert and miti-
gate crises that develop by addressing their root causes, and to reverse the
consequences of  violations of  international norms and standards;
• general reductions in spending for conventional national military forces,
made possible by strengthening the capacity of regional organizations
(and possibly the United Nations) to respond to intra-state and inter-
state violence and to humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters;
• more equitable economic development via open markets, free trade, and
economic development and assistance from developed countries; and
• equitable use of  the world’s diminishing natural resources, including
fresh water, arable land and food, forests, and energy sources.
If  this (or something close to this) is a desirable outcome, are there actions
or avenues the United States can pursue that will help bring this world closer
to reality? Can the United States sufficiently influence other states so that this
promising world – or a better one – can be sustained?
For the United States to retain its moral, diplomatic, economic, and mili-
tary leadership over the next 25 years, it will have to:
• increase participation in shaping international legal, economic, envi-
ronmental, and natural resource agreements and treaties that affect vi-
tal and important national interests;
• maintain strong ties to allies (North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of  American States (OAS),
and with key states in the Far East, Middle East, Asia, and Africa;
• encourage the evolution of  new security relationships founded on com-
mon interests with Russia, China, India, Brazil, and other emerging
regional power centers;
• develop military structures capable of  efficiently responding to remain-
ing threats or emergencies that are susceptible to military power and
capabilities;
• move from dependence on fossil fuels to renewable energy sources.
Internally, the executive branch must improve the interagency process. As
the distinctions between domestic and international issues, and between mili-
tary and political/economic issues continue to blur, “improvement” may well
mean broadening participation by agencies and offices and distributing in-
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formation more widely to ensure that second- and third-order effects of  a
proposed policy reach consideration. Since the military is only one compo-
nent of  national security, there likely is a need to have other civilian agencies
play an equal or greater role (and a role better funded than it is now) at certain
points in U.S. engagement and interventions abroad. At the same time, stream-
lined analysis of  the real-world effects of  national policy decisions will be
required to preclude unacceptable delays in subsequent decision-making.
Within the U.S. military, programs and policies of  the individual services
need to be reviewed for their impact on joint operations. This is particularly
true for communications and intelligence analysis and dissemination. In a
very real sense, these areas are no longer mere force enablers. They are central
elements in the joint commander’s ability to assess reactions – desired, un-
desired, even unanticipated – and adapt peacetime planning or wartime op-
erations to the changed environment.
Another key to a 2025 world in which American values predominate and
America remains a leader is the rebalancing of the application of the ele-
ments of  national power. Diplomacy is the first line of  both offense and de-
fense of  U.S. interests, the realm in which the nation signals its intention to
involve itself  or abstain from participation in world affairs. Supporting diplo-
macy are economic actions, positive (reducing tariffs, expanding trade agree-
ments) and negative (sanctions). Military power – another supporting capa-
bility but one which, over the last 60 years has been the dominant element in
U.S. international relations – must be recast into its essentially supporting
role. Above all, the United States must avoid even the perception of  threaten-
ing military force unilaterally in pursuit of  narrowly defined “national inter-
ests” at the expense of  international equity.
WHAT IF WE’RE WRONG?
Underlying this proposal are a number of  assumptions which, if  not fulfilled,
would require adjustments to various conclusions. The main assumptions are:
• Classic cross-border aggression will be less frequent and of more re-
stricted intensity and duration than in the 20th century.
• The need to posit and prepare for two nearly simultaneous major the-
ater wars is unnecessary, given the increasing integration of  interests
among major powers, the conventional military overmatch against lesser
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powers, and the potential for greater allied contributions to winning
such wars should they occur.
• Major allies and friends of the United States are politically and finan-
cially able to continue to move toward acquiring the capacity (some-
times unilaterally, more often multinationally) to provide for their own
defense and security needs and to build intervention forces. A reorien-
tation of  U.S. strategy as proposed here, and hence strong U.S. encour-
agement for allied transformation, might help allies to do so.
• Expanding bilateral and multinational training exercises, rotational de-
ployments to “show the flag,” and other military-to-military contacts
will credibly indicate continued U.S. engagement in a similar way to
permanent forward stationing of  large, heavy U.S. forces.
• Projected technology advances necessary to support strategy and tactics
driving the transformation efforts of the military services will materialize.
• Improved and expanded transformation of  national-level information
collection, analysis, and dissemination by intelligence agencies will be
able to rectify existing shortfalls in these activities; be able to keep abreast
of  the intentions and capabilities of  allies, friends, possible and identi-
fied adversaries; and identify potential internal upheavals in other na-
tions that might affect peace or stability in a region.6
• Overall, a Depression-type collapse of  the global economy will not oc-
cur, and nations will prefer accommodation to war with regard to the
distribution of  scarce resources such as energy and water.
There are measures – hedges – against the failure of one or more of these
assumptions to materialize. They fall into three main categories: organiza-
tional (people, ideas, and transformational processes); alliances and multilat-
eral approaches to security challenges; and the industrial base. All are under-
pinned by the same critical ability – first-rate, comprehensive analysis of  in-
formation about the intentions and military capabilities of  others, both friends
and potential adversaries.
Organization
The most important hedge against unexpectedly large security challenges that
may arise is strengthening the military’s capability for strategic flexibility.
This requires attracting the right people and giving them the infrastructure
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support and doctrinal flexibility to prepare for potential remobilization should
this become necessary.
As this paper repeatedly stresses, people are the central core of  military
organizations. They must have competent leadership, both civilian and mili-
tary. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers, especially in the active
force, must be given time to be with their troops so as to understand and
resolve problems and conduct relevant training to keep skills honed. How-
ever, Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve units of  all four ser-
vices that constitute part of  the Ready Reserve also must be provided oppor-
tunities for solid individual and unit training to meet the demands of  the
Pentagon’s “Total Force” policy which is designed to fully integrate the vari-
ous components into a single fighting force.7
Should general mobilization on the scale of  20th century world wars be
required again, the greatest burden of  reconstituting forces would fall on the
Army as the service responsible for sustained land combat. The task of  orga-
nizing and training individuals and units would fall to the Army Reserve,
which currently has seven institutional training divisions and five exercise
divisions. These would form the bases for receiving and organizing recruits
needed to expand the Army.
A second requirement for mobilization is to have space and facilities that
can be pressed into service. As early deploying active units are relocated abroad
(or to critical areas in the United States), it may be possible to rapidly back-
fill installations that have been vacated. But it will also be necessary to have
separate, existing space on active duty military bases and separate installa-
tions that can be used as mobilization reception and training facilities. Thus
an important consideration in any future base realignment and closing deci-
sions ought to be the number and siting of facilities that could be pressed into
service for general mobilizing activities.
To carry out these responsibilities, trainers and training units must remain
well informed and trained themselves in the doctrine, strategy, and organiza-
tional concepts of  their services. The responsibility for ensuring such educa-
tion and “training of trainers” rests with the senior leadership of each ser-
vice. Budgets must be allocated and time and opportunities made available
for familiarization with new organizations and equipment, as these are imple-
mented or fielded. The extent of  such “transformational training” will de-
pend in part on the speed at which the new concepts are introduced and the
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expected roles that newly mobilized units will assume. In all cases, the goal
should be what it is for active duty units: to train as they will fight.
A related issue is the requirement to maintain agreements with friendly
nations that could be activated in times of  emergencies. Two significant sets
of  agreements are Status-of-Forces, which “defines the legal position of  a
visiting miliary force deployed in the territory of  a friendly state,”8  and bas-
ing rights, particularly for aircraft.9
Multilateralism
The second set of  assumptions that must be hedged are those involving alli-
ances and multilateral approaches to security issues. Although an “ideal” se-
curity world from Washington’s perspective is one in which the United States
dominates diplomatically, economically, militarily, and environmentally, such
a unidirectional order would inevitably lead to a coalition of  rebellious, lesser
powers. Globalization, because it forms interlocking webs that can exist only
if  the webs have multiple anchor points, is predicated on cooperative efforts
to embrace as many interests of  as many states as possible. While not all
states are equal, those whose power allows them to assume the mantle of
leadership must be perceived as willing to – and at least occasionally to grace-
fully – incorporate the positions of  others.
Properly woven, the webs will reflect a convergence of  interests and the
recognition that all have rights and responsibilities in a global world. And it is
with the responsibilities that problems may first manifest themselves because
political will, left to itself, can disintegrate all too rapidly as competition for
human, fiscal, and even natural resources rise. For example, two years after
NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was agreed, concerns are be-
ing voiced as to whether the European NATO countries will meet the objec-
tives of  the plan.10  In that these initiatives parallel requirements for the Euro-
pean Union’s efforts to raise and sustain a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force,
failure in implementing the Defense Capabilities Initiative will adversely af-
fect the EU effort.11  And success in the EU effort is the basis for some of  the
U.S. force structure changes proposed by this paper.12  Hence the phased na-
ture of  the changes in U.S. force structure provides a hedge against delays in
meeting expectations of  improvements in allied military forces. Moreover, a
phased change permits more extended use of  diplomatic, economic, and en-
vironmental tools to influence trends and shape events affecting bilateral and
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multinational relations. It also keeps the anticipated transformation of  the
U.S. military on a steady course.13
Industrial Base
The third arena is the industrial base. In a world driven more and more by
rapid advances in technology in general and information in particular, change
is so pervasive and quick that past methods of  trying to maintain military
industrial capacity are no longer useful.14
The predominant change of the last decade is the shrinking of the defense
industrial base to the point that it is dominated by a handful of  companies.
This immediately suggests that an important hedge lies in improving the vi-
tality and regenerative ability of  this smaller and much more concentrated
defense industrial base. This is perhaps best done by improving the competi-
tiveness of  this new, leaner defense industrial base (see discussion at p. 135).
In some respects, change is not coming fast. The increasing longevity of
major weapons platforms (e.g., aircraft carriers are expected to last as long as
50 years; the average age of  aerial tankers is more than 39 years; and B-52H
bombers, first flown in 1961, are projected to be in service until 2040) means
associated maintenance costs are rising. At the same time, new, much more
expensive systems are projected to enter production and provide thousands
of  jobs. One way to control rising maintenance costs and sustain jobs is to
produce replacements of  current platforms – still the best in the world – en-
hanced with the latest upgrades in communications, situational awareness
capabilities, and weapons. This would provide work for industries that rely
on the Defense Department while sustaining at least a minimum hardware
production capability for future defense needs.
Perhaps more serious is the question of  keeping new ideas and new, com-
petitive designs flowing. This has become more of  an issue as the defense
industry has been swept by mergers and other consolidations.15  Maintaining
the interest of  weapon design teams generally will require a concentration on
recycling lessons derived from prototype testing – either of  one or two prod-
ucts or, in cases where operational concepts need to be evaluated because of
significant advances, more substantial production runs – and simulations. As
with actual production facilities, the Pentagon may have to assume more of
the direct costs of  research and development in order to keep highly special-
ized design teams employed.
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Intelligence
The hedges outlined above rely heavily on creating and maintaining the abil-
ity to discern the intentions of  other nations and their leaders. This is a long-
term, human-intensive occupation that inherently has the potential for high
error rates. For this reason it cannot be undertaken haphazardly or lightly. It
also cannot be confined to targeting officials and other elites of foreign na-
tions. The recent record of  U.S. intelligence agencies suggests that too much
attention has been devoted to weapons system numbers and capabilities while
what a country’s rulers might or might not do with these capabilities has not
been as readily discerned.16
The lesson embodied in this inversion of  priorities goes back to the an-
cient strategist Sun Tzu – it is better to win without having to fight one’s
enemies. Winning without fighting requires much improved knowledge and
understanding of  opponents. As Sun Tzu wrote,
So what enables an intelligent government and wise military lead-
ership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplish-
ment is foreknowledge. Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from
ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out
by calculation. It must be obtained from people, people who know
the conditions of  the enemy.17
IDENTIFYING NATIONAL INTERESTS
To reach a desired world in 2025, the United States must identify and pursue
a set of  national security interests. Protection and enhancement of  such inter-
ests will help shape the characteristics and events of  international security
that in turn will create either fertile or hostile ground for the gestation of  a
desired world.
Although national interests can be hard to define precisely – and specific
interests can change quickly in ways that only become clear after major inter-
national events have occurred18  – it is still useful to clarify the interests that a
strategy is intended to serve.
In the post-Cold War world it is especially important to define interests
since they are less clear than they used to be and they determine what role the
military is to play in foreign policy. A prominent debate now occurs over the
importance of  interests arising from U.S. “values,” such as limiting genocide
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or massacres and promoting democracy and human rights. Is it a vital interest
– or not an interest at all, or something in between – for the United States to
intervene militarily in ethnocidal situations or failed states? Should the United
States step in when its vital interests are not at stake, but humanitarian inter-
ests are? Are these interests related? Some see interests that appear at first to
be solely value-related as crucial to the long run security of  the United States
– if  chaos and violence are allowed to go unchecked now, sooner or later they
will reach the United States or its vital interests. For them, preparing to con-
duct “humanitarian” or peacekeeping operations, and equipping forces to do
so, would occupy a higher priority than for those who view such interests as
minor or completely discretionary. The answers to these questions help de-
termine what the military should do – and hence what it should look like.
Types of U.S. National Security Interests
A key function of assessing national security interests as a basis for strategy is
to provide a ranking of  interests. Strategy-making is a matter of  choosing
among competing options for action, and having ranked interests is a prereq-
uisite for making good choices. If  interests are not clearly ranked, in practice
the outcome of  each event or the situation in each area tends to become a
“vital” interest to the United States.19
However, the ranking does not crudely translate into the areas of  highest
and lowest priority for action. The low ranking of  an interest, for example,
does not necessarily mean that it does not need the most attention in military
transformation. For one thing, a low-ranked interest may be far more likely to
occur than a higher-ranked interest. Similarly, military capabilities to respond
to threats against higher-ranked interests may already be in good shape.
This report takes a broad approach to “interests,” keeping the focus at a
higher level than specific cases, countries, and policy tools or options. This helps
avoid overvaluation of  specific existing tools and inflexibility in changing them
when necessary. The specifics are more suited to the succeeding steps of  strat-
egy-making – assessing “threats to interests” and “how to defend interests.”
This study suggests the following as a ranking of  broad U.S. national interests:
Vital
• Survival, territorial integrity, and independence of  the United States
• Security of citizens in the United States from foreign attacks
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Very Important
• Stability and strength of  international economic, political, legal, en-
ergy, and environmental systems
• Security and prosperity of  allies, friends, and neighbors
Important
• Limitation of  armed conflicts, genocide, massacres, ethnic and other
violence, and civil disturbance
• Solving transnational problems such as drug trafficking; illegal migra-
tion; environmental damage and conflict over water supplies; disease
and epidemics; and international crime and corruption
As noted above, such categorizations provide an indication of  the conse-
quences of  failing to protect an interest, they do not indicate where the mili-
tary needs to transform the most or provide the most additional resources.
For example, the ability of  the military to protect the survival of  the United
States against a large-scale nuclear attack (a vital interest) through its large
nuclear deterrent force is quite robust, yet its ability to intervene successfully
in complex intra-state conflicts (a less-than-vital interest) needs a lot of  work.
Survival and territorial integrity of  the United States
This most fundamental interest is probably the least endangered it has been
in the last 50 years – except in the nuclear realm. The destruction of  fascist
Germany, militarist Japan, and finally the communist Soviet Union have elimi-
nated any serious conventional military challenge to the integrity of  the United
States for the immediate future. Unfortunately, the danger of  major nuclear
war did not disappear along with the Cold War. Indeed, as relations with
China deteriorate and nuclear weapons potentially proliferate, the danger of
limited, but still catastrophic, nuclear attack may be increasing. Given U.S.
offensive nuclear might, more attention needs to be focused on other cost-
effective means of  furthering this interest, such as increased funding for safe-
guarding and destruction of  nuclear weapons and material abroad.
Security of  citizens in the United States from foreign (and domestic)
terrorist attacks
The possibility of  foreign terrorist attack on the homeland has been aggra-
vated by the potential for use of  weapons of  mass destruction – chemical,
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biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons. As the United States intervenes
with its military forces more frequently around the world, the motives for
foreign parties to strike back increase. To date, however, there has been little
activity against the U.S. homeland, despite the numerous U.S. deployments
and interventions in the 1990s. U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military sites
or personnel abroad appear to be easier targets than the U.S. homeland.
Stability and strength of  international economic,  political,  legal,  energy,
and environmental systems
A substantial new strength that adds to the national security of  the United
States is the broad web of  international systems that are increasingly weaving
nations together, including democratic institutions, trade, international and
regional organizations, and international treaties on environmental and other
global concerns. To threaten such a robust web of  interlocking relationships
and systems takes a superpower alliance on the scale of  the former Soviet
Union and its bloc of  allies. Although no such challenger to the democratic,
free-market order exists today, some fear the rise of  a “peer competitor” in
the future, with China as the most readily-imagined candidate.
Security and prosperity of  allies,  friends,  and neighbors
One threat to this interest is the possibility of a major theater war against an
ally or friend. As noted previously, classic cross-border invasions of  one country
by another have become quite rare, but the danger has not vanished entirely.
Closely associated with the previous interest, this interest points more di-
rectly to the military function and component of  national security that is still
required for international order in today’s world.
Limitation of  armed conflicts,  genocide,  massacres,  and ethnic violence
This interest is the largely – but certainly not solely – humanitarian one of
trying to contain and halt the worst cases of  violence, destruction, and abuse
in civil wars or in “failed states.” This category includes protection or evacu-
ation of  U.S. citizens or others endangered by violence in foreign areas. Pure
disaster relief  where there is no organized violence is also accommodated in
this category.
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This study takes the approach that United States does have an interest in
stopping genocide, massacres, and ethnic violence. If  conceived better than
they have been to date and executed with more appropriately-tuned military
forces, carefully selected interventions in such cases could contribute sub-
stantially to amelioration of  conflicts without excessive backlash against the
United States or undue cost. This does not mean that the United States should
intervene in every case, or in the same way when it does intervene. Pursuing
any interest, especially a lower-ranking one, must be balanced carefully against
a host of  considerations and costs.
Solving transnational problems
The chronic problems of international drug trafficking, illegal migration, and
crime have been joined by emerging issues such as cross-border environmental
damage, conflict over access to water, and growing international disease trans-
mission. These issues frequently are prominent in zones of conflict – the places
where U.S. forces may be called upon to intervene. The U.S. military has indeed
been given missions to work on these problems – most notably in anti-drug smug-
gling operations – and is positioned to engage with foreign governments on these
and related issues through the headquarters of  regional commanders in chief.
Noting that U.S. forces have, and will be, tasked with operations in these
areas and that the issues will only grow in importance, some have called for
the military to prepare now to handle these issues better. One way to do so, in
effect, is for the military to more effectively integrate and act jointly with U.S.
civilian agencies whose primary missions and core competencies are in these
areas. While these complex issues are national security interests, it is not clear
that they are primarily military interests. Rather than have U.S. military forces
become a dominant player in such new missions, it may be more effective to
focus on improving the ability of  military units to work jointly with teams
from civilian agencies, particularly in peacekeeping operations.
In recent years, non-military missions have often fallen by default to the
Defense Department because of  resource shortages at other agencies. If, how-
ever, these non-military components of  national security were better resourced,
they could take some of  the load off  the military.
Having identified some national security interests that need to be promoted
in pursuit of  a desired 2025 world, what are some strategies to advance those
interests?
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THREATS, CAPABILITIES, AND STRATEGIES
Assuming the Enemy Will Fight “Our Way”
None of  the post-Cold War reviews or blue ribbon commissions has yet suc-
ceeded in changing (as opposed to reducing the size of) the basic United States
military force structure. This fact alone is enough to suggest that the defense
establishment – including the Congress and defense industries – has failed to
sufficiently adapt to what has been termed the “changing face of  war.”
Some preliminary changes have been made. The Air Force has reorga-
nized its combat squadrons into 10 Air Expeditionary Wings, but a driving
force behind this was the attempt to make deployments more predictable,
thereby enhancing family stability. The Marines developed the “three block
war” concept that prepares Marines to undertake peacekeeping, medium-in-
tensity combat, and support to humanitarian relief  operations in a theoretical
24 hour period. The Army, having learned that many of  its forces are too
heavy to be moved quickly while others lack the combat power to stand up to
armored forces, is experimenting with a “medium weight” brigade that it
hopes will be more agile and more transportable without losing lethality.
“Generations” of  Warfare
What remain to be changed are ideas of  how to fight and, from that, with what
to fight – the people and the equipment. At root, the “American way of  war”
remains focused on a paradigm variously known as attrition, second-genera-
tion, or Industrial Age warfare. This style of  war-fighting tends to be linear
and slow moving, relying on masses of  men and material to physically crush
(albeit not necessarily through frontal assaults) or threatening to crush an op-
ponent. Industrially, second-generation warfare emulates and relies on mass
production techniques to mobilize, train and equip, and deploy military forces.
Of  course there are exceptions; the high speed (for then) attacks of  the
U.S. Third Army under Gen. George Patton in World War II and Gen. Dou-
glas MacArthur’s daring strike at Inchon in the Korea War come to mind as
American examples of  maneuver or third-generation warfare within the more
ponderous methods of  their contemporaries. But even these exceptions relied
on massed manpower, massed firepower, and massed supplies.
Real third-generation war-fighting breaks battlefield linearity by seeking
and exploiting a combination of  “spaces and timing” vis-a-vis an enemy –
that is, creating or at least finding weak points or gaps in enemy thinking and
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dispositions and taking advantage of  these openings before the opponent can
rectify them. The objective of  this kind of  warfare is to collapse the opponent’s
will to fight early (ideally, even before becoming decisively engaged) by intro-
ducing chaos into his intelligence/surveillance-evaluation/command-action/
reaction processes.20  This can be done by anticipating the actions of  the op-
ponent and preempting his intentions via unexpected thrusts and parries by
highly agile, dispersed friendly forces brought together quickly for the mis-
sion and just as quickly dispersed when the action is finished.21  This type of
warfare also may free forces from the ponderous support structure character-
istic of  Industrial Age warfare.
Just as second- and third-generation warfare intermingle, they are both
interpenetrated by what some call fourth-generation warfare. This primarily
involves land forces (although targets can be naval vessels and air assets) –
irregular or guerilla warfare carried out by groups motivated by ideology, re-
venge, lust for power, ethnicity, religion or some other unifying bond. Such
irregulars often are associated with or supported by regular military forces,
but in the late 20th century this was less often the case. In fact there are
countervailing trends. There are more small groups or very loosely knit orga-
nizations which employ terror by threatening to or actually attacking civilian
populations and infrastructure – the so-called asymmetric style of  warfare.
Some receive support, safe harbor, or encouragement from nations while oth-
ers seem to operate with little support. Conversely, regular military forces are
trying to reconfigure and redirect themselves toward more rapid force projec-
tion. They are responding – albeit at a seemingly slow pace – to the percep-
tion that the preponderance of  future missions will be low intensity, “stabil-
ity” ones – peace monitoring, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief  support, na-
tion building, and peace enforcement. In one sense, this change in orientation
seeks to make the asymmetrical symmetrical by confronting wherever pos-
sible the irregular forces on their own terms.
An indication of  the focus on symmetrical warfare is the attention devoted
to how many major theater wars (MTWs) the U.S. military should be pre-
pared to fight at one time. The “nearly simultaneous” two-war plan of  the
Clinton administration was used to justify a large portion of  existing military
forces. Then-Secretary of  Defense Les Aspin tried and conspicuously failed
to move from fighting two MTWs concurrently to a “win-hold-win” ap-
proach in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. Deciding a number of  MTWs to
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fight at once, however, is to answer the wrong question, because it encourages
thinking in terms of  rigid force packages.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s strategy review appears ready to
move from a two MTW approach to one MTW.22  If  this is ultimately imple-
mented, it will be an improvement, but more important than merely chang-
ing the number of MTWs is dropping the concept of defining rigid “MTW
forces” and using them to drive force size. In line with this study’s promo-
tion of  more agile strategy-making, what is needed is more flexible force-
sizing concepts.
A number-of-MTWs approach is a somewhat arbitrary force-sizing de-
vice. Calculations of  forces needed to fight MTWs actually depend on a wide
variety of  background assumptions about the shape of  possible future inter-
ventions and combat. Examples of  assumptions and planning estimates used
in developing an MTW yardstick include: acceptable levels of  friendly casu-
alties; size and capabilities of enemy forces; the combat model used; accept-
able duration of the fighting; ability to trade space for time on the battlefield;
number and size of  operations underway elsewhere in the world; acceptable
level of  strategic reserves; the level of  destruction and civilian casualties that
may be inflicted on the enemy; and acceptable overall “risk” in conducting
the war. Varying these and other assumptions can produce widely different
results in calculating service “requirements” and ultimately the types and
numbers of  forces available to joint force commanders.
Rather than focus on fixed MTW forces, the ability to put together and
jointly operate varying force packages tailored to specific circumstances should
be improved and quickened.
Directions for Transformation
The end of  the Cold War reduced the requirement to permanently forward
deploy heavy military forces and their supporting structures. It also removed
the always loose discipline over international relations that was part of  the
bipolar world, allowing the re-emergence of  global societal ills such as pov-
erty, sickness, urbanization, environmental degradation, competition for natu-
ral resources, and cultural divisions that spawn conflict. The first line of  of-
fense against these problems is economic development and diplomacy. The
military’s contribution, which should be reflected in unit structure, training,
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and doctrine, is to provide forces that can establish (or re-establish) general
security in a region so that non-military international and even U.S. national
agencies can aid indigenous governments to reclaim legitimate power.
To effectively provide such forces for the disordered new world, the mili-
tary should more fully assume the transformation initiative. This means im-
proving the ability of  U.S. forces to act and, when necessary, to fight employ-
ing a combination of  advanced third- and fourth-generation warfare against
opponents who are structured and trained primarily for second- or early third-
generation warfare.
Structuring and training itself  for advanced third- and fourth-generation
warfare does not mean that the U.S. military will be unable to defend the
nation against more substantial military forces. The whole point of  the trans-
formation is a realignment and reorientation of  combat power that is more
readily adaptable to unfolding scenarios but with emphasis on disrupting evolv-
ing scenarios early in their development – perhaps even before hostilities be-
gin. With this as a principal focus, the unduly narrow definition of  the
military’s raison d’etre – “to fight and win the nation’s wars” – assumes an
inherently broader range of  capabilities than in the 20th century.
An alternative strategy that tries to respond to new generations of  warfare,
including political and economic considerations, is discussed next.
A Proposed 21st Century Security Strategy
The strategy proposed here consists of  several different but related elements
that apply to specific types of  threats. The common themes that run through
the different elements are brought together here to suggest a cohesive overall
strategy. Since actual threat scenarios are unlikely to feature a single clearly
defined threat, it is appropriate that the varied elements of  strategy are in-
deed mutually reinforcing. In combination they should help reduce the growth
of  threats, assist in defeating those that become realized, and help move the
world toward a more desirable state in 2025. The following chart lists the
overarching elements of  the strategy.
The proposed strategy echoes the “Shape” element of the recent official
“Shape, Respond, Prepare” approach in strongly endorsing military engage-
ment around the world, but emphasizes more the potential contributions of
non-military national security tools and of  allied or partner forces if  and when
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their capabilities are improved. The proposed strategy also calls for “Prepar-
ing” for the possibility of  a future superpower challenge, but emphasizes the
strategic breathing space the United States is likely to enjoy in the medium
term and the need to improve capabilities for the operations the military is
and should be called upon to perform in the immediate future.
More detail on common elements of  the proposed strategy follows. “Na-
tional security strategy” includes the diplomatic, economic, informational,
“BROADEN, INTEGRATE, QUICKEN”: A PROPOSED STRATEGY
• Broaden national security tools to include stronger political,
economic, informational, and social components. Recognize the
second- and third-order consequences of  military actions in
political and grand strategic arenas.
• Integrate with allies and partners to collectively engage with
areas of  conflict, head off  conflict if  possible, and jointly
intervene if  not. Work with them to transform their militaries
and to improve joint, multinational capabilities.
• Quicken military forces in order to refocus them on smaller-
scale contingencies in which they are likely to face asymmetric
or fourth-generation warfare. Improve their mobility, agility,
flexibility, and strategy and decision-making cycles.
and social components of  security as well as the military component. Military
strategy focuses on the military component of  national security.
Elements of  a National Security Strategy
• Increase use of  the diplomatic, economic, informational, and social com-
ponents of  national security to identify and prevent conflicts before
they explode into violence.
• Avoid generating major threats. Potential threats against the United
States are not fixed – U.S. actions can increase or decrease them.
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• Focus on preserving positive relations with Russia and China, paying
particular attention to how U.S. actions affect politics in those countries.
• Recognize and respond to a perception in the Islamic world of  conflict
with the United States. Avoid “drive-by” cruise missile or bombing
attacks. Be aware of  the potential political costs of  basing U.S. forces in
the Middle East.
• Recognize the foreign perception of the United States as a global bully, and
then shape foreign and military policy so as to minimize that perception.
• Work more with allies and other nations on common problems and in mili-
tary interventions, giving them substantial and, in some cases, leading roles.
• Act to correct the foreign perception of  hypocrisy on the issue of  weap-
ons of  mass destruction, which arises out of  U.S. maintenance of  a vast
nuclear arsenal of  its own while striving to halt proliferation of  nuclear,
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons elsewhere. Re-energize
serious nuclear arms reduction efforts to help delegitimize proliferation.
• Conduct military operations in carefully selected humanitarian or peace
enforcement cases even where the United States may not have a vital
national interest. The United States can and should play a useful role in
ameliorating the worst cases of  violence, destruction, and abuse in civil
wars, “failed states,” and similar situations.
Elements of  a Military Strategy
• To replace the ongoing Cold War threat-based force structure model,
use a tripartite model: a “threat-based” approach to force sizing and
structure for certain military challenges; a “capabilities-based” approach
for others; and an “industrial-based” approach for long-term challenges.
For militarily-quantifiable challenges – nuclear war and conventional
theater war – size the force according to the threat. For hard-to-quan-
tify challenges – terrorism at home and abroad and smaller-scale con-
tingencies such as peacekeeping – create a range of capabilities that
enable flexible responses. For a potential future peer challenge, pre-
serve robust industrial and technological capabilities.
• Make use of, and improve, allied military capabilities and conduct mili-
tary operations multinationally.
• Make U.S. forces more “expeditionary.” Adust forward deployment by
reducing Cold War heavy, permanently-deployed forces and increasing
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short-term deployments, exercises, training, military-to-military con-
tacts, and engagement with foreign militaries.
• Prepare to conduct the equivalent of  one major theater war at a time
along with smaller-scale contingencies, but prepare to use adjustable
force packages so as to maintain flexibility and options.
• Transform some of the active heavy armored forces into forces more suited
to smaller-scale contingencies. Prepare to work more with other nations
and non-governmental or international organizations in such contingen-
cies. Deal with chronic transnational problems such as drug trafficking,
illegal migration, and crime by integrating operations better with U.S.
civilian agencies whose primary missions and core competencies are in
these areas. Preserve a heavy capability primarily in the reserves.
• Boost the human intelligence capabilities that improve knowledge and
understanding of  foreign cultures and governments.
• Improve ability to conduct new asymmetric, maneuver, or third/fourth-
generation warfare by creating agile and flexible forces. Reform per-
sonnel and promotion policies to better support agile and flexible lead-
ers. Establish doctrine suitable for maneuver warfare and train with it.
Strengthen joint capabilities by expanding the role of  war-fighting com-
manders and the Joint Staff  in planning, budgeting, and procurement.
• Focus transformation and funding on agile forces such as: light- and me-
dium-weight Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations; littoral Navy; lift,
close air support, and interdiction Air Force; and defensive nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical forces and equipment. Help fund the re-orientation
with moderate reductions in the forces that are already overwhelmingly
dominant in force-on-force combat such as: heavy active Army, open-ocean
Navy, nuclear and air superiority Air Force, and offensive nuclear forces.
• Fund cooperative destruction or safeguarding of  Russian nuclear weap-
ons and materials.
• Maintain a long-term ability to respond to the potential emergence of  a
superpower challenge by preserving a robust defense industrial base.
Restore competition to the industry. Continue research and develop-
ment on complex weapons, but favor prototyping over large production
runs. Where possible, upgrade existing weapon platforms with new
software, avionics, electronics, and other subsystems rather than pro-
duce entirely new platforms.
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Two elements of  the strategy deserve special discussion – the proposed role
of  partners and allies, and forward engagement.
Allies – Can’t Live With Them, Can’t Live Without Them
A Prescription for Greater Allied Cooperation
A pivotal component of  the strategy proposed here is to join more with part-
ners and allies in concerted military, political, and economic action. For this
to happen in the military sphere, allies will have to improve their military
capabilities and be more politically ready to intervene than they were in the
second half  of  the 20th century. (And the United States will have to alter its
equipment and doctrine to allow for greater interoperability with allies.) One
of  the key assumptions (p. 28) underlying the strategy is that the conditions
exist that would allow allies to increase their military capabilities and political
will to take action. Whether or not it will happen is a more open question.
Early signs have been both positive and negative. As discussed below, Eu-
rope is moving ahead with plans to create a capable intervention force. Progress
is uneven, but is perhaps all the more revealing given that the U.S. response
ranged from distinctly unenthusiastic to actively hostile.
Whether allied defense budgets are going up or down has also been taken as
a measure of  prospects for increased allied efforts. But budgets do not indicate
the capabilities of  transformed militaries – it is possible, and it is expected by
this report, that transformed forces will cost less, at least in the near term, than
legacy Cold War forces such as the large conscript armies of  Europe designed
to repel a Warsaw Pact attack. More important than budget level is what the
money is being spent on, and it is clear that numerous allies are allocating re-
sources to boost their intervention or self-defense capabilities.
Regardless of  today’s forecasts on allies, this report’s call for allies and the
United States to develop the military capabilities and political will to conduct
joint operations more effectively is not descriptive of  the future as it looks
now, but prescriptive. The proposal is that the United States embrace a new
strategy featuring increased allied and coalition cooperation. With such a re-
orientation, and hence strong U.S. encouragement for, and participation in,
military transformation among allies and at home, it becomes more imagin-
able that allies and partners will undertake substantially greater responsibili-
ties. The challenges will be great, the task is ambitious, and it may take the
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entire quarter century covered by this report, but that is why a high level of
focus and attention is proposed here for U.S. strategy in this key area.
Increased cooperation does not always mean the commitment of  U.S. troops.
In many cases it will be desirable for the United States not to jointly conduct
military operations with other nations, but to help improve partners’ capa-
bilities so that they can act by themselves. The potential for other nations to
act or intervene in their own regions so that the United States does not have to
is still insufficiently tapped. A problem with several recent multinational or
U.N. interventions is that the military forces have not been adequately pre-
pared for the task and procedures for operating jointly have not been smooth.
A much greater U.S. effort in training, equipping, and supporting of  re-
gional peacekeeping forces, and in helping establish effective joint procedures,
could go a long way towards improving their success rate. If, for example, the
regional troops that intervened after conflict broke out in Sierra Leone again
in 1999 had been better trained, the results might have been much better.
The small African Crisis Response Initiative (see p. 98 ) is a first step towards
what an greatly expanded program might look like.
If, for whatever reasons, allies or partners are politically, financially, or
militarily unable or unwilling to play a greater role, then the approach taken
here would have to be substantially revised.
Gaining or Losing Allies?
George Washington, in his Farewell Address at the end of  his second term as
President, cautioned the nation against entangling alliances.23
Yet today the United States is party to six collective defense treaties, all of
which were signed between 1947 and 1960.24
The departure from America’s 170-year tradition was prompted by the
vastly changed circumstances following World War II. Alone among the major
powers, the United States was the only one to have escaped territorial, popu-
lation, and economic devastation. And although the mighty military machine
constructed for the war was quickly disassembled, the United States remained
a potent military force by virtue of  its (initially) sole possession of  atomic
weapons.
Firmly anchored economically and militarily, America nonetheless con-
fronted a hostile and militarily potent Soviet Union which quickly brought
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East European nations under its dominion. To prevent all of  continental Eu-
rope from being swallowed, the United States developed a massive economic
assistance package complemented by its first defensive military alliance out-
side the Western hemisphere. With containment of  communistic totalitari-
anism as the guiding principle of  American foreign policy, other multina-
tional and bilateral pacts followed. Together they formed a loose ring around
the USSR and – after 1949 – the People’s Republic of  China.
In 1989-1991 the world changed again with the collapse of  the USSR and
the formation of  16 independent states from its ashes. With the conventional
military threat gone, underlying but previously muted divergent interests and
perceptions of  how to deal with emerging crises became apparent. In Europe,
what in 1966 had been written off  as French pique over America’s political
and military dominance of  NATO, resurfaced in European resistance to
American pressure to assume more of the cost of defense (burdensharing)
without a concomitant increased voice in decision-making. Indeed, it could
be argued that Europeans, drawing on their post-World War II experience,
see economic development and assistance rather than political-military power
as the primary avenue for ameliorating the causes of  conflict.
Moreover, the Europeans declined to fall in line with the U.S. view of
“rogue states.” Europeans had gone to war in the Gulf  with the Americans,
but they do not see themselves as threatened by “Islamic fundamentalist ter-
rorists” as does the United States.25
If  a fundamental element of  grand strategy is to attract allies to one’s side
while limiting allies that an opponent might have, the U.S. effort could use
improvement. As noted earlier, the divergence in non-European threat per-
ceptions was offset initially by Europe’s concern about events in the former
Yugoslavia, on NATO’s doorstep. When diplomacy failed and military inter-
vention became necessary first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, Europe was
embarrassed by its glaring inadequacies. Hence its dual response, the De-
fense Capabilities Initiative within NATO, supported by the United States;
and the Common European Security and Defense Policy, centered on the
European Union and the European Rapid Reaction Force.
Europe’s interest in taking on a greater role may find greater receptivity by
the Bush administration which wants to scale back long-term U.S. military
contingency deployments.26  But the Bush administration appears unenthusi-
astic, as was the Clinton administration, about the EU initiative. Yet if  the
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Europeans can establish the proposed force, it would allow the Pentagon to
remove another division from Europe27  in addition to the division and corps
headquarters that are no longer needed there with the end of  the heavy force-
on-force threat. Although the European force has less armor than the U.S.
divisions currently in Europe, those divisions have only engaged in peace-
keeping and SSCs since the end of  the Gulf  War. In terms of  naval forces, the
four larger European aircraft carriers (Britain will have two and France and
Italy one each) should be sufficient to relieve the U.S. Navy of  any need to
station a carrier in the Mediterranean Sea.
Elsewhere the United States is encountering subtle – and sometimes not so
subtle – resistance to its policies and pronouncements. The sanctions regime
against Iraq has been crumbling for years, and even the new proposal by Sec-
retary of  State Colin Powell to redirect the main effort to stopping illegal oil
exports and military-related imports has gained only lukewarm support. Most
of  the GCC states have also re-established diplomatic ties with Iran, which
the United States still refuses to do – although it is not certain that Iran is
ready for a new bilateral relationship either.
In Asia, the other area where the United States has numerous interests,
America’s allies were unsettled by the handling of  the standoff  over the re-
turn of  the U.S. Navy EP-3E crew and plane involved in the April 1, 2001
collision with the Chinese F-8 fighter. Just three weeks earlier, President Bush
had opened a policy gap with South Korea over President Kim Dae Jung’s
“sunshine” policy toward the North, prompting the European Union to an-
nounce a mission of  its own to sustain the momentum toward peace between
the two Koreas.28  Whether and to what extent the policy gap with South Ko-
rea will affect U.S.-South Korean military relations remains to be seen. Even
Japan seems to be wearying of  the U.S. presence (47,000 personnel) and the
money it pays to support the American bases.29
One major impediment that stands in the way of more cooperation is the
profound reluctance of presidents and congresses to permit operational control
(as opposed to command) of U.S. forces to non-American military commanders.
This threatens to become another divisive issue in future multinational opera-
tions particularly when allied nations provide the bulk of the forces involved.
One premise that the United States should avoid with respect to its allies
and friends is “exceptionalism,” which implies a right to lead. Leadership is a
status that must be earned and re-earned; it cannot come solely from military
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preponderance or stationing the most troops in a region. No nation, espe-
cially one that eschews military conquest, can retain its leadership unless it
engages the rest of  the world across the spectrum of  diplomatic, economic,
and environmental activities. In this regard, U.S. positions of  the last few
years – rejection of  the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the Senate, oppo-
sition to creation of  an International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), dis-
avowal of  the Kyoto Agreement on the environment, opposition to a pro-
posed convention regulating the international small arms trade – suggest a
growing disposition for the United States to disengage from efforts by nations
collectively to create a more stable and predictable world in which the rule of
law prevails. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States may
well lay claim to a leadership role, but unless others are willing to follow con-
sistently, such “leadership” ends up an aggregate of  one.
Forward Engagement and Forward Deployment
An Expeditionary Military
“One if  by land, two if  by sea.”
When the signal came, Paul Revere, William Dawes, and Dr. Samuel Prescott
rode to Concord to alert the militia to gather to oppose the British.30  This
rallying to the colors, which epitomized the tradition of  colonial times, also
began the American tradition of  structuring the military services as reactive,
mobilization-based expeditionary forces that were “to get there” rather than
“be there” when the nation was threatened.
In the years immediately following the end of  the War for Independence,
the Army was reduced to less than a hundred men. The state militias were
expected to deal with Native Americans who caused “trouble” on the fron-
tier. Two years after the end of  the war, with the sale of  the Alliance, the
Continental Navy ceased to exist – a condition that lasted for nine years until
the depredations of  the Barbary pirates and rekindled war in Europe prompted
the new federal government to build six heavy frigates.31
Indeed, other than the War of  1812, virtually all threats to the United
States in its first one hundred years originated in North America itself. The
only “expeditionary” efforts by the Americans were the abortive thrust into
Canada during the War of  1812 and the Mexican War some 30 years later.
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For the most part, the Navy existed to protect American commerce, not to
take on the major European powers. The slowness of  ocean transit and the
distances to be traversed to reach the Americas provided the necessary space-
time for mobilization and movement to meet any threat.
The sciences of  propulsion and flight changed the calculus. As the 20th
century opened and the United States assumed a more central role in world
politics, it became apparent that military defense would increasingly have to
include an ability to deploy credible combat power beyond the nation’s shores
if  circumstances warranted. Because of  the lingering distrust of  a large standing
army, this mission fell to the Navy, which in any event would have to keep
open the sea lines of  communication and move a land force to any theater of
war. Such had been the case during the Spanish-American War and would be
the case in the wars of  the 20th century. Confederate Maj.-Gen. Nathan Bedford
Forrest’s dictum – “Get there first with the most” – ruled.
But in an age when space-time has been compressed to hours (even minutes
for intercontinental ballistic missiles), are large, permanently forward-stationed
forces and clockwork deployment of  military power the best and most cost-
effective responses if  and when threats to U.S. and world interests arise?
Adjusting Forward Deployment to Serve Forward Engagement
Stationing U.S. forces permanently in foreign areas serves the goals of  provid-
ing opportunities for peacetime military engagement with other nations, of  dem-
onstrating a willingness to fight for them, and of  providing additional options
for deploying forces to conflicts. Among other benefits, military engagement
provides valuable interaction, training, and relationship-building with poten-
tial partners; indicates U.S. willingness to be involved in a region (including to
fight there); and provides an additional channel of  access to leaders.
The strategy proposed in this report strongly endorses U.S. military en-
gagement with other like-minded nations. The multilateral approach to de-
terring and responding to conflicts proposed here greatly benefits from prior
training with, exposure to, and contacts in other militaries. This approach
rejects isolationism and recognizes that an important component of  U.S. en-
gagement with the world is military engagement, alongside political, economic,
and social interaction. Some level of  military deployment provides an irre-
placeable signal of  U.S. interest in a region, partnership with it, and willing-
ness to expend resources and even blood in support of  it.
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There are, however, some drawbacks to forward deployment of  large, per-
manent forces, so the nature and size of  today’s forward deployment may
need adjustment. Being there “first with the most” firepower is a valid op-
tion, but it can have diplomatic and political costs as well as economic ones.
In some countries, particularly in Asia, residents of  towns and communities
near U.S. bases are pressing their national governments to cut back on mili-
tary training activities if  not the entire U.S. presence. Permanently stationed
forces also can be tempting targets for terrorists; at the very least, forward
stationing requires additional force protection measures.32
More broadly, a heavy military presence can feed the negative perception
of  the United States as a global policeman or worse, a global bully, building
up popular resentment and opposition to the United States and its policies.
The issue is particularly salient in the Middle East where it is easy to inflame
opinion against the United States and to add to the perception of  a U.S. con-
flict with Islam.
Can engagement, which this paper fully supports, be accomplished through
modified deployment and other, more cost-effective means that minimize the
political and social problems and allow better use of  available funds? Forward
deployment can take many shapes and forms. It is possible that the benefits
of  engagement can be gained with a less heavy footprint.
The strategy of  this paper suggests phasing out the permanent deploy-
ment of  much of  the remaining large, heavy ground forces in Europe, Japan,
and possibly Korea depending on events, and being ready to adjust other
deployments that have outlived their usefulness. It does not call for a with-
drawal of  all forces from foreign countries nor for a termination of  military
engagement, exercises, training, and cooperation with other nations. And it
does not propose closing access to bases in foreign countries. Rather it calls
for beefing up facilities where necessary to improve U.S. ability to deploy
forces. If  it becomes necessary to redeploy large permanent forces in the fu-
ture, these facilities could again serve as the infrastructure foundation for a
long-term presence. Regional U.S. commanders in chief  (CINCs) have ap-
propriately suggested that the theoretical commitment in national security
strategy to military engagement and “Shaping” has not been matched by a
corresponding commitment of  resources. This report endorses the sugges-
tion that the full potential for engagement can only be realized with better
strategic planning and funding to support it.
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This paper takes the view that short-term, rotational deployments, plus
increased military-to-military contacts and training can serve many of  the
same goals as large permanent forces in an extensive base infrastructure, and
that irregular, as opposed to rote, exercises can establish effective military-to-
military relationships. It holds that a more flexible and agile form of  forward
deployment can reduce the political and other costs of  the old version.
Precipitous withdrawal is neither called for nor being called for by allies –
yet. Any contemplated reductions should be coordinated with allies before
actions are initiated, and usually phased withdrawals – unless other demands
are made by host nations – should be the rule. Bringing selected forces back
to the United States, coupled with regular combined force exercises and ape-
riodic deployments of  military units, will allow the United States to more
centrally position forces to respond to emerging contingencies without being
seen as isolationist.
An alternative view is that adjusting forward deployment and pulling back
some forces would send the wrong signals about U.S. involvement in a region,
would reduce U.S. influence and leadership, and would excessively limit de-
ployment options. This view holds that rotational deployments cannot be
equivalent to permanent deployments, and that smart enemies will find “anti-
access” means to prevent deployment and keep the United States out, to the
extent that it is not there already. It also suggests that more and more coun-
tries will want U.S. forces to be stationed there, as a signal that the United
States intends to defend them.
Although this report does not propose ending forward engagement and
deployment, rather adjusting it, the study’s willingness to reduce permanent
forward deployment can be traced to a greater sensitivity to the potential for
negative second- and third-order effects of  military policies in the broader
national security arena – particularly on global perceptions of  the United States
as a hegemon, which may affect willingness to act in concert with the United
States in a multitude of  fora. This must be balanced with positive perceptions
of  the United States as a stabilizing force, but the report assesses a dangerous
potential for popular anti-U.S. feelings, catalyzed by a large and high-profile
presence, to explode in damaging ways.
This assessment is concerned that enthusiasm in governments of  foreign
nations for major U.S. deployments and implied defense commitment may
not be as widely shared by their people. The lack of  consensus on the threats
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to the interests of  the United States and its allies, together with growing aware-
ness of  indigenous populations to pollution, crimes, and costs associated with
the American presence, suggests that the welcome for U.S. forces may be
uncertain in the years ahead. In addition, this strategy suggests that while
engagement is valuable, the United States must be careful about implied de-
fense commitments and not signal a willingness to conduct a war where the
nation is really not willing to do so, nor overcommit to too many contingen-
cies in too many places.
Being There or Being Able to Get There
Some also argue that large forward deployments of  heavy forces improves ability
to intervene in a region. Being deployed already might seem the ultimate way to
reduce deployment delays (the space-time interval) to zero. But forces perma-
nently deployed forward seem rarely to be in the right place to counter a rapidly
emerging conflict or, after lengthy bed-down, be agile enough to respond quickly.
The issue of  “deployed” versus “deployable” recently came up concretely
in the debate between the director of  the strategy panel for Secretary Rumsfeld’s
defense review, Andrew Marshall, and the CINC of  the U.S. Pacific Com-
mand, Adm. Dennis Blair. Marshall reportedly has argued that forward de-
ployed forces in Asia may be increasingly vulnerable, particularly to Chinese
ballistic missiles, weapons of  mass destruction, and other forces. Hence long-
range weapons and forces should substitute to some extent for the forward
deployed forces.33  Adm. Blair denies that China has a robust ability to attack
or scare off  forward deployed U.S. forces, and puts more value on the rela-
tionships facilitated by forward basing and deployment.34
The disagreement over vulnerability may be explained in part by the time
frame – Marshall may be looking far ahead, as he is known to do. Still, the
strategy advocated in this study attempts to use elements of  each approach,
since it both encourages working with friends or potential friends in a region
and favors moderate reductions in permanent forward-basing. Basing forces
in the United States can provide strategic flexibility, lower political costs in
host nations, and, whether the level of  exposure is potentially crippling or
not, reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks in case of  a war. “Being able to
get there” as opposed to “being there” also introduces an added opportunity
to reflect before committing forces or firing shots. It also allows time for con-
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sultation with allies and friendly nations whose interests parallel those of  the
United States and whose participation would add international legitimacy to
any contemplated military action. But this study acknowledges Adm. Blair’s
assessment of  the benefits, for alliance building and positive relations with
China and other countries, of  military engagement with countries in the re-
gion, and certainly does not endorse the concept of  winning primarily through
long-range air power or other stand-off  high-tech weaponry.
An option that needs serious consideration, given the changed post-Cold
War world, is whether more forces ought to be centrally stationed so they can
swing east or west as necessary. In response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait and threat to Saudi Arabia, troops were taken from Europe, but the
bulk came from the United States. After the fighting ended, a corps head-
quarters and two divisions were withdrawn from Europe (a similar sized force
remained). The Army found it very difficult to deploy heavy forces to the
Balkans from Europe for the Kosovo campaign against forces of  the former
Yugoslavia and the Army forces were not used in combat. Forward deploy-
ment might be judged as not providing any benefit in the latter case.
Increasing U.S. Capability to Deploy Forces
Credible, deployable forces can deter a potential adversary from initiating
conflict. Naval forces have an inherent credibility as they are always armed.
Credibility in terms of  ground and air forces includes at least four elements:
a well-trained, balanced combat force in-being; a responsive combination of
rapid sea and air transport that can move or accompany the combat force;
adequate resources to sustain the force (personnel, supplies and equipment,
intelligence, transport); and the understanding that the United States, with
allies or ad hoc coalitions whenever possible, is willing to act. In some cases,
smaller sized units can provide a similar deterrent as larger units to would-be
aggressors – the leaders are deterred by the presence of  U.S. forces, rather
than by the specific size of the units in question.
Naval vessels carry their combat load with them. The reach of  modern
aircraft permits round-trip flights from and back to the continental United
States if  necessary, although en route (and in-theater or even in-country) ac-
cess is desirable. The re-organization of  armored land forces into lighter-
weight, more agile units with less oversized equipment lessens the strain on
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air transport engaged in deploying units to and sustaining them in the area of
potential combat.35
But real transformation goes well beyond new or different equipment that
makes deployment more timely. The key is to take the capabilities each ser-
vice possesses and successfully integrate them to produce a joint structure
that, by capitalizing on service strengths, accentuates the first part of  Forrest’s
admonition by diminishing the space-time interval necessary to take effective
military action.
Keyed by intelligence, air forces originating from the United States and
transiting naval groups can contribute responses to unfolding events. With
adequate fast sea- and airlift, ground forces centrally stationed in the United
States can be deployed to reinforce the capabilities of  the other services to
preclude a “one-dimensional” response such as that in Kosovo.
If  U.S. forces are to increase their deployment capabilities from the United
States, an issue that will need much more examination is the possibility of
“anti-access” attacks within the United States to prevent or hinder deploy-
ment, such as sabotage of  rail lines serving military bases. An analysis of  the
level of  vulnerability and threat is beyond the scope of  this paper, but the
strategy acknowledges that, as part of  an effort to increase and improve U.S.
deployment capabilities, domestic anti-access attacks will have to be addressed.
Shaping the Force
During the Cold War, the size and shape of  U.S. forces were determined by a
calculation of  the threat – embodied in the nuclear and conventional forces of
the Soviet Union – and what was necessary to counter the threat with an
acceptable degree of  risk of  miscalculation. In theory, the process was itera-
tive, beginning with a force size and force structure that were essentially un-
constrained by budget or other resource caps.
Of course, the real world is hardly ever unconstrained, and as caps on avail-
able personnel, installations, industrial and natural resources, and budgets were
applied, trade-offs became necessary. But the lack of  strong centralized mili-
tary authority at the Joint Staff  level – most critically budget authority – meant
that each of  the services constantly strove to limit the loss of  any of its missions
(and therefore its share of the budget), with seemingly little regard for the capa-
bilities of  the other services to contribute to mission accomplishment
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Threat as the Force-Shaper
Threat is a combination of  perceived capabilities and intentions. Capabilities
are generally measurable. The capabilities part of  threat determination is of-
ten referred to as bean-counting – counting a potential opponent’s people and
equipment, noting where units are located, how good the supporting trans-
port system is (which could limit the speed of  movement of  units and their
resupply rate), etc. The United States traditionally has used a threat-based
strategy. Under this strategy, calculations of  the capabilities of  the “threat”
force – the Soviet Union primarily during the Cold War – form the baseline
for calculations about the size and structure requirements for the U.S. forces.
The need to respond to a perceived threat drives the evolution of  friendly
force capabilities. In terms of  the development of  weapons systems, these can
be either a “symmetrical” mirror-image – e.g., tank against tank – or asym-
metrical – e.g., an anti-tank missile against a tank. Whichever response is
selected, its effectiveness will depend on the level of  training and experience
of the operators with the equipment and the ability of commanders to em-
ploy forces (people and equipment) effectively against an opponent.
Even when not measurable, capabilities may be estimated. Traditionally U.S.
Air Force officials talk about “generations” when evaluating the performance
characteristics of  airplanes. (For example, the F-15 Eagle might be classified as
a fourth-generation fighter.) But the equipment’s real capability can only be
estimated because effectiveness is also dependent on such factors as the training
proficiency of  the operator and the manner in which a weapon system contrib-
utes (or fails to contribute) to achieving the overall military objective.
The length and the relative stability of  the Cold War permitted U.S. intel-
ligence agencies to focus on the Soviets and to develop detailed assessments
of  the strength, organization, tactics, deployment patterns, and readiness con-
dition of  the U.S.S.R.’s nuclear and conventional forces. But with the collapse
of  the Soviet Union this sharp focus was lost, as was the rationale for the
then-existing U.S. force structure, although the Pentagon did not yet trust
that the Russian threat had gone away, as they continued to judge the threat
on perceived capabilities such as the size of  the force rather than intentions.
Other potential threats – the “rogue” nations – that the Pentagon increas-
ingly focused on were not on the same military scale as the Soviet Union. Even
in combination they were spending far less on their militaries than the United
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States, which had been rebuilding and modernizing its armed forces in the tra-
ditional Cold War posture. Thus, in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf  War, when the
Iraqis attempted to oppose U.S. strength head-on, they were overmatched. Psy-
chologically, the overwhelming U.S. victory reinforced pre-war Pentagon pro-
jections of  the size and shape of  the force that would be needed to ensure a
decisive win in a classic, symmetrical force-on-force confrontation.36
Capabilities as the Force-Shaper
Another approach to developing and sizing forces and force structure is to
concentrate on required (and desired) friendly force capabilities regardless –
and in some instances even in the absence – of  a perceived direct threat. This
approach is illustrated by the “flexible response” or “spectrum of  conflict”
concept, which holds that the United States must be capable of  dealing with
any military challenge from low-level guerrilla/insurgency action through
high-intensity/ high technology conventional warfare, to nuclear war.
Most often, this approach reflects a hedging or “insurance policy” approach
to force structuring. The two MTW construct that has prevailed since the
Cold War is an example.37  But developing capabilities across the full spec-
trum of  conflict is costly. On the other hand, selected capabilities that pro-
vide a distinct advantage and are useful across many scenarios (e.g., special
operations units) might well be cost-effective, particularly if  pursued in con-
junction with allied contributions in more traditional units.
Besides the potential for high costs, another weakness of  the capabilities-
based structure is that it will always be subject to counteraction. Inherently,
this force-shaping approach attempts to be prophetic: to look ahead at what
others might do and then pre-empt them by developing the capability first or
on a larger scale. Obviously, however, this can lead to a vicious circle: U.S.
predictions about a potential enemy lead to development of  certain U.S. ca-
pabilities, which in turn lead opponents to choose other approaches or new
developments to counter U.S. plans. Opponents will adapt their actions to
counter the changed world presented to them, which in turn will demand
new prophecies and new procurement by the Pentagon.
A Tripartite Approach to 21st Century Military Force Structure
As the world has changed over the last 10 years, some challenges to U.S. security
have faded, new types and sources have emerged from the shadows, and some old
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ones remain. Where military considerations are in play, this new amalgam pre-
sents the opportunity to re-examine and reformulate the U.S. response. In the
view of this study, the nature and extent of actual and probable threats in them-
selves are insufficient to justify the current force size and force structure. Simi-
larly, the continuous development spiral engendered by sole reliance on a force-
capability approach is too costly. A possible resolution is to more selectively target
threat-based and capabilities-based responses against actual or probable threats
in the near (Future Years Defense Plan) and medium (out to 2015) time frame,
and to orient the long-term (out to 2025-2030) response to a continued evolution
of the defense industrial base. (See p. 135 for a discussion of industry issues.)
Military challenges in the 21st century can be grouped into five areas: nuclear
war, major conventional theater war, terrorism at home and abroad, smaller-
scale contingencies ranging from peacekeeping to non-combatant evacuation
and humanitarian relief  support, and a new peer challenge. The first two are
prominent legacies of  the Cold War. Their scope is largely quantifiable in
terms of  numbers and effectiveness of  weapons involved. The third and fourth
are much less predictable, demanding different responses and different in-
tensity of  response. The fifth at this stage is unpredictable but considered
inevitable by many analysts. In addition, in the course of  responding to these
challenges, particularly in smaller-scale contingencies, the military will be
faced with transnational issues that are not clearly military challenges, such as
the drug trade, crime, immigration, and environmental conflicts.
The proposed alternative to solely relying on a threat-based or a capabili-
ties-based approach is to use each selectively depending on the type of  threat
and warfare in question.
• For militarily-quantifiable challenges – nuclear war and conventional
theater war – use a “threat-based” approach to force structure and size
the force according to the threat.
• For hard-to-quantify challenges – terrorism at home and abroad and
smaller-scale contingencies such as peacekeeping – use a “capabilities-
based” approach and create a range of force capabilities that enable
flexible responses.
• For a potential future peer challenge, preserve robust industrial and
technological capabilities.
What these approaches would look like are explored in more detail next.
58   |   Reforging the Sword
Strategies for Military Challenges
Threat-Based Responses for Nuclear War
Without question, the most dire threat to the survival of  the United States
and its way of  life remains nuclear war, particularly with a weakened and
chaotic Russia. In the near term, however, the threat of  deliberate nuclear
war, as opposed to an accident, is not very high.
The various strategic arms control agreements negotiated over the course
of  the Cold War cut the number of  strategic arsenals of  each superpower to
approximately 6,000 warheads. Stricter limits are in place in the still unratified
START II agreement to bring warheads down to 3,000-3,500 each and elimi-
nate Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).38  Even lower totals
have been proposed for START III (2,000-2,500 warheads) and the Rus-
sians, beset by economic woes, have proposed going down to as few as 1,000
strategic warheads. Even at that level, each side would have more than enough
weapons to preserve the stability of  deterrence.
How often this process can be implemented is a policy question (as is the
question of  no-first use). However, there is undoubtedly a minimum number
below which one or both military establishments would not wish to go with-
out engaging the other six nuclear weapons states in reductions. Equally chal-
lenging are questions surrounding the nuclear posture – whether any of  the
force should be on hair-trigger alert, and the distribution of  warheads among
bombers, land-based missiles, and submarines. (Obviously, the best of  all
possible worlds is one with no nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons.)
But whatever the size and complexion of  nuclear arsenals, the threat level
is calculable – as is the distribution and costs of  today’s U.S. nuclear force.
Therefore, a threat-based response is an appropriate approach for devising a
future U.S. nuclear strategy, and force structure.
Strategies to Reduce the Threat of  Nuclear War
In large measure, the actual threat level over the mid-term will depend on
what the United States does vis-a-vis its strategic relations with Russia (re-
garding the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and National Missile Defense),
China, (National Missile Defense), and North Korea (continuation of  the
Clinton administration engagement policy).39  Over the long-term the size of
the nuclear threat will depend on the implementation by the original five
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nuclear weapon states of  their unconditional promises under the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles. A strategy of  reviving
moribund nuclear arms control negotiations or pursuing new agreements could
reduce the number of  nuclear weapons, as well as help sustain or revive a
more positive international climate of  cooperation and trust.
An obvious broad U.S. national security strategy to reduce the threat of  a
non-accidental nuclear attack is to maintain positive relations with Russia
and China to the extent possible. Part of  this includes developing a more
sophisticated understanding of  how U.S. actions can be used by the more
hostile political factions within Russia and China to damage good relations.
Many observers and actors in Russia and China perceive U.S. policies at best
as humiliating and meddling, and at worst as aggressive and expansionist.
This also is the case in many of the so-called rogue states and among non-
state actors – although it is arguable that some states pursuing nuclear and
other weapons of  mass destruction are driven more by regional concerns than
by U.S. policies. In any event, a broad strategy would pay more attention to
how U.S. actions are perceived abroad.
Actions that must be considered carefully include expanding NATO, build-
ing National Missile Defense (NMD), and arming Taiwan with high-tech-
nology weapons. Other U.S. actions that raise hackles in Russia and China are
continuing Cold War-type intelligence gathering operations, such as shad-
owing Russian naval vessels with U.S. submarines (which was happening when
the Kursk sank), and frequent intelligence-gathering flights close to Chinese
borders (which was the mission of  the U.S. EP-3E that collided with a Chi-
nese F-8 and had to land in China in April 2001). While all of  these may be
ultimately justified as in U.S. interests, more high-level thought needs to go
into how to shape the best possible response from Russia and China – especially
as regards their nuclear arsenals.
Another key strategy to reduce the threat of  nuclear war would be to con-
tinue and expand U.S. funding of  Russian nuclear weapon and nuclear mate-
rial destruction, disposal, and safeguarding. Funds spent on such programs
have a more direct effect on reducing numbers of  potentially opposing nuclear
weapons, and hence nuclear weapon threats, than funds put into either U.S.
offensive nuclear weapons-building or missile defenses. Despite the recom-
mendations of  a blue ribbon commission to triple such funding, in March
2001 the Bush administration proposed to cut the programs.40
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Threat-Based Responses for Major Conventional Theater War
The threat of  a major conventional war is also quantifiable to a great degree
by the straightforward process of  counting people, equipment, and stocks of
materiel held by allies and friends and by potential opponents. Therefore, a
threat-based strategy is an applicable response.
It is important when defining the threat that the quantitative measure of
counting “enemy” military assets is complemented by a qualitative overlay
that factors into the equation morale, training, interoperability, and the level
of  technology in equipment. At the same time, this assessment must be care-
ful to avoid the danger that the qualitative factors are accorded too much
weight. This happened in 1994 when the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  evaluated a
North Korean soldier as equally proficient in combat to an American and 25
percent more effective than a South Korean soldier.41  The same error was
made in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf  War in estimates of  the level of  disci-
pline and fighting capabilities of  Iraq’s conscripts.
The basis for the current MTW force structure is the Bottom-Up Review
(BUR) conducted at the beginning of  the Clinton administration (March-
August 1993). In terms of  strategy, the BUR eliminated the European-based
global war scenario of  the Cold War and substituted the idea of  regional
conflicts that would not, in the absence of  a rival superpower, evolve into a
world-wide conflagration.42  Reflecting this strategy change, the BUR took
the 1990-91 Base Force and made some additional adjustments. What it did
not change was the way the forces were organized and equipped (see U.S.
Force Structures chart on p. 62 for comparative figures).
But unlike the Base Force, the BUR could use an actual MTW as a template
to size U.S. forces – the 1991 war against Iraq.43  In fact, “The Report on the
Bottom-Up Review” posited an aggressor force that, except for tanks, equaled or
surpassed the forces of Saddam Hussein in 1990 (see Iraq Forces chart on p. 63).
But the MTW package that resulted as the goal of  U.S. forces exceeded the actual
U.S. contribution to the Gulf  War (see MTW Packages chart on p. 63), because
it overestimated the conventional “symmetric” forces of  potential adversaries. A
more realistic appraisal of the threat would significantly reduce this MTW force.
Strategies to Deal with Major Conventional Theater Wars
A key national security strategy to improve U.S. preparation for MTWs is
better alliance building and utilization of  allied capabilities. These need not
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be formal alliances – flexible “coalitions of  the willing” and other informal
partnerships are just as useful. This strategy would have diplomatic and eco-
nomic applications (building coalitions, deterring aggressors, and establish-
ing well-supported sanctions regimes), as well as military (making full use of
allied military capabilities).
Coalitions. A fundamental element of  grand strategy should be to attract al-
lies to one’s own side and to limit the ability of  an opponent to gain allies. As
a legacy of  the Cold War, the United States still takes a dominant – some
would say hegemonic – role in confronting troublesome nations. This global
police work can be perceived as domineering by friends and highly threaten-
ing by countries that are not yet opponents.
Greater attention to coalition-building through diplomacy can reduce the
chance of  MTWs breaking out in the first place. The abandonment of  the
United States’ sanctions policy against Iraq by friends and neutrals in late
2000 illustrates how not to become isolated from partners.
Allied Capabilities. The military side of  a strategy of  utilizing allies should be
enhanced. On the Korean peninsula, for example, the United States still plans
to use a large force to defend the South. A Korean war is one of  the pillars of
the current two MTW force structure. Yet booming South Korea has an
economy many times the size and quality of  the North, which has had diffi-
culty even feeding its people, and the South has twice the population. Clearly,
a willingness to utilize allied South Korean capabilities more fully would per-
mit a reduction in demands on U.S. forces. If  the strategy of  attracting friends
to one’s side were pursued fully, it would even be possible to imagine bringing
in the forces of  other nations to assist in deterring an attack on South Korea.
Number of  MTWs. A strategy emphasizing flexibility – the ability to be un-
predictable, keep options open, and pursue lines of  least resistance – suggests
the current adherence to fixed MTW-fighting forces should be replaced with
plans to use a variety of  different force sizes and compositions in an MTW.
This would provide some hedge in case of  a second simultaneous MTW,
since a second opponent could not be sure that a whole “MTW force” would
be tied up in the first MTW. More flexible packages would also provide less
telegraphing of  U.S. plans to opponents, and would increase options for using
forces in smaller-scale contingencies.
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U.S. FORCE STRUTURES
Cold War 1991 Base 1993 BUR Force 1997 QDR
Force Force (Projected 1999) Force
Active Divisions 18 12 10 10
Active ACR 3 2
Reserve Divisions 10 6+2 8 8
Reserve Brigades 20 15 15
Aircraft carriers 15 13 (12 A/C) 12 (11 A/C) 12 (11 A/C)
Attack Subs 93 45-55 50
Surface Ships 530 450 346 approx. 311
Active Fighter Wings 34 15+ 13 12+
Reserve Fighter Wings 11+ 7 8
Conventional Bombers 90 96
Active MEF 3 2.5 3 3
Reserve Divisions 1 1 1 1
Bombers 94 B-52; 20 B-2 71 B-52; 21 B-2
ICBMs 1,000 550 500 500
Ballistic Missile Subs 34 18 18 18
ACRONYMS: A/C: ACtive Component BUR: Bottom-Up Review. QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review.
ACR: Armored Cavalry Regiment. MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force.
SOURCES: National Security Strategy of  the United States, 1991. 1992 Joint Miliary Net Assessment, DOD.
Secretary of  Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom Up Review, October 1993, p. 28. Report of  the QDR,
May 1997 pp. 29-32. Annual Reports of  the Secretary of  Defense.
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IRAQ FORCES (1990) VS. PROJECTED ENEMY
MTW FORCES IN BUR
Major Equipment 1990 Iraq force BUR MTW Enemy Force
Tanks 5,000 up to 4,000
Armored Fighting Vehicles 5,000 up to 5,000
Combat aircraft 700 up to 1,000
Artillery 3,000 up to 3,000
Ballistic Missiles (theater) 600 up to 1,000
Ships 60 up to 200
ACRONYMS:  MTW: Major Theater War. BUR: Bottom-Up Review.
SOURCES: The Military Balance, 1990-1991 (pp. 90-91, 105-106). Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 13.
Conduct of  the Persian Gulf  War, Department of  Defense, April 1992 (pp. 9, 11, 97).
MTW PACKAGE VS. US GULF WAR DEPLOYED FORCE
One MTW Two MTW U.S. Gulf
Force Force War Force
 Active Divisions 8 10  7
 Reserve Division Equivalents 6
 Enhanced Reserve Brigades 15
 Special Forces Groups 2
 Armored Cavalry Regiments 2
 Carrier battlegroups 8 12 6
 Battleship battlegroups 2
 Active Fighter Wings 10 13 10 (total 28
 Reserve Fighter Wings 6 7 Squadrons)
 Bombers 3 Squadrons
Active Brigades 5 5 6
Reserve Divisions 1 1
ACRONYMS: MTW: Major Theater War.
SOURCES: 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment, August 21, 1992 p. 3-3. Report on the Bottom Up Review, p. 30.
Secretary of  Defense Report to the President and Congress, 1992.
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Type of  Forces. In addition to being more strategically mobile, forces should
be made more operationally and tactically mobile for MTW-type combat.
Rather than relying as much on mass for combat power, advances in informa-
tion/communications technology and in stand-off  weapon effectiveness should
allow U.S. forces to be more mobile, more dispersed, smaller, more lethal, and
faster. Testing and evaluation will need to be expanded and improved within
the services and the Department of  Defense to ensure that, to the extent this
redesign relies on complex technology, the hardware actually works and per-
forms the role desired.
Capabilities-Based Responses for Smaller-Scale Contingencies
Complementing the forces offsetting the quantifiable threats are forces that
would constitute the U.S. reaction/preventive forces for smaller-scale contin-
gencies (SSCs), which include humanitarian, peacekeeping, peace enforce-
ment, non-combatant evacuation, and presence operations. As it is difficult
to predict not only the threat that will arise in such contingencies, but also
their nature, a capabilities-based response is the best strategic approach.
This study takes the approach that the United States does have an interest
in intervening in largely – but certainly not solely – humanitarian SSCs in
situations such as civil wars, “failed states,” genocide, massacres, and ethnic
violence. This does not mean that the United States should intervene in every
situation, only in carefully selected and weighed cases. Some generic “capa-
bilities” that the United States might want to maintain include:
• Halt the outbreak of  civil violence in a foreign country early on.
• In combination with allies, establish civil security in a conflict-torn country.
• In combination with allies, end an outbreak of  genocide, halt ethnic
cleansing, or establish peace.
Examples of  military capabilities to achieve such aims include:
• Deploy an airborne battalion within one day and a brigade within two
days to halt an outbreak of  civil violence.
• Deploy a light division equivalent within four days to enforce peace in a
semi-hostile situation as part of  a multinational force, and support trans-
portation of  allied forces.
• Deploy a medium division equivalent in five days in a hostile forced-
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entry environment to halt a civil war, followed by two more U.S. divi-
sions and substantial allied forces.
These are just a few examples of  a variety of  capabilities and forces that
are deliberately not tailored to specific threats, but are kept flexible to be able
to respond quickly to unforeseen situations.
Strategies to Deal with Smaller-Scale Contingencies
The chief  national security strategy to handle SSCs would do more to prevent
them in the first place. Most broadly, this means assisting economic develop-
ment, promoting democracy, and conducting institution-building in pre-con-
flict situations. This would be helped by a substantial increase in economic
assistance funding. Since the United States often does not have the strongest
grasp of the political, social, and economic realities in areas of unrest, this
again calls for making better use of  the knowledge and skills of  local partners
or other countries that may have more experience in particular areas.
When prevention fails and an SSC is undertaken, more needs to be done to
make the case for the operation to the U.S. public. An administration has
considerable leeway to initiate interventions, but if  the operation does not go
well and casualties are taken, the political backlash can be swift and severe,
necessitating the cancelation of  the SSC. The most prominent example is the
intervention in Somalia in 1992-93, when, after a firefight and deaths in U.S.
forces, the operation was hastily terminated and Secretary of  Defense Les
Aspin resigned not long after.
If  the case for an intervention has not been made and accepted by the
public, successful conclusion of  an SSC is also likely to be questionable if
terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland occur. The solution is clearly to make
the case to the public for an intervention early on. The danger, which pre-
sumably motivated White House reluctance to do so in the 1990s, is that the
public may not accept the argument. This, however, is a good litmus test for
the intervention – if, with all the powers of  persuasion and the leeway the
presidency enjoys, the public still is doubtful about an intervention, it should
be taken as a sign that the intervention may not be soundly conceived, and
should be modified or not undertaken at all.
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A New Focus for the Military. The Defense Department primarily has viewed
the forces to conduct humanitarian and peacekeeping operations as “lesser in-
cluded” elements of  the forces to fight major conventional theater wars. The
large number and variety of  these smaller operations, however, call for a new
focus on these operations as primary missions for the military in their own
right, and suggest reshaping a portion of  the force away from intense force-on-
force combat and towards these more complex expeditionary missions.
Some suggest that these forces should constitute a special constabulary
organization structured along military lines. Such units would not have the
military’s heavy armament but would be more heavily armed than police.
(Alternatively, others suggest enlarging regular military police units.)
The experience of  units in SSC interventions in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia,
Rwanda-Congo, and Kosovo suggests that creating separate quasi-military
units may not be the best course. The very unpredictability of  SSCs, which
can turn from traditional peacekeeping to peace maintenance and even peace
enforcement, argue for forces that are trained to operate across most of the
spectrum of  conflict. The Marine Corps’ “three-block war” unit training regi-
men that includes scenarios for mid-intensity war-fighting, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian relief  support seems to be appropriate for the majority of  situ-
ations that U.S. ground forces actually will face in the foreseeable future. While
the Army’s transformation into a medium-weight force will facilitate its par-
ticipation in these missions, it will retain for the mid-term elements of  heavy
striking power in armored/mechanized units.
“Multinational Jointness.” In addition to providing improved understanding
of  foreign conflict situations, there is substantial untapped potential for im-
proved collaboration with allied or friendly forces in SSC operations. Operat-
ing more equally with foreign forces not only can reduce foreign resentment
of  the United States as a sole global policeman, but also could improve popu-
lar support for such operations domestically. The public is likely to look more
favorably on operations with other countries where the United States is not
bearing almost all of  the burden (of  cost, casualties, and responsibility).
The Defense Department has worked hard to make the services “joint,” in
terms of  common – or at least compatible – communications, headquarters,
equipment, and doctrine.44  A parallel opportunity may exist for integration
of  allied forces in SSCs along the lines of  what the Defense Department has
done for the U.S. services – expanding the concept of  “jointness” to include
A New Strategy   |   67
foreign military services. If  U.S. and a broad range of  other nations’ forces
train units to be integrated into multinational command structures, a force
package with a variety of  types of  units and nationalities could be assembled
quickly for specific operations. Clearly, for this to work, much would need to
be done in training, doctrine, and equipping to make allied forces more
“interoperable” with U.S. forces. Decades of  experience in NATO with this
issue should provide a solid base to develop improved joint capability in the
age of  sophisticated electronics.
“Civilian Jointness.” The definition of  “Joint and Combined Forces” may also
usefully be broadened to include civilian non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), such as relief  agencies, and non-military Other Government Agen-
cies (OGAs), including international organizations. These groups often have
been operating in an area before intervention forces arrive, and can provide
essential understanding of  the situation and culture where they are located.
U.S. forces have cooperated with such organizations during interventions, but
these ad hoc efforts could be substantially improved with development and insti-
tutionalization of  structures and procedures for cooperation and joint tasking
beforehand. While experience has shown that personnel in the field will quickly
establish informal structures and methods for coordinating and communicating
with non-military actors, relying on this combination of luck and personal his-
tory and experience is very risky. Planners should determine definitions of  rel-
evant “mission essential tasks,” which NGOs/OGAs are best organized to per-
form them, and how best to allocate them among the non-military actors.45
Intelligence. Apart from taking advantage of  external sources of  information
like NGOs, the Defense Department needs to substantially improve its or-
ganic intelligence capabilities and better develop and integrate foreign area
knowledge and understanding into deployed units. Intelligence capabilities
for SSCs need to focus as much on understanding the society and politics of
an area as on targeting hostile weapons.
In sum, the relative unpredictability of  SSCs enhances the appeal of  flex-
ible units able to operate easily across the range of  these contingencies. It also
points to the dual need for increased intelligence collection via human agents
“on the ground” supplemented by increased diplomatic activity to prevent,
or at least mitigate, outbreaks of  violence. The key points for structuring and
training units able to discharge this mission are flexibility and mobility.
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Force Protection and Operational Risk. A growing concern for the Pentagon is
force protection and managing operational risks. This concern extends to both
permanent forward garrisons and to forces – land, sea, and air – deployed for
exercises or specific missions that fall short of  “war.” It is an issue because of
the perceived need to detail forces for force protection missions – thus in-
creasing the number of  troops needed for each deployment. Some also believe
that the emphasis on force protection plays a role in decisions on where, when,
and to what extent U.S. forces will be engaged in world hot spots.46  Force
protection has played a considerable role in how U.S. forces engage – shaping
operational decision-making to the extent that some officers have decried its
influence. As one general recently noted, “You don’t deploy somewhere to
protect yourself. If  you want to do that you stay in Kansas. You deploy some-
where to accomplish a mission.”47
Obviously, such risks can be avoided by complete withdrawal into a for-
tress America. Just as obviously, this is no solution at all for a nation with
broad interests and allies in the world.
The conventional wisdom is that the public is “casualty averse” and hence
that deployments of  U.S. personnel to hotspots are highly operationally risky
for domestic political reasons. This view has been hotly debated, and in any
case, risks can probably be reduced by improving communication with the
public and Congress before deployments are undertaken.
However, risks can be managed in part through a combination of  means,
the first of  which is a well-funded, active diplomatic effort to promote demo-
cratic ideals and adherence to international norms and agreements, both mul-
tilateral and bilateral. A second factor contributing to risk mitigation is im-
proved information sharing with allies and targeted intelligence dissemina-
tion to U.S. diplomatic missions and combatant commanders. Operational
security is a third factor. Use of  specialized units in high risk areas or on high
risk missions, such as U.S. Navy port security units, is a fourth.
When combat is expected, how a military task force is put together and
how it controls the time, place, and tempo in which armed conflict occurs
influences the degree of  risk it faces. Highly trained joint forces able to con-
centrate power – personnel, fires, computer/cyber – swiftly against an oppos-
ing force and disperse quickly once a mission is over engender, by their very
activity, lower risk than a more “conventional” task force.
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Capabilities-Based Responses for Terrorism and Homeland Defense
As with SSCs, that there will be future terrorism attempts on U.S. soil is agreed
by many observers, but when and exactly where are unpredictable. The as-
sumption, endorsed by virtually every recent special commission or blue-rib-
bon panel, is that within the first quarter of  the 21st century the American
homeland will suffer a significant deliberate attack involving biological, chemi-
cal, nuclear, or radiological sources.48  Such a prediction moves fourth-genera-
tion warfare into the first rank of  threats and elevates “homeland defense” to a
national priority.49  Further, it reinforces the “worst case” mentality of  interna-
tional relations with its emphasis on response to, rather than shaping of, events.50
Perhaps the fundamental question is whether the United States risks cre-
ating a self-fulfilling prophecy. As a global power, America’s diplomatic, fi-
nancial, social, and in some cases, military presence is inescapable but not
always welcome. If  the country’s leaders interpret opposition to American
influence as threatening, they would seek information through all available
means (military and non-military) to clarify the extent and nature of  the re-
sistance. The conundrum, however, is doing so quickly but not in an obvious
or heavy-handed manner that easily could intensify existing opposition and
create new anti-American centers willing to take “direct action” against U.S.
citizens and interests, both abroad and even within America’s borders. The
cycle then repeats until what is feared, no matter how unlikely, becomes the
governing paradigm. This in fact is the road on which the United States finds
itself  today even though the most serious threat to the nation remains what it
was during the Cold War – the Russian nuclear arsenal.
However likely or unlikely a terrorist attack, it is not clear that the military
component of national security is well equipped to do much about it. National
missile defense is the foremost military option, but it has never been satisfactorily
explained why an opponent would choose the expensive, technically difficult,
and suicidal method of  delivering a weapon of mass destruction via missile rather
than via truck, boat, or plane. Some scenarios in which it would be useful to have
a working missile defense can always be described, but the program becomes a
matter of  priorities. The strategy proposed here puts other military needs – not
least of which is fully funding personnel, training, and spare parts to ensure that
today’s forces are fully ready – at a higher priority than a missile defense system
of high cost, of unknowable reliability in actual use, and that will likely be politi-
cally costly in relations with allies and with Russia and China.
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Essentially, the active duty military’s role is in intelligence and logistical sup-
port (equipment and transport) to local authorities after an incident of  physical
terrorism (bomb, chemical or biological agent release). In keeping with their
long-standing role in domestic emergencies, National Guard units have been
designated to form rapid response assistance teams to help local “first respond-
ers” identify and deal with biological and chemical agent attacks. However, the
formation of these special units is behind schedule, training has been insuffi-
cient, and the program itself has been criticized on the basis that the National
Guard teams will not be able to respond fast enough to be helpful.
In the unlikely event that it is well known where and how a weapon of
mass destruction attack against the United States is being prepared in a for-
eign country, U.S. forces can of  course conduct pre-emptive attacks. U.S. mili-
tary strategy should ensure that Special Operations and other forces have a
capability for long-range raids to attack weapon development, deployment,
or launch sites and command structures if  necessary to prevent weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) attacks.
The “other” terrorism – cyberterrorism – again largely falls outside DoD’s
responsibilities except for the protection of  its own systems. The lead coordi-
nating agency for anti-cyberterrorism is the Department of  Justice, which
has established a central data clearing house designed to monitor and assess
attempted and actual incursions into government and private critical infra-
structure systems. Protection of  government systems is proceeding more rap-
idly than in the commercial private sector.51
National Security Strategies to Prevent Terrorist Attacks
Despite the limited role for military strategies and for the Defense Depart-
ment in defense against terrorism, there is more that the United States can do
in its broader national security strategies. The government has tended to fo-
cus on stopping or limiting damage from a terrorist attack rather than focus-
ing on the cause – why would foreign people want to rain destruction on a
U.S. city? What is the United States doing in its foreign and military policy
that creates the perception in the United States that it is such a target?
The easy, dangerous answer is that putative attackers are at best irrational
fanatics, at worst actual madmen. This is to ignore the broad current of  re-
sentment and suspicion of the United States found in far too many places
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around the world. The individuals at the helm of  the boat that blew a hole in
the USS Cole may have been fanatics, but the tens of  thousands who demon-
strate against the United States in the cities of  the Muslim world are not. The
United States is often credited in the developing world with having far more
power and influence in the affairs of  other countries than it actually does.
Although this is somewhat flattering, it means that America gets easily blamed
for political and economic woes in other regions.
U.S. “drive-by” attacks using cruise missiles or bombing raids have dem-
onstrated the long reach of  U.S. military might, but not U.S. willingness to
truly engage over the long haul with the causes of  conflicts. The attacks deal
with the symptoms, usually in an ineffective way, while instilling fear and
resentment in populations that perceive themselves as targets.
National security strategy should focus on three approaches to attempt to
mitigate the incentive and desire for attacks on the United States or its over-
seas posts. The first is to recognize and then shape foreign and military policy
so as to minimize the foreign perception of  the United States as a global bully.
As former Secretary of  Defense Robert McNamara recently noted, many other
countries “consider we’re arrogantly unilateralist, that we insist on our own
way. ... We should develop an empathy – empathy is not sympathy, empathy
means trying to understand the way your potential opponent looks at you.”52
The primary solution to the problem of  being perceived as a hegemon is to
work more with allies and other nations both in leading the world and in
specific interventions. This means not just including token diplomatic or
military participation by other nations, but actually giving other nations sub-
stantial, and in some cases leading, roles. It will be much harder to demonize
the United States if  it is not perceived as trying to run the world by itself.
Reducing the perception of  U.S. hubris means careful balancing of  the
need for humanitarian interventions with the inevitable backlash generated
in one group or another. In a specific peacekeeping operation, the United
States does not necessarily need to be neutral, but it does need to be perceived
as fair and operating under clearly defined rules.
Second, the United States should recognize and respond to a perception of
conflict with Islam and Islamic peoples. America does not need to be in a
“clash of  civilizations” with the Muslim world. The United States’ foreign
policy should undertake an initiative to explore how to reduce tensions and
avoid needless friction that contribute to a perception of  inherent conflict.
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HOW TO WIN IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
“Asymmetric” warfare cuts across different challenges outlined above.
It can be used with telling effect in major theater wars, in smaller-scale
contingencies, and in terrorist attacks. This sidebar briefly notes ad-
vanced strategies to conduct, and thus counter, asymmetric warfare.
U.S. military thinking and planning remains excessively focused on
second-generation, industrial age warfare of  bloody and destructive
attrition, based in part on the works of  19th century strategist Carl von
Clausewitz. Because of  U.S. dominance in this type of  warfare, how-
ever, opponents instead are likely to fight “asymmetrically” – avoid-
ing U.S. strengths and attacking its vulnerabilities. They are likely to
use either third-generation maneuver warfare (with regular armed
forces) or, more likely, fourth-generation irregular warfare (with ir-
regular attacks on vulnerable military units, population, infrastruc-
ture, culture, and institutions).
Two great military strategists – an ancient one, Sun Tzu, and a 20th
century one, the late John Boyd – provide an answer.53  They explain
how to fight and win such warfare. Broadly, these strategists focused
on how to win by outmaneuvering an enemy mentally, so as to limit the
need for actual combat. Greatly simplified, their ideas suggest that to
win asymmetric war:
• Understand that military force is not the only, or necessarily the
best, means of  achieving national goals – excessive or inappro-
priate use of force breeds resentment and plants the seeds of
future conflict.
• Attract allies to one’s own side, and subtract them from an
opponent’s side.
• Focus on two major and complementary elements: create “har-
mony” and cohesion on one’s own side, and foster chaos and
paralysis on the other side
• Surround the opponent with sustained ambiguity, deception, sur-
prise, isolation, and menace; pursue multiple approaches and at-
tacks, then switch between them and develop new thrusts faster
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On the military side, permanent basing of  substantial U.S. forces in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf  is a specific, prominent irritant for cultural and reli-
gious reasons. When other problems arise, such as Israeli-Palestinian clashes,
hostile elements can use U.S. forces as a figurative and literal target, whipping
up resentment. Ways to adjust U.S. deployments and reduce the perception
of  permanent U.S. presence should be examined so as limit the drawbacks of
stationing U.S. forces in the area.
Third, the United States should recognize and correct the perception that
it is hypocritical on the issue of  weapons of  mass destruction. It is striving to
prevent others from obtaining nuclear weapons or other weapons of  mass
destruction, but has done relatively little in the last decade to reduce its own
massive nuclear arsenal. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is relevant to biological,
than the opponent can cope; alternate unpredictably between the
expected and unexpected, the orthodox and unorthodox, dis-
tracting moves and decisive moves, or in Sun Tzu’s terminology,
cheng and ch’i.
• Understand that success in conflict depends most upon people,
then ideas, and least upon hardware.
• Fix fraying leadership and cohesion in the military, in part by
ending constant personnel rotation among units, halting the sys-
tem of  premature discharging of  mid-level officers, and training
and empowering officers to exercise more initiative.
• End a fixation on complex hardware, which is not only unreli-
able and expensive, but also creates complex bureaucracies to
build, deploy, operate, supply, and fix it – bureaucracies that are
unsuited to exercising the most important components of  third-
and fourth-generation warfare strategy: agility, quickness, flex-
ibility, responsiveness, creativity, initiative.
• Structure and equip U.S. forces so that they: are agile and flexible;
provide commanders with multiple options; can switch between
different thrusts quickly; continuously reshape themselves through
experimentation and training; and most importantly, are well-led.
74   |   Reforging the Sword
chemical, and radiological terrorist weapons because these can be seen as “poor
man’s bombs.” Conducting serious nuclear arms reduction efforts again would
help delegitimize nuclear and other proliferation.
As mentioned above regarding SSCs, a key strategy to deal with the emo-
tional and political effect – as opposed to physical damage – of  small-scale
attacks on the homeland is to prepare the U.S. public for them in advance,
largely by making the case for whatever U.S. actions or interventions sparked
the attack in the first place.
Industrial-Based Responses for a Peer Challenge
Virtually all forecasts out to 2020-2025 hedge on the possibility of  the rise of
a peer or near-peer. The chief  candidate for this role is the People’s Republic
of  China, a choice seemingly confirmed by the March 2001 announcement
of  a 17 percent increase in the budget for the People’s Liberation Army. How-
ever, much of  this increase is going for higher salaries, additional training
exercises, resettling those cut from the force structure (500,000 troops), mod-
ernizing missile forces, and compensating the PLA’s loss of  income from the
many commercial enterprises it developed in the 1980s and early 1990s to
supplement its official budget.54  In fact, China seems to be portraying the
U.S. as its chief  antagonist at least partly to justify a slow but steady ship and
aircraft modernization program.55
Strategies to Prepare for a Peer Challenge
The broad national security strategy to head off  a peer competitor would
work to maintain positive relations with China and Russia, paying particular
attention to how U.S. acts will play out in the domestic politics of  the relevant
countries (as was discussed above in strategies to reduce the likelihood of
nuclear war). Another broad strategy would increase support for economic
development in less industrialized areas of  the world to provide a potential
challenger with less fertile ground for a hostile alliance against the wealthy
United States. U.S. economic assistance in Fiscal Year 2000 was $7.3 billion,
which amounted to only 2.5% of  the defense budget and less than one half  of
one percent of  overall government spending.56
The military strategy to handle a peer challenge if  one does arise would
preserve the U.S. economic and technological strength that backstops mili-
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tary hardware dominance. The key to remaining technologically dominant
lies in preserving cutting-edge research in basic and applied science and tech-
nology. Personnel with critical engineering design skills in fields such as aero-
dynamics, propulsion, weapons effects, sensors, electronic warfare, stealth,
precision guidance, and associated fields have to be retained. On the other
hand, the military must recognize where the commercial sector is in the lead
and adapt its products to military use. This is particularly true in terms of
computing power and the use of  highly complex simulations. Advances in
these fields enable much design work and virtual testing to be performed
without actually producing pieces of  equipment. Eventually, fabrication of  a
plane or ship prototype may be necessary to ensure the models and simula-
tions work, and in other cases an advanced weapon system may be produced
in limited quantities to test the doctrine and tactics envisioned for it. Lessons
learned from such experiments would then be integrated back into models
and simulations for the next generation of  equipment. Only when (and if)
intelligence concludes that a peer power is emerging would a major produc-
tion run of  the most recent prototypes be undertaken.
Maintaining this design-prototype-limited production/testing-cycle would
require the Pentagon to spend more on research and development, but the
costs incurred would be offset by cuts in procurement made possible by not
having to recapitalize the entire force. (Similarly, there may be excess infra-
structure both in weapons production facilities and in research and develop-
ment activities that could be pared for savings.) Production lines for existing
aircraft, ships, and tanks, still the world’s best, would be updated to produce
the very latest iterations of  proven systems such as the F-16 Block 60 which
has been sold to Oman but is not in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) inventory.
Joint Agency-Based Responses for Transnational Challenges
Transnational problems such as international drug trafficking, illegal migra-
tion, crime, environmental conflict or damage, access to water, and health are
often tied together in conflict zones. For example, drugs, crime, the environ-
ment, and economic issues are deeply intertwined in the conflict in Colom-
bia. If  U.S. forces are present in such conflict zones, it is likely they will be
exposed to these issues and may have to deal with them. The approach sug-
gested here is that procedures be improved for military units to collaborate
76   |   Reforging the Sword
more with the civilian agencies that focus on these issues. Current ad hoc
arrangements can be made more effective if  a high-level effort is undertaken
to assess how military, non-military, international (and non-government) or-
ganizations can best work together to address these complex issues.
The next section explores regional issues and how some of  these “the-
matic” strategies might apply to specific nations and regions of  the world and
to non-state actors.
REGIONAL ISSUES
The Arc of Crisis – Geography and Military Forces
The area stretching from Southeastern Europe through the Middle East and
the Persian Gulf  to the Indian subcontinent and up to the Koreas constitutes
what some commentators term an “arc of  crisis.” Since World War II and the
retreat from empire of  European powers, the United States has become more
involved diplomatically and militarily in selected areas along this arc. Some
involvements, as in Korea and Taiwan, have spanned virtually the entire pe-
riod since 1945 and seem set to continue for some time. Other involvements
have been less direct, as in the case of  Pakistan during the Soviet occupation
of  Afghanistan and Pakistan and India as nuclear weapons states. In still other
parts of  this arc, the perception that vital U.S. interests have been (Vietnam
and Southeast Asia) or are (Persian Gulf) at risk have influenced military
engagement, presence, and support for indigenous governments.
Some of  these areas remain important to the United States and its allies. But
the United States must not become so focused on this arc of  potential flashpoints
that other important areas fall below the cognitive diplomatic and, where ap-
propriate, military horizons. Central America was a major concern in the 1980s.
As already noted, growing economic disparities, drugs, transnational crime,
and environmental degradation severely challenge the all-too fragile democratic
institutions in many countries. A growing area of  interest and concern to the
United States is Central Asia stretching on either side of the Caspian Sea from
Turkey on the west to Russia and China on the east. Not only is this an area rich
in energy resources, it is flanked by Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey (a NATO
nation), making it susceptible to varying outside pressures. Moreover, with no
modern democratic tradition on which to draw, any economic benefits that ac-
crue from energy resource development may not be widespread.
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The inherent diplomatic, economic, military, and environmental uncer-
tainties of  the future call for well-considered, coordinated, selective “shap-
ing” activities by the United States that will contribute to the goal of  reduc-
ing armed conflict in the world. A truly “internationalist” diplomacy, one
that seeks to engage allies and international organizations, remains the first
line of  offense and defense in this endeavor. For their part, U.S. military forces
must be capable of  rapid response, with allies or in ad hoc coalitions, to sup-
port diplomacy or, when diplomacy fails, to ameliorate or localize conflict.
Choices will have to be made. But simply because we cannot be present ev-
erywhere does not mean we should be present nowhere.
Issues in Assessing Threats
The Department of  Defense defines strategy as “the art and science of  devel-
oping and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as nec-
essary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in
order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of  victory and
to lessen the chances of  defeat.”57
Short-term military strategies – essentially responses to contingencies –
call for rapid assessment of  an evolving crisis and a determination of  an ap-
propriate, proportional, effective course of  action when military power is
warranted. The greatest danger in these situations lies in generating unwanted,
unanticipated second and third order consequences that cannot easily be miti-
gated even by intense diplomatic effort.58  This danger can be offset to some
degree by the formation of  deployable joint headquarters support packages
(e.g., command and control, communications, intelligence) geared to augment
the joint response forces under the control of the regional commanders in
chief. When no crisis looms, responses to hypothetical, very possible contin-
gencies – selected based on history, the state of  current inter-regional or bilat-
eral relations, and armament levels – can be war-gamed repetitively to de-
velop the optimum range of  possible combinations of  land, air, and sea assets
that would be effective in an actual crisis.59
Regardless of  whether the analysis of  changing international events is de-
liberate or crisis-driven, the response will be highly dependent on two factors:
the countries subject to the analysis, including an assessment of  the quantita-
tive strengths and operational concepts of  potentially opposing militaries
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(military “science”), and the synergistic effect of  the human dimension that
can enable one force, even if  numerically or technologically inferior, to pre-
vail (the military “art”).
Quantitative elements involve, first, the number of  people under arms, for
without people there is no military force.60  Quantity also refers to the number
of  war-making (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, fighter/attack air-
planes and bombers, attack helicopters, naval warships and submarines) and
war-supporting (trucks, fixed- and rotary-winged transport aircraft, replen-
ishment ships) machines.
Technological sophistication in the form of  the “generation” of  a weapons
system can be included in this “quantitative” realm for comparative purposes.
In doing so, however, it is important to remember that technology is neutral;
it is beneficial only when it helps rather than hinders individuals to accom-
plish human tasks. Combined with other factors such as well-trained and
motivated people, a coherent doctrine, and sound tactics, technology can en-
hance the war-fighter’s capabilities. Conversely, as equipment becomes more
sophisticated, it becomes more difficult to repair “forward” in the battle arena.
Packed into “black boxes,” highly complex elements have to be shipped to
depots in the United States, creating a maintenance “tail” that is often longer
in time and distance.61
Complexity also increases costs, which impose their own iron discipline.
In human terms, as complexity increases, operator stress can increase because
of  the number of  functions that must be performed or monitored.
Then there is the financial cost. For example, the total target acquisition
of  the USAF F-22, a fifth-generation American warplane conceived to counter
fourth- and fifth-generation Soviet fighter aircraft expected to enter service in
the 1990s,62  was 750 aircraft – essentially a one-for-one replacement of  the F-
15C. Because the F-22 has become so expensive – $180 million each – the
current expected procurement is 341 aircraft, assuming the Bush administra-
tion does not scale back the program further. (Some in the Air Force are again
calling for an F-22 buy of  over 750 aircraft.)
What is done with the technology available – the operational concepts and
tactics – is often more relevant than the technology. In 1940, the French and
British forces opposing the Germans had better armor but inferior doctrine
and tactics. In 2000- 2001 weapons technology available to the Palestinians is
vastly inferior to what the Israelis possess, yet the latter seem bereft of  a mili-
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tary doctrine to thwart the “asymmetric” actions and determination of  the
former short of  attempting to re-occupy Palestinian areas.63
Ideally, from a single starting point (doctrine), the optimum case involves
the ability to advance far down multiple paths of  endeavor (tactics) before
having to commit to a main effort. Such flexibility applies to conflict preven-
tion, mitigation, and resolution as well as to war-fighting in all its dimen-
sions. Moreover, the military establishment that encourages bold action and
rewards experimentation and risk-taking in peacetime will find itself  better
able to adapt in war – to turn the tables on even an “asymmetric” opponent
by initiating an unexpected response that is itself  “asymmetric” in terms of
the opponent’s strength.
Anyone can count the number of  war machines an opponent has. No one
can count on “a” military response if  innovation is prized.
Recommendations:
• In assessing regional threats and allied and U.S. military capabilities,
evaluate qualitative factors (the human dimension, well-trained and
motivated people, coherent doctrine and tactics, military “art”) as equal
or more important than quantitative factors (“bean counts” of  numbers
of  weapons, military “science”).
• Take into consideration that technology is neutral – if  overcomplex, too
demanding to operate, and too expensive, high technology can hurt rather
than help. What is done with the technology available – the operational
concepts and tactics – is often more relevant than the technology.
• To turn the tables on an opponent that uses “asymmetric” attacks on
U.S. forces, improve the military’s ability to be flexible, pursue mul-
tiple approaches simultaneously, experiment, develop scenarios involv-
ing multi-disciplinary second and third-order effects, and take risks.
The following sections briefly examine the diplomatic and political back-
ground to conflicts in regions of  the world. They suggest actions and strategies
for the United States to pursue in the broader national security arena, including
diplomatic and economic components, as well as in the military arena.
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MILITARY STRENGTHS OF U.S., ALLIED, AND SELECTED
OTHER ARMED FORCES
Any simple “bean count” such as this understates the full military strength of  the U.S. and its
allies. These data portray neither the generally higher capabilities of  U.S. and allied weaponry,
nor the unrivaled U.S. capabilities in communications, intelligence gathering, logistics, training,
maintenance, and global mobility.
Amphibious,
Armored Major Mine, &
Active Reserve Heavy Infantry Air- Heli- War- Support
Troops Troops Tanks Vehicles planes copters ships Ships
U.S. & ALLIES
U.S. 1,384,400 1,211,500 8,303 24,075 9,030 6,779 200 200
France 294,430 419,000 834 6,041 1,160 642 46 60
Germany 321,000 364,300 2,815 5,802 790 734 28 80
Greece 159,170 291,000 1,735 2,657 645 196 24 38
Turkey 609,700 378,700 4,205 4,293 994 362 36 59
U.K. 212,450 302,850 616 3,278 1,146 435 50 51
Other NATO1 979,880 1,734,780 6,138 17,098 3001 1630 135 249
Australia 50,600 20,200 71 574 294 123 12 21
Japan 236,700 49,200 1,070 940 825 623 71 59
South Korea  683,000 4,500,000 2,390 2,583 765 473 58 41
Totals 4,930,330 9,271,530 30,839 64,679 18,650 11,997 660 858
“POTENTIAL ENEMIES”2
Cuba 58,000 39,000 900 750 208 90 7
Iran 513,000 350,000 1,135 1,145 269 718 8 46
Iraq 429,000 650,000 2,200 4,400 350 500 7
Libya 76,000 40,000 2,210 2,620 594 202 4 19
North Korea 1,082,000 4,700,000 3,500 3,060 1,167 320 29 40
Sudan 104,500 — 170 488 46 28
Syria  316,000 396,000 4,850 4,785 640 221 2 12
Totals 2,262,500 6,175,000 14,965 17,248 3,274 2,079 42 131
OTHER COUNTRIES OF SIGNIFICANCE
China 2,470,000 600,000 7,060 5,500 3,632 497 125 257
India 1,303,000 535,000 3,414 1,697 1,498 431 42 52
Israel 172,500 425,000 3,900 5,900 945 295 2
Pakistan 612,000 513,000 2,285 1,000 665 187 18 12
Russia 1,004,100 2,400,000 22,300 29,665 6,397 2,788 102 533
Saudi Arabia 126,500 75,000 1,055 4,710 574 206 8 14
Taiwan 370,000 1,657,500 739 2,080 733 297 37 50
Vietnam 484,000 3,000,000 1,315 2,100 259 75 8 46
Yugoslavia 97,700 400,000 1,035 930 255 99 9 20
NOTES:
1 Other NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) includes Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain.
2 As historically defined by DoD.  Iran was removed from this list in March, 1999.
Includes equipment in store.  Figures are estimates.
SOURCES: International Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. Department of  Defense.
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Europe
In the aftermath of  World War II, Europe became the first battleground be-
tween communism and capitalism, oppression and democracy. While the
United States, in the first few years the only atomic power in the world, held
at bay the armies of  the Soviet Union, strong diplomatic and massive eco-
nomic aid enabled Western Europe to regain its balance. In 1949, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed, eventually reaching 16 nations
during the Cold War.
Although the Cold War ended a decade ago, only in the last few years have
NATO forces begun to shake the Cold War mentality that emphasized orga-
nization for territorial defense. Russia, though still possessing a nuclear arse-
nal, is suffering economically. Its conventional military forces are in shambles.
And while Europeans still want continued U.S. interest in the continent, many
are less enamored now of  the American presence than 50 years ago.
Ironically, the main aim of  many today is to bring a politically reformed and
economically viable Russia into European structures beyond the 55-member
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). Just as the OSCE
provides a diplomatic forum for nations whose territory stretches from Vancouver
to Vladivostok, the ideal outcome of  enmeshing Russia in a web of  military and
economic cooperative ventures (an expanded NATO and World Trade Orga-
nization) would keep America (and Canada) fully “in” as well.64
NATO itself  recognized that, with the Soviet threat gone, its principal
raison d’être had disappeared. Thus, at the 50th anniversary NATO summit
held in Washington in April 1999, the allies agreed to a change in NATO’s
formal missions to include crisis management, out-of-area security missions
such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, training non-NATO militaries
(under the Partnership for Peace), countering terrorism and fighting interna-
tional crime.65  Most of  the missions are far different from those for which
NATO was formed, with some even being more law enforcement or coopera-
tive para-police activities. To this extent, while these new missions involve
continued alliance cooperation, they do not require a large permanent U.S.
military forward presence on the continent. In addition, in 1998 NATO added
three new members from the former Warsaw Pact – Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic.
The splintering of  Yugoslavia during the 1990s seems to have been decisive
for Europe. The mayhem in Bosnia and Croatia left European countries cha-
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grined at their inability to move out of  America’s shadow and prevent or inter-
vene in the conflict. In response to this embarrassment, NATO launched the
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) as a means to strengthen Eu-
ropean military capabilities and raise Europe’s profile in NATO operations.
But ESDI never got off  the ground. Most European countries balked when
it came to committing money to defense and reforming their Cold War-era
militaries. Thus when NATO launched its air war against what was left of
the former Yugoslavia in 1999, the United States again led the military opera-
tions and contributed most of the materiel.66
After Kosovo, Europeans renewed their efforts to add military muscle to
their economic prowess.67  This time, however, the responsibility was handed
to the European Union (EU). With continental military affairs now in a non-
NATO forum, the Europeans anticipated that EU members would have an
increased incentive to invest in their militaries.
At the heart of  Europe’s defense plans is a proposal to build an autono-
mous military force supported by the necessary political and military appara-
tus. The plan envisioned three types of  missions for this force: humanitarian
and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking.
The sinews of  the plan, as laid out in the Helsinki communiqué, are:
• Creating by 2003 a rapid reaction force of 50,000-60,000 troops (15
brigades) capable of  fully deploying within 60 days and sustainable for
a year;
• Establishing a standing Political and Security Committee to provide
political control and strategic direction, a Military Committee composed
of  the EU chiefs of  defense to give military advice, and a Military Staff
to provide military expertise; and
• Developing a non-military crisis management mechanism to coordi-
nate the civilian resources at the disposal of  the member states.
Interim political and military bodies were quickly created, and on June 11,
2001 the EU Military Staff  became operational.69  The EU also laid down
basic guidelines for the future non-military crisis management force. It will
consist of  police, customs officers, judges, and other non-military personnel
who will preserve or reestablish civic structures in a crisis area.
Evolution of  the CESDP and formation of  the 60,000 rapid reaction force
(with sustainment for 12 months) will allow Europeans to handle smaller-
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scale contingencies on and near the continent out to an anticipated action
radius of  some 2,000 miles from Brussels.70  If  this force matures, NATO
could gradually cede primacy to Europeans.
The most obvious benefit to the United States of the proposed EU defense
organization is a decrease in the burdens that the United States now carries
for its permanent presence in Europe.71  (Conversely, in the NATO-led op-
erations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States, as the leading member of
the alliance, was expected to contribute forces commensurate with its capa-
bilities.) Should the European Union develop an effective, responsive force
capable of  assuming overall responsibility for future peacekeeping in Europe,
the United States would not automatically be expected to participate or could
do so at a lower level of  contribution.
The jury is still out on the question of  the political steadfastness of  EU
members to make the required major reforms of  their respective militaries to
enable Europe’s force contributions to balance a reduced U.S. commitment.
The expected costs of  such development, at a time when a number of  Euro-
pean defense budgets are falling, not rising, is a key obstacle.
There is reason for optimism, however. In its last annual Report to the
United States Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense
(March 2001), the Pentagon noted that NATO allies “perform very well” in
the areas of multinational reaction forces and peace operations personnel, key
elements also for any EU-based force. The report also notes that eleven allies
increased the percentage of  their defense spending devoted to modernization.
This complements the March 2000 report which noted that European coun-
tries were developing forces able to (1) be rapidly transported to remote the-
aters; (2) function without  pre-established lines of communication and host
nation support; and (3) fight effectively in multinational formations at the
corps and even division level. The trend to all-volunteer structures (or reduc-
ing the number of  short-term conscripts) continues.
The Europeans recognize their shortcomings. A 1999 audit determined
that their militaries need more transportation aircraft, stronger logistical units,
improved satellite surveillance, and more coordination to make nationally-
based military systems compatible with each other and interoperable with
U.S. forces. The gaps were clearly visible in Kosovo, where U.S. and allied
pilots were forced to communicate on non-secure frequencies – thus jeopar-
dizing their safety and the effectiveness of  missions – because U.S. coded
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REPORTED COMMITMENTS TO EUROPEAN
RAPID REACTION FORCE
The European Rapid Reaction Force will draw on a pool of  100,000 troops available to per-
form humanitarian relief, evacuations of  non-combatants, conflict prevention, and even sepa-
ration of  warring parties – what are known as the “Petersberg Tasks” from the German city
where they were discussed. Major contributions are:68
Italy 19,000
Germany 18,000
Great Britain 12,500
France 12,000
Spain 6,000
Turkey 6,000
The Netherlands 5,000
Greece 3,500
Belgium 3,000
Austria 2,000
Finland 2,000
Sweden 1,500
Portugal 1,000
Ireland 850
Luxembourg 100
Italy 14,000 in-theater plus carabinieri
Germany 14,000 combat troops
Great Britain Four brigades
Belgium One brigade
Italy One aircraft carrier, 18 other ships; naval infantry
Germany 15 warships
Great Britain One aircraft carrier, two attack submarines, four surface
warships, 11 other ships; Royal Marine commandos
France One aircraft carrier, two amphibious ships, nine other warships
Belgium Nine ships
Italy 69 fixed/ rotary wing aircraft, 18 transport aircraft, 2 aerial tankers
Germany Seven combat squadrons, 31 transports, 1 tanker
Great Britain 72 combat aircraft, 72 transports (for UK forces), 15 tankers,
3 airborne early warning
France 75 combat aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, 40 transport,
8 tankers, 4 airborne early warning, battlefield surveillance system
Belgium One combat squadron, 8 transports
France Helios imaging satellites
EU Galileo GPS satellite network
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communications systems were incompatible with those of  some NATO al-
lies. Similarly, the lack of  military lift aircraft in Europe slowed the deploy-
ment of  peacekeeping units. A lone British submarine was the only European
vessel around Kosovo capable of  launching guided cruise missiles.
Does the potential emergence of a viable CESDP mean the end of  NATO?
Hardly. CESDP only aims to create a lightly-armed, rapid reaction force for cri-
ses such as Bosnia and Kosovo. More importantly, the European Union is not
likely, at least in the near and medium-term, to acquire the capabilities needed to
guarantee its members’ security in the same way NATO’s charter does.
Replacing the web of  multinational military land, air, and sea formations
by CESDP units also would be a daunting task.73
NATO provides a structured framework within which new member states
can exercise, have troop exchanges, and plan activities such as modernizing
their armed forces in a way that balances contributions to the common defense
while restraining costs. This same framework provides opportunities for future
defense industrial cooperation via spreading the costs of  research and develop-
ment and procurement while reducing competition for arms sales to non-NATO
nations that could easily spark regional arms races. Finally, in cases such as the
1991 Persian Gulf  War and the Kosovo air campaign in which the United States
participates, NATO countries provide transient and forward deployment bases
for American forces responding to out-of-area emergencies.
But nothing will come of  CESDP if  the European Union and NATO fail
to develop formal relations and agree on terms of  cooperation on the Euro-
pean continent. Among the questions that must be resolved is the critical one
of  who decides whether a particular crisis is an EU or NATO responsibility.
If  and when such an eventuality happens, it would be an appropriate time to
reconsider current arrangements which always have an American as head of
NATO military forces (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and a Euro-
pean as NATO Secretary-General.
A viable CESDP would mark the end of  U.S. control over European secu-
rity affairs through NATO – a prospect sure to be opposed by many in Con-
gress and the defense establishment. For Europe, once the European Union is
tasked with concrete military responsibilities, CESDP would move from theory
into the world of  real budgets and real forces.
Many question whether the United States will give the CESDP the chance
to flourish on its own. Perhaps more important questions are whether the indi-
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vidual nations of  the European Union can muster the budgetary resources for
CESDP and are willing to create mechanisms (which means ceding national
control over foreign policy) able to implement an effective EU foreign policy.
Recommendations:
• The United States and Europe should discuss and agree on the future
terms of  cooperation on the European continent, and formally develop
relations between new EU foreign policy and military institutions such
as those of  the CESDP and NATO.
• Support the development of  a CESDP light Rapid Reaction Force to
help handle smaller-scale contingencies in Europe and hence permit
the United States to reduce its contribution to and costs for joint en-
deavors.
• Preserve NATO as a useful structured framework in which to conduct
joint exercises and troop exchanges, plan modernization activities, share
costs, increase defense industrial cooperation, provide transient bases
for U.S. forces, and, most broadly, continue to guarantee its members’
security.
• As the European Rapid Reaction Force takes shape, the United States
should draw down its permanently stationed forces but maintain its
participation in ongoing peace maintenance operations and be ready to
contribute to similar operations under NATO.
Asia
Asia will loom ever larger in U.S. national security strategy in the 21st century.
Thirty-five percent of  U.S. trade is within the region, amounting to more
than $548 billion in 1998.74  Asia-Pacific nations, not including the United
States, account for about 34 percent of  the Gross World Product (the U.S.
accounts for 21 percent).75
In terms of  the viability of  multilateral security alliances, Asia is far be-
hind Europe. The ill-fated Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, United States) remain the only
attempts to create formal multinational arrangements in the operational the-
ater.76  Over the last three years, five nations among the original 21 that com-
prised the Korean War-era United Nations Command have resumed partici-
A New Strategy   |   87
pation at the staff  officer level, but essentially Republic of  Korea and U.S.
forces constitute the present-day U.N. Command.77
The other salient points are the presence along the Asia-Pacific Rim of  the
world’s six largest armed forces (People’s Republic of  China, United States,
Russia, India, North Korea, and South Korea78 ), the volatility of  relation-
ships among key players, and the vast distance separating the United States
from the other countries of the region.
Contributing to volatility are territorial disputes, particularly over the sta-
tus of  Taiwan, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the return of  Japan’s
Northern Territories seized by the then Soviet Union at the end of  World
War II, and the disposition of  Kashmir. Other countries, especially Indone-
sia and the Philippines, are beset by secessionist movements.
World War II era memories/antagonisms remain: Korea-Japan, China-
Japan, Japan-Vietnam, Japan-Indonesia. These are supplemented by Cold
War era disputes that pitted North Korea against the South, Vietnam against
the United States and later against China, and China against India.
Given the inevitable distrust and sensitivities that these conflicts engen-
der, the system of  bilateral relationships instituted by the United States was
probably the only feasible approach to security issues. But the combination
of  regional volatility and the vast distances between the United States and the
countries party to these bilateral agreements dictated a more visible U.S. pres-
ence than in Europe. In turn, this higher visibility risked fueling anti-Ameri-
can sentiment as cultures clashed and human and other resources were di-
verted to support the American presence. Indeed, since the Cold War ended,
both Japanese (especially Okinawans) and South Koreans have increasingly
questioned the costs of  the U.S. presence, suggesting the re-alignment of  per-
manent forward bases may soon be required.79  In monetary terms alone, the
worsening Japanese economy may increase pressure for reducing or eliminat-
ing Japanese host-nation payments/concessions for U.S. bases.
Today the major military players remain Russia and China, with India
rising rapidly by virtue of  its military expansion and development of  nuclear
weapons and missile delivery systems. Pakistan’s entry onto the list of  nuclear
weapons/missile nations warrants increased attention towards it.
Even if  the United States were not a superpower, as a Pacific power it must
be active in regional affairs. By virtue of  the size of  its nuclear arsenal, Russia’s
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reactions to U.S. policies in Asia cannot be ignored. Engagement in Asia should
be seen as a complement to engagement in Europe.
The regional stand-off  drawing the most attention recently is China-Tai-
wan. At the heart of  the issue as it involves the United States is the question
of  reunification under the “one-China” formula, to which all parties (China,
Taiwan, and the United States) are committed. In 1997 China regained Hong
Kong and in 1999 Macao, but these had been “leased” under binding agree-
ments a century earlier by European powers.
The Clinton administration referred to China as a strategic partner; that
rhetoric has changed with the change of  administrations. China is now a “stra-
tegic competitor,” a rising regional power in the western Pacific which some-
times finds its interests conflicting with Washington’s. The picture across the
Taiwan Strait is further complicated by a widespread U.S. moral commitment
to prevent a “roll-back” of  democracy in Taiwan. This moral stance underlies
the calls for the United States to be ready to use military force to protect Taiwan
in the event of  an “unprovoked” attack – the Clinton policy – and for some,
even in the event of  a “provocation” such as a declaration of  independence.
China does not have the military forces to successfully invade Taiwan (the
main island) and defeat Taiwan’s forces, even without U.S. military participa-
tion.80  Nevertheless, other strategies such as a naval blockade of  Taiwan by
Chinese submarines could pose serious challenges. U.S. sales of  weapons such
as P-3 anti-submarine aircraft, frigates, and minesweepers could further in-
crease Taiwan’s ability to defend itself  without outside forces. These sales can
be made without excessively provoking China if  weapons that Beijing per-
ceives as more offensive – such as Aegis destroyers and attack submarines –
are not provided.
In terms of potential consequences, the next most troublesome conflict is be-
tween India and Pakistan over the status of Kashmir. Since May 1998, when each
conducted a series of  nuclear explosions, the magnitude of consequences from a
war between these two sub-continent nations has broadened from purely regional
to international. Unlike China-Taiwan, there are no calls for U.S. military action
in this dispute. The United States faces a diplomatic challenge in trying to induce
both nations to limit their nuclear arsenals, refrain from periodic fighting across
the Line of  Demarcation in Kashmir, and rein in ballistic missile developments.
Driven by their intertwined history, India and Pakistan seem largely resistant to
what few diplomatic “sticks” the United States can wield.
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The third, still unpredictable relationship is that between the two Koreas.
Since the election of  Kim Dae Jung as South Korea’s president, the two nations
have been moving cautiously toward a new paradigm. Road and rail links are
scheduled to be restored across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and some fami-
lies, separated by the Korean War, have been able to visit. Still, the North main-
tains some 70 percent of its mobilized forces within 100 kilometers of the DMZ.
It has also threatened to withdraw from the 1994 “Agreed Framework” with the
United States (in which it committed to stop running its “heavy water” nuclear
reactors in exchange for two “light water” reactors and supplies of  fuel oil) and
cancel its self-declared moratorium on further long-range missile tests.81
The United States’ position in Northeast Asia will be significantly altered
should a sustainable accommodation be reached between the Koreas and if
North Korea stands by its commitments on nuclear power plants and missiles.
The main justification for the nearly 100,000 forward-deployed U.S. forces has
long been to deter a repeat of  North Korea’s 1950s assault on the South.
But whether or not the North Korean regime transforms itself, crumbles, or
reunifies, South Korea – with a population twice as large and a high-tech economy
27 times as large as the North – should not need a full U.S. MTW force to
defend it. A more open, less militarized, and economically developing North
may well lead to more pressure for the United States to reduce its permanent
forward presence in Japan/Okinawa if  not in South Korea itself. Complying
with such requests but still remaining west of  Hawaii would entail shifting
more force to Diego Garcia or to the U.S. territory of  Guam, which the Navy is
already considering as a home base for as many as five attack submarines.82  But
Diego Garcia itself  may soon be under siege as the native Ilois inhabitants,
moved by the British in 1967-73 to accommodate U.S. demands for operational
security on the island, won a decision from the British High Court in Novem-
ber 2000 that declares the U.K. government had “acted unlawfully” in the forced
removal of  the islanders. The ruling opens the way for the islanders and their
descendants to return to their homeland.83
Recommendations:
• Overall. Continue military exercises with all regional allies, emphasize
more multilateral exercises and initiatives, employ rotational presence
and periodic visits in anticipation of  a reduction in forward permanent
presence of  U.S. troops, and maintain support infrastructure as needed
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(e.g., new pier at Singapore, which like the one at Port Klang, Malaysia,
is able to accommodate an aircraft carrier).84
• China-Taiwan. Continue process of  engaging China in diplomatic and
economic spheres while maintaining a “one-China” policy, warning
Taipei against declaring independence and warning China that an un-
provoked attack on Taiwan will trigger unspecified assistance to Taipei;
sustain Taiwan’s current defensive capability. Maintain and, if  possible,
expand military-to-military ties with China; monitor China’s military
modernization program and priorities to preclude surprise.
• India-Pakistan. Induce both nations to sign and adhere to the Non-
Proliferation and Comprehensive Test Ban treaties and the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime. Encourage resolution of  the Kashmir dispute.
Work for a restoration of  civilian government in Pakistan.
• Korean Peninsula. With the concurrence of  Seoul, initially reduce
land forces to one mechanized brigade and preposition equipment for
two more mechanized brigades. Depending on the pace and nature of
reconciliation, reductions of  the North Korean military, and increased
South Korean capabilities, be prepared to withdraw the remaining bri-
gade from South Korea in five years.
• Japan. Forces on Main Islands: retain until the end of  the current Status
of  Forces Agreement (SOFA) period one aircraft carrier home port and
U.S. Air Force squadrons; remove all land forces. After the end of  SOFA,
reduce U.S. presence to supply, maintenance, and infrastructure activities
that would allow rapid resumption of  home porting for an aircraft carrier.
• Okinawa. maintain forward supplies, equipment, and infrastructure for a
major forward staging base, phase out land forces back to Guam and Hawaii.
• Philippines. Investigate emerging opportunity to redevelop a major
maintenance, service, and supply base at Subic Bay.
Middle East/Gulf
As a region, the Middle East/Persian Gulf  arguably is consistently the most
volatile. From the Defense Department’s perspective, most of  the geographic
area encompassed by this broad designation is the responsibility of  the U.S.
Central Command.85
Yet diplomatically, religiously, and practically, the eastern rim of  the Medi-
terranean Sea is inexorably linked to the Gulf. It has been most apparent
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since 1948 with the creation of Israel and the numerous wars with its neigh-
bors. The 1973 “oil shock” was a sharp reminder of  the linkage. As recently
as March 6, 2001, in answering a question about views of  Arab leaders on
Iraqi sanctions and the ongoing Israel-Palestine armed conflict, Secretary of
State Colin Powell said: “[T]his is now a regional situation; you have to look
at it regionally; the issues are linked.”86
Ten years after the end of  the Persian Gulf  War, only the United States
and Britain, of  the original military coalition that defeated Iraq, remain mili-
tarily engaged. The principal manifestation of this engagement is the routine
patrolling of  “no-fly zones” over southern and northern Iraq and attacks on
Iraqi air-defense sites. This activity has become so ritualized that the press
usually does not report any occurrences unless a raid is particularly heavy or
sustained, as in February 2001.87  Syria, an ally in the Gulf  War coalition, and
Saudi Arabia, which allows U.S. forces on its soil, “expressed feelings of  de-
nunciation and anxiety” over the attack.88  In May, the two commanders in
chief  in charge of  the no-fly zones, Gens. Tommy Franks of  Central Com-
mand and Joseph Ralston of  European Command, reportedly recommended
reducing or ending the air patrols, ostensibly because of  the danger of  a shoot-
down of  a U.S. aircraft.89
Diplomatically, the Bush administration is seeking to revise and revive the
U.N. sanctions regime against Iraq. More and more nations, even the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC)90  states other than Kuwait, hold the United States
responsible for the continued depressed condition of  the Iraqi population’s health
and welfare despite the creation and expansion of  the “oil-for-food” program.
But so much oil – estimated to be as much as 450,000 barrels a day – is escaping
U.N. oversight that it is difficult to control.91  Nor is the Iraqi National Con-
gress, an opposition group that is in line for as much as $97 million in U.S. aid,
likely to have any success in its plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
In addition to aircraft based in the region (principally in Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait), the United States has facility access agreements (e.g., with Oman,
first negotiated in 1979), maintains prepositioned equipment in Qatar (enough
for a division) and Kuwait (enough for a brigade), and regularly rotates troop
units in Kuwait on a 90 day training and exercise tour. The United States also
routinely has a carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf  from which planes fly
over southern Iraq. All told, America spends more than $2 billion a year to
maintain forces in the Gulf  – half  of  which is paid by the GCC.92
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Arab revulsion at the plight of  Iraqi citizens finds a counterpart in the
struggle of  the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The col-
lapse of  the August 2000 Camp David talks led to the autumn 2000 resur-
gence of the intifada (still continuing) and the election of Ariel Sharon, a man
hated by many Arabs, as Israel’s prime minister. The continuing violence on
the part of  Palestinians and other Arab-based groups against Israeli forces
and civilians and the Israeli economic and military response destroyed the
fundamental principle of  all peace negotiations – trust. Under such circum-
stances, the reduction in fighting and the restoration of  some semblance of
peace and stability, the prerequisites for economic and social development
that the region so desperately needs, remain only a hope for all sides.
The Gulf-Eastern Mediterranean rim is also the “home” of  four states (a
fifth, Sudan, borders the Red Sea) often referred to as “rogues,” a shorthand
designation for minor states and their leaders who are seen as implacably op-
posed to U.S. interests.93  Saddam Hussein “set the standard” in the post-Desert
Storm 1990s when nations like Iraq that supported terrorism and were devel-
oping weapons of  mass destruction took center stage in the thinking of  Ameri-
can policy makers.
Rep. Les Aspin, then chairman of  the House Armed Services Committee
and soon to be Clinton’s first defense secretary, identified “regional” aggres-
sors as the main threat to international peace. Aspin created a four point “threat
yardstick” by which all regional renegades could be measured:
• willing to commit aggression;
• pursuing nuclear weapons development;
• using or supporting the use of  terrorism; and
• employing a totalitarian system of  governance.
The term came to be applied to seven countries – Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria,
North Korea, Sudan, and Cuba. The first six were tied to terrorism, with North
Korea also being involved in proliferation of  missile and nuclear technology.
Together, the military spending of  these countries is about four percent of
what the United States spends on its military. The hold they exert on the
American psyche is the “asymmetric” or terrorist action against U.S. citizens,
military forces, or business interests abroad and even at home. But just as
such acts never happen in a vacuum – there is a perceived cause – so too
preventive measures and multilateral cooperative and punitive actions can
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reduce the opportunities for attacks. Again, in large measure, these require
diplomatic initiatives supported, where necessary, with military power.
In the Gulf, the GCC states are becoming more open to Iran even as they
remain uneasy about the prospects for continued Iranian liberalization.94  They
are also uneasy about the large cohort of  unemployed youths in the region
who have taken to the streets in opposition to U.S. military action against Iraq
and to Israeli actions against the Palestinians and Israel’s chief  supporter, the
United States. This conflict, together with the continued uncertainty sur-
rounding events in Iran and Iraq’s status under even a reformed sanctions
regime, will keep roiling events with no clear political, let alone military, reso-
lution for these confrontations on the horizon.
In terms of  military involvement in the region, the United States could lower
its profile by phasing in a withdrawal of  U.S. combat forces from the Multina-
tional Force of  Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Desert between Israel and Egypt
in consultation with Jerusalem and Cairo.95  These troops could be replaced by
smaller U.S. detachments operating day/night capable unmanned aerial ve-
hicles to carry out the monitoring mission of  the MFO. Furthermore, the United
States should end all military subsidies to Egypt and Israel, replacing these with
economic assistance. This would eliminate one element of  the U.S.-Israeli rela-
tionship that can be used to inflame opposition groups.96  United States partici-
pation in non-NATO multilateral exercises (and even bilateral ones) in the
Mediterranean together with increased military-to-military exchanges at com-
mand and small unit levels, would maintain America’s profile in the region.97
The southern “no-fly zone,” which does not have any basis in U.N. resolu-
tions, should be terminated as should the bombing of  Iraq which, after 10
years, serves no purpose. Under the United Nations, sanctions should be re-
vised and then enforced through interdiction and checkpoints.
Finally, as long as Saddam Hussein refuses to comply with the terms end-
ing the Gulf  War, the United States should maintain a low-profile presence
in the Gulf. As anti-ship cruise missiles proliferate and increase in range,
aircraft carriers in confined spaces such as the Gulf  become more vulnerable.
Even smaller vessels such as Arleigh Burke-class destroyers may be more
vulnerable in littoral areas to fast patrol boats and other surface and subsur-
face craft.98  What will remain a critical consideration is what forces and force
levels will be enough to demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to allies in
the region without providing extremists a cause around which to rally.
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Such dangers can be mitigated in the Gulf. Should Iran resume liberaliza-
tion, the United States ought to consider resuming normal diplomatic rela-
tions. Such a step would recognize Iran’s security interests in the region with-
out sacrificing those of  the United States, the GCC, and our allies who are
more dependent on Gulf  petroleum than is the United States.
Recommendations:
• Recognize the effects of  the unease among even friendly Muslim na-
tions in the Middle East about the plight of  Iraqi citizens, sanctions,
no-fly zones, and routine bombing of  Iraq; about the basing of  U.S.
forces in the region; and about the U.S. role in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
• Lower the U.S. profile by phasing in a withdrawal from the Sinai ob-
server force in consultation with Egypt and Israel, and ending their
military subsidies, replacing the subsidies with economic assistance.
Continue multilateral or bilateral exercises in the region.
• Terminate the southern “no-fly zone,” and the bombing of  Iraq. Re-
vise sanctions on Iraq through the United Nations. Use high altitude
unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor Iraqi activities in the south and
randomly intersperse unmanned aerial vehicles with manned overflights
in the northern no-fly zone.
• Maintain a low-profile military presence in the Persian Gulf.
• Consider improving relations with Iran.
Latin America/Caribbean
The predominant international treaty governing the Americas is the Organi-
zation of  American States (OAS).99  Now consisting of  35 members100  and 47
observers, its purpose is “to strengthen peace and security in the hemisphere;
promote representative democracy; ensure the peaceful settlement of  disputes
among members; provide for common action in the event of  aggression; and
promote economic, social, and cultural development.”
Currently, the United States sees its contribution to achieving these goals
largely in terms of  one problem – drugs, most of  which are produced in Co-
lombia, that find their way into the United States. This orientation toward
the source of  production and away from the source of  the problem – domes-
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tic demand for illegal drugs – also justifies expending diplomatic, legal, and
military resources in the drug-growing regions of  the hemisphere.
Hence, the Clinton administration invested $1.3 billion in support of  Plan
Colombia, the effort to eradicate cocaine and heroin production areas; help
the Colombian government reassert control of  its territory from guerrillas,
para-militaries, and drug lords; and aid in redevelopment. Most of  this aid is
in the form of  helicopters and military training by as many as 500 U.S. mili-
tary personnel.101  President George W. Bush reaffirmed this commitment
when Colombian President Andres Pastrana visited Washington Feb. 27, 2001.
Pastrana had hoped for $2 billion from European nations for social and de-
velopment programs, but so far the Europeans have contributed only $280 mil-
lion. But in a reversal of  roles, Europeans were among representatives from 25
nations who monitored a March 8 peace discussion between the main Colom-
bian guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  Colombia (FARC),
and Pastrana – a meeting in which the United States did not participate.
In its FY2002 budget, the Bush administration proposes to spend $731
million for an “Andean Regional Initiative.”102  This is an extension of  Plan
Colombia that seeks to address the spill-over into neighboring nations of  the
anti-guerrilla, anti-narcotics effort in Colombia. This regionalized approach
acknowledges that the drug trade, when pressured in one area by crop spray-
ing (which adversely affects the environment and even some legitimate crops)
or military sweeps, simply shifts its activities to another. The policy is also a
tacit acknowledgment that some Andean democracies remain fragile and sus-
ceptible to being undermined by growing transnational criminality, problems
that require concerted diplomatic, economic, and law-enforcement aid as well
as some military assistance.
Given the intermixing of  political insurgencies and drug trafficking in some
Latin American nations, U.S. military aid must be measured, appropriate, and
carefully directed to conform to limitations set by U.S. law. This at times can be a
challenge as the clear distinctions drawn in legislation can become less clear in the
field. Insurgents and para-militaries both are involved in aspects of  the drug trade
and use profits from this trade to finance their operations. Thus military units
that have received U.S. equipment and training so they can provide needed secu-
rity for national police in attacking drug operations may find themselves fighting
insurgents or para-militaries. In such cases, as a former commander of  U.S. South-
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ern Command remarked, ultimately a group is defined by what they do, and
what they do will determine in part the extent of  military-to-military exchanges
between the U.S. and Latin American militaries.
The other significant issue is illegal immigration. Like the drug trade, this
falls outside the missions ascribed to military forces (nuclear or conventional
war-fighting, peace operations, homeland defense). This fact is acknowledged
by the pre-eminent role of the Coast Guard on the high seas and the Border
Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Service on land. The government
has established inter-agency task forces which include military personnel oper-
ating or maintaining radar facilities (although these are chiefly directed against
suspected drug smuggling operations) and at one time dispatched small units
to overwatch the border with Mexico. The inappropriate diversion of  troops
for such a mission was tragically highlighted by the death of a young American
boy who was killed by a shot from a Marine patrol on May 20, 1997.103
Almost off  the Pentagon’s radar scope with regard to Latin America and the
Caribbean is one of  the seven “rogue” states, Cuba. In congressional testimony,
Adm. Thomas Wilson, director of  the Defense Intelligence Agency, said: “Cuba
is...not a strong conventional military threat. But their ability to employ asym-
metric tactics...would be significant. They have strong intelligence apparatus,
good security, and the potential to disrupt our military through asymmetric
tactics [such as] information warfare or computer network attack.”104
This response is noteworthy on two points. Cuba’s “potential” for asym-
metric attacks is the same as most other nations and can be countered by
defensive measures being developed by DoD. Second, there is in Wilson’s
response no hint of  Cuba as an exporter of  revolution or as a threat to any
other country in the Americas. Indeed, the likelihood of  armed conflict with
Cuba is considered so low that all the landmines that used to protect the U.S.
enclave at Guantanamo Bay have been removed.
The U.S. military strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean should
emphasize training and exercises with other military forces. International Mili-
tary Education and Training should be sustained, including the revamped
“School of  the Americas.”105  To dampen any tendency towards a renewed arms
race in the region, provision of new military weapons and equipment should
not involve a significant increase in the level of  technological sophistication of
one nation over its regional neighbors (current U.S. arms export policy).
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Indeed, the greatest demand for U.S. military involvement in the Americas
over the foreseeable future may well be support for humanitarian relief  efforts
in the wake of  recurrent natural disasters, particularly in Central America.
Recommendations:
• Fighting the drug trade is not primarily a military mission. Increasing
real security and sustainable development in drug-producing countries
and cutting demand in the consuming countries is likely to be more
effective than a U.S. military role. Similarly, dealing with illegal immi-
gration is also primarily a civilian agency mission.
• Cooperate with, do not ostracize, Cuba. Cuba is not a substantial mili-
tary threat.
• Emphasize training and exercises with other Latin American and Car-
ibbean military forces.
• Continue to exercise restraint in the arms trade; provide only weapons
that do not significantly increase the level of  technology of  one nation
over its regional neighbors.
• Support humanitarian relief  efforts, particularly in Central America.
• In the broader hemispheric security arena, increase diplomatic and eco-
nomic ties with the objective of  strengthening respect for democratic
institutions in Central and South America, minimizing environmental
destruction throughout the region, and helping nations help themselves
in reducing poverty.
Africa
Africa is a region that draws the least attention from and has the least influ-
ence on the policies of  the United States.106  Few see any traditional U.S. inter-
ests at stake on this continent other than its strategic position along the west-
ern access route (Suez Canal-Red Sea-Gulf  of  Aden) to the Indian Ocean
and the Persian Gulf  from the Mediterranean Sea.
Even the fact that the United States now draws a significant part of  its oil
from Africa107  does not seem to raise Africa’s relative position in U.S. national
security thinking and therefore in U.S. military strategy.108
Yet since the end of  the Cold War, the U.S. military has been deployed
more often to Africa than to any other region. It is also in Africa that military
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forces have confronted forms of  “asymmetric” threats, albeit low-tech ones,
that together validate experientially the Marine Corps concept of  the “three
block war.” The 1992-93 peacekeeping and humanitarian relief  support mis-
sion in Somalia became, for a few hours in mid-October 1993, a mid-inten-
sity fight for Army Rangers who lost 18 killed.
Africa is a testing ground of  another sort, for it challenges the idea that
democracy (and free markets) can flourish among a people who, constantly
struggling with deadly diseases and starvation, cannot spare time and energy
to exercise basic human and political rights that are taken for granted by
Western democracies.
In the last half  of  the 1990s the United States, scarred by events in Soma-
lia, first abstained (as did other nations) from involving itself  in Africa’s tur-
moil and then, after the Rwandan genocide, restricted its activities to short
term support of  international relief  efforts. In fact, Africa has become the
region in which the United States seems content to let multinational organi-
zations such as the United Nations, the Economic Community of  West Afri-
can States (ECOWAS), and the South African Development Community
(SADC) carry the burden of  peace enforcement and peacekeeping.109
The United States did undertake two initiatives in Africa in the late 1990s.
In an effort to minimize U.S. involvement in peace operations (and thereby
minimize the risk of  U.S. casualties), the Clinton administration in 1997 ini-
tiated the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). This program provides
training and equipment to troops from selected sub-Saharan African states.
The criteria for participation are that governments must be democracies, ob-
serve human rights, and be governed by civilians. Some of  the countries cho-
sen, which include Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, have
very uneven records with regard to these criteria, but they have not been
dropped from the program. ACRI has the encouragement of  the United Na-
tions insofar as African nations currently provide over 25 percent of  the nearly
29,000 military personnel employed on U.N. peacekeeping duty.
The second initiative is the founding in 1999 of  the African Center for
Strategic Studies. Modeled after other DoD regional schools, it serves as “a
forum for African military and civilian leaders to discuss national security
policy development, defense economics, and civil-military relations.”110  It has
so far held two sessions for African officials whose countries are judged to
meet the same criteria as for ACRI.
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Recommendations:
• Pay more diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military attention to
Africa, given the number of  past deployments there and the likelihood
of  future conflicts and conflict-related disasters potentially calling for
U.S. or other intervention.
• Recognize that a relatively minor intervention can turn into a fiasco if
an understanding of the politics and culture of the area are ignored (as
in Somalia), but that there are opportunities for a small force to provide
a disproportionately large benefit in pre-empting low-tech massacres
(as in Rwanda).
• Increase support for development of  regional capabilities to conduct
peace enforcement and peacekeeping.
Non-State Actors
Every piece of  land and a good portion of  the 70 percent of  the Earth’s sur-
face that is water is claimed by sovereign nation-states. As in the rest of  Na-
ture, nations are prepared to fight for what they regard as their territory.
In Nature and among nations there are ways to fight that are not lethal.
Animals mark territories or posture to warn off  challengers. Nations deter
other nations by credibly holding an opponent at risk of losing something
valuable should conflict ensue.
Nature and nations also witness a similar phenomena in the outcast, a young
male (usually) driven from the pack or herd to wander alone, trying to survive
among the cracks in the territorial claims of  its species.111  In Nature the out-
cast tends to avoid confrontation, hunting and only fighting for survival.
Among nations, however, the “non-state actor” has other goals. Whether an
individual or a group, the non-state actor frequently will lash out at one or
more “oppressors” with the intent to wreak as much damage as possible, to
call attention to perceived grievances, or to be killed as a “martyr” to a cause.
Another difference between Nature and nations is that the non-state actor
(unless a “common” criminal) often is tolerated, if  not actively supported, by a
nation-state. In such cases, absent establishing material support that is or leads to
violations of  international law by the country giving refuge, it is difficult for a
second nation (often the target) to justify taking military action against the coun-
try harboring the outcast without bring on itself  international condemnation.112
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In fact, military action against nations in such cases, while perhaps cathar-
tic, is more often counterproductive to efforts to bring to justice the perpetra-
tors of  atrocities. Perhaps recognizing this, the U.S. government has made
attempts to strengthen international norms against terrorism.113
• On July 30, 1996 in Paris, ministers of  the Group of  Eight (the United
States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia) met
to endorse 25 explicit ways to enhance cooperation in the fight against
terrorism and transnational crime.
• Terrorism and international crime were subjects taken up at the May
1998 U.S.-EU Summit in the United Kingdom and at the April 1999
50th Anniversary of  NATO celebration in Washington.
• In October 1999 the United Nations unanimously passed resolution
1267, requiring the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Ladin to a country
where he will be arrested and brought to justice. This resolution im-
posed international sanctions against the Taliban which continue to this
day. In the same month, the United States released its bi-annual list of
terrorist organizations. The 1999 report listed 27 groups, down from 30
in 1997.
• Between January and August 2000, the United States held formal bilat-
eral counterterrorism discussions with India, Spain, Russia, and Canada.
Moreover, according to the State Department, the United States has rati-
fied all 10 counterterrorism conventions in force at the end of  1997114  and
signed the International Convention for the Suppression of  Terrorist Bomb-
ing on Jan.12, 1998 – the day it opened for signature. Finally, on the diplo-
matic front, the United States has negotiated mutual legal assistance treaties
with a number of  governments as a basis for faster and more effective legal
cooperation, and is expanding extradition arrangements with other nations.
In addition to working within multilateral fora, the United States needs to
continue its informal yet very significant bilateral efforts to control prolifera-
tion, particularly of  nuclear material and knowledge. This point was force-
fully argued as recently as Mar. 28, 2001 by former Sen. Howard Baker, co-
chair of  the Department of  Energy’s Nonproliferation Program Russian Task
Force. Baker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “[T]here aren’t
any issues of  national defense that are more important in my view, short of
ultimate survival of  the nation, than seeing that we reduce the threat of
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proliferation; and the greatest threat of  proliferation is...existing sources of
nuclear material.”115
Perhaps most significantly, U.S. counterterrorism policy116  pointedly omits
any mention of  military action. “Justice” is a law enforcement, not a military
concept, although in some circumstances (as in aircraft or ship hijackings)
elite military forces might be used to gain control of  a situation.
Recommendations:
• Military action against nations, while perhaps cathartic, is more often
counterproductive to efforts to root out and bring to justice the perpe-
trators of  atrocities. Absent proof  of  wrongdoing, it is difficult for a
target nation to justify initiating military action against a country har-
boring a terrorist without bring international condemnation on itself.
• In addition to working within multilateral fora, the United States needs
to continue its informal yet very significant bilateral efforts to control
proliferation, particularly of  nuclear material and knowledge.

IV. A Responsive, Balanced Force
FORCE STRUCTURE PRIORITIES
In recent years, defense strategy debates have often degenerated into arguments
over which new weapons are needed most. This has been encouraged by the
popularity of  the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) concept in defense
circles. The RMA view holds that unprecedented change in the capabilities of
high-tech hardware, computers, and electronics can change the dynamics of
warfare itself  – that the United States can develop a slate of  new hardware able
to see, identify, and destroy all the opposing vehicles, vessels, missiles, and air-
craft it needs to, anywhere on the battlefield, often from long distances.
As noted earlier, the Pentagon’s doctrinal direction has been changing along
RMA lines, but much more slowly in terms of  overall strategy. In doctrine, the
Air Force has been emphasizing long-range strike capabilities. And while it has
long used the term aerospace, the interrelationship between air power and space
power has been receiving increased emphasis,117  spurred in part by missile de-
fense testing and the January 2001 report of  the congressionally-created Com-
mission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Or-
ganization, chaired, until December 2000, by now Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld. The Navy emphasizes its role in fighting along and controlling the
littoral areas (as opposed to deep water ocean areas) and supporting the Marine
Corps who envision striking much deeper inland than in the past. For its part,
the Army is trying to reshape its force structure, in part for faster deployability,
to give substance to its long-standing contention that it is truly a strategic force.
Media reports concerning the “Rumsfeld review” and the 2001 Quadren-
nial Defense Review point to a drive by the Bush administration to push the
Pentagon faster into “transformation.” This is reflected in the intense effort
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to move more fully into space: protecting U.S. assets while being able to deny
others the use of  their space capabilities and developing missile defense against
long-range threats.
The RMA model of  war is most relevant to high-tech global war and to
major theater wars. It is not very useful for SSCs such as complex peacekeep-
ing interventions where the opponents may not have many vehicles at which
to shoot, where it may not even be clear who the opponents are, and where an
adversary is likely to fight back with asymmetric warfare.
In accordance with its emphasis on improving preparations for SSCs, the
strategy and forces proposed here focus on elements – people and doctrine –
most relevant to the numerous messy conflicts that will be fought by humans
rather than machines. The discussion does not delve extensively into the merits
of  the various new high-tech weapons and equipment that are the focus of
much attention in the defense establishment and reportedly in Secretary
Rumsfeld’s defense review, such as satellite and space hardware, communica-
tions gear, unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision-guided munitions. This
strategy emphasizes that the United States already has overwhelmingly domi-
nant military capabilities on the battlefields of  the major theater wars for
which the new hardware is most relevant. (The United States may not be
“dominant” in missile wars in the short- or medium-term future. For reasons
discussed previously (p.69), this strategy does not prioritize national missile
defense.) The strategy also assesses that warning time is such that the United
States can keep its technological lead with a moderate effort until a new hos-
tile superpower appears on the horizon.
The strategy prioritizes new efforts on the conflicts where the United States
certainly does not have overwhelming dominance – smaller-scale contingen-
cies. For such operations, some high-tech hardware can even be a hindrance.118
For example, ever-faster communications equipment is increasingly able to
put ever-higher levels of  authority “in the picture” with visual imagery from
the scene of  a deployment. But in a hypothetical tense stand-off  between
ethnic mobs, would it be best for a U.S. soldier on the ground to have bureau-
crats from Washington telling him what to do through an earphone in real
time? The Marine Corps has instead focused on the human element – train-
ing Marines to be “strategic corporals” able to handle complex situations by
themselves when necessary. As Gen. Charles Krulak put it:
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The inescapable lesson of  Somalia and of  other recent operations,
whether humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or traditional
warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made
by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level. . . .
Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently
make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme
stress – decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny
of  both the media and the court of  public opinion. In many cases,
the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of
American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only
the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic
levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the out-
come of  the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of
this article suggests – the Strategic Corporal.119
PRIORITIES FOR THE FORCE
• People: fix personnel problems, adequately fund military readi-
ness and “quality of  life.”
• Doctrine and training: adequately fund training and refine doc-
trine for third- and fourth-generation warfare and for joint
operations with other nations, civilian agencies, international bod-
ies, and non-governmental organizations.
• Hardware: improve mobility with airlift, sealift, overseas facility
infrastructure, and force transformation; develop equipment for
interoperability with allies; prioritize development of  human
intelligence capabilities (and ability to process data into “under-
standing”) over new satellite or other technical data collection
and communication systems.
• Other national security tools: adequately fund other components
of  national security, including the State Department, economic
aid programs, and agencies that deal with transnational issues.
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The United States is already the world leader in collection and communi-
cation of  raw data and information. The area that needs attention is moving
from data to “knowledge” and then to “understanding.”
This is not to suggest that new technology has no role to play – research,
development, and selected procurement should continue at a moderate pace –
merely that people and doctrine issues need attention and resourcing more
urgently. The chart on the preceding page summarizes some of  the higher
priority areas proposed for this strategy and force structure.
The following sections look at each of  the components of  an overall “force
structure” – people, units, weapons, command structures, and industry.
PEOPLE
This report emphasizes the importance of  “people” over “units” and “hard-
ware.” A force structure cannot be complete without attention to the people
that make it up and to the fundamental reforms needed in organization and
personnel procedures. This section begins not with lists of  units, but with a
brief  discussion of  some of  the key issues affecting people in the force. These
address the core of  force effectiveness – why people fight, why they polish
their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won.
The focus on people characterizes a school of  military thought that reaches
back 2,500 years to Sun Tzu.120  More recently, John Boyd expanded the dis-
cussion. In his extensive strategic analyses, Boyd considered military forces,
that is, combinations of  people, ideas, and hardware. In this scheme, “people”
includes all the normal personnel issues of  selection, retention, and promo-
tion, as well as the various “moral” forces that hold units together during the
stress of  combat. “Ideas” include both doctrine and those concepts that are
widely shared but are not written down.
Not that weapons are unimportant. But Boyd’s historical studies have shown
that time and again, the smaller or less technologically advanced force could
win, whereas there are relatively few instances in which technology or size
alone was able to overcome deficiencies in people or ideas. Thus Boyd would
insist on “People, ideas, and hardware – in that order!”121
Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd (even though he spent the majority of  his Air
Force career either flying or developing fighter aircraft) rated technology highly.
The likely reason is that it is very difficult to find historical support for hold-
ing technology in such esteem. There are simply too many cases where the
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side with the higher technology lost. Apart from the recent case of  Vietnam,
it often surprises people to learn that in World War II, the Germans tended
to win when their technology lagged behind the Allies (as during the 1940
blitzkrieg against France) and lose during the era of  their wonder weapons.
German V-2s rained down on London as Allied tanks were rolling across
Europe. Fifty years later, Somali tribesmen blasted high-tech U.S. Blackhawks
out of  the Mogadishu skies with weapons that would have been quite familiar
to the Germans of  the blitzkrieg.122
To place technology in its proper place under this approach, one must stay
with the concept of  a military force – people, ideas, hardware, in that order.
Technology can make a difference only if  it is integrated into this scheme.
That is, given a well-trained, cohesive, motivated force, technology appropri-
ately tested and evolved can provide them with better tools to do the job.
Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd denigrated the role of  technology, but neither
would they have given it the primary role in determining the effectiveness of
a military force.123  Even if  the U.S. military were to leave its current hardware
plans intact and just implemented reforms with people and strategy, it would
likely make major improvements in the effectiveness of  forces.
Although people issues are not as glamorous as new ships and fighters, and
do not provide the opportunities for the political engineering and simple pork-
barreling inherent in large weapons programs, no credible strategist argues that
they are not the heart and soul of  an effective military force.124  While all the
services have problems, the Army’s have been reported most widely, probably
because the current Army personnel system, which was created in the late 1940s
to mobilize massive armies to fight a war with the Soviet Union, has not re-
sponded rapidly enough to deal with flare-ups like Kosovo. Personnel are shuffled
constantly so that cohesion (the single largest component of  force effectiveness)
is difficult. When forces do reach the field, they lack the cohesion that would
come from years of  training together and the trust this engenders.125  These
virtues are the foundation of  success for any military force.
The Army is by no means alone in suffering personnel and leadership
problems. The discussion below merely cites it as one example among the
various services – a particularly important one if  land forces are called upon
to be involved in complex intra-state conflicts and peacekeeping operations.
Comments from Army top-performing junior officers reinforce an impres-
sion of  increasing mistrust and lack of  cohesion:
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COMMAND DECLINATIONS IN THE ARMY127
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 year-to-date
Colonel 1 1 ? 1 9 4 14 12 23 7
Lt. Colonel ? ? 1 2 1 15 22 39 32 26
• “The Army’s senior leadership has a definite credibility problem. There
is a lack of  trust.”
• “Until an officer corps that possesses impeccable character and leads
by inspiration is developed, you will continue to see a mass departure
of  junior officers.”
• “Even though we have completed the drawdown, I still feel that many
officers are so worried about their careers that they still back stab. Again,
I think this is what many did to get through the drawdown. It is now
ingrained in these officers.”
• “Senior officers are willing to throw us under a bus if  it would advance
their careers.”
• “We talk about initiative and agility, but we reward officers who follow
a rigidly prescribed path to success; being innovative will get you fired
unless your results are so outstanding that your boss can’t slam you.
Forget about taking risk; we don’t reward risk takers.”126
Perhaps the best single indicator of  problems in the personnel system is the
rate at which the Army’s high-achievers are turning down chances for a general’s
star. By the time they qualify for retirement, at 20 years service, many of the
Army’s best are declining the opportunity for the command slots that would
qualify them for senior rank. As the chart below shows, these declinations have
escalated to unprecedented levels. The numbers are revealing because these
officers have devoted their entire working lives to the Army, and by virtue of
their selection to this level of  command, had a legitimate opportunity to achieve
the pinnacle of  their profession, general officer rank, in due course.
Throughout history, cohesion/trust is the one constant among successful,
highly effective units. It has been called the “lubricant for friction” in mili-
tary operations.128  As ancient a strategist as Sun Tzu noted that the way to
effective military operations winds through unit cohesion:
Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
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Therefore good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of  mo-
mentum, not from individual people.129
Cohesion works because it creates and in turn depends on trust.130  The
first item in any defense review should be to stop doing those things that
erode cohesion and mutual trust. In his epochal study, The Revolution in Hu-
man Affairs,131  U.S. Army Maj. Donald Vandergriff  describes specific changes
that could be made, paraphrased in the following chart.
PERSONNEL REFORMS
• Pass a new Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.
· Replace the “up-or-out” promotion system with an “up-or-stay”
system.
· Reduce the size of  the officer corps in the land forces to 5 percent
over 10 years.
· Replace the “all or nothing” retirement system with a “Vest at 10,
Collect at 55” approach.
• Design the land forces structure around a regimental system (for co-
hesion). Replace the individual personnel system with a unit person-
nel system. Revolve personnel policies around a unit system, and move
to an Army force structure that can be supported by a unit replace-
ment system.
· Flatten the force structure, eliminating many headquarters above
brigade.
· Integrate reserve and active components into each regiment.
• Empower leaders to exercise more initiative without excessive fear of
hurting their careers.
• Change the personnel management system.
· Reform accessions and entry.
· Revise the education system, where mid-level education is conducted
earlier in an officer’s career, as well as moving to an education system
that emphasizes the art of war, including the study of  military history.
· Decentralize management and promotion policies. Revise the
officer evaluation system to involve a narrative officer evaluation
report on character.
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The current dysfunctional military personnel policies have long roots in
U.S. history and society. Although they may have been suitable to U.S. secu-
rity challenges in the past, including the Cold War and preparations for glo-
bal war against another superpower, they are no longer well adapted to the
situation the nation faces in the early 21st century. Three closely related prac-
tices are at the heart of  the current personnel problems: the mobilization sys-
tem, the individual replacement system, and the “up-or-out” officer system.132
The Mobilization System
Origins
The mobilization system, developed in the early 19th century under Secretary
of  War John Calhoun, had earlier roots in the Minuteman system of  the colo-
nial and revolutionary periods. The Calhoun strategy envisioned mobilization
of militia to supplement a small regular force if  land forces were even needed
behind the defense provided by the Navy. In the early 20th century, Secretary of
War Elihu Root slightly revised the concept to use conscripts in place of  mili-
tia, but as Maj. Vandergriff  notes, “the basic idea has underlain U.S. military
policy for more than 180 years.”133  In parallel with the enlisted ranks, in times
of  war the officer corps would be greatly expanded with non-professionals.
It was recognized that this system would not produce an initially tactically
effective force. The gap in capability would have to be filled by hardware –
massive production of  war material by industry similarly converted from
peacetime occupations. In this way, an amateur force buttressed by technol-
ogy would be able to match a more professional force.
This approach helped shape the doctrine of winning by attrition – gradu-
ally wearing down the enemy through application of  overwhelming numbers
of  personnel and weapons. This was exactly the method used to defeat the
tactically more effective German Army in World War II. The U.S. military
applied this approach so fully in the U.S. Civil War, World Wars I and II,
Korea, Vietnam, and even Operation Desert Storm that it has become known
as “The American Way of  War.”
Problems
• Although it produced victory in cases such as World War II, this sec-
ond-generation warfare strategy tends to be extremely destructive and
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relatively costly in casualties. Notably, the strategy produced failure in
Vietnam, which was a guerrilla war during the key phases of  U.S. in-
volvement. It is ill-suited to the smaller-scale, rapidly-arising opera-
tions likely to occur in the next few decades.
• The complexity of  modern weapons means they cannot be operated
well with little training nor be produced in large numbers rapidly. Wars
and smaller-scale operations are more likely to be “come as you are”
affairs that do not leave time for a long mobilization build-up.
• Relying on hardware to make up for other deficiencies engenders tech-
nological arms races, and pursuit of  ever more complex weapons and
equipment. Complex weapons engender high costs, equipment short-
ages, low readiness, and extensive logistical and support tails. For ex-
ample, the Defense Department now has nearly 300,000 people work-
ing in acquisition, compared to 42,000 in combat arms battalions.134
• The mobilization system encourages ponderous forces, as illustrated by
the Gulf  War and Army operations in the war with Serbia over Kosovo.
The 200 year-old focus on a corps/division structure now promotes
excessive layers of  bureaucracy and provides make-work for the exces-
sively large officer corps.135
Reforms
The approach of  mobilizing the nation, including large numbers of  civilians
for the enlisted ranks and the officer corps, can safely be replaced with a “come
as you are” plan until such time as a challenge from a new global superpower or
alliance arises. If  the mobilization system, which drives other personnel poli-
cies, is changed, the way will be paved for transformation of  the professional
military to fight third- and fourth-generation warfare, which relies less on sheer
numbers, mass, and destructive power and more on agility and maneuver.
Individual Replacement System
Origins
The Individual Replacement System (IRS) shuttles individuals in and out of
units (whether as peacetime rotations or as casualties in war) rather than keep-
ing a group together in a unit. Established in 1912, the system fit with two
prominent elements of  American society and economy – the long-held aver-
sion to standing, professional armies that were more traditional in Europe,
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and the rise of  assembly-line industry. Relying on a large conscript army rather
than a smaller professional force encouraged the development of  the indi-
vidual replacement system – more flexibility, from a personnel management
perspective, is available to handle large influxes of  conscripts using individual
replacement. Individual replacement also paralleled the application of  assem-
bly-line techniques in industry, in which workers performing one function
could easily be replaced, as could machines on the assembly line, or for that
matter, parts on the product.
Problems
• The familiar drawbacks of  frequent personnel turnover – “churning” –
for organizations and group activities are particularly crippling in the
complex, life-or-death operations of  military units, which require rapid
and flexible action. As Maj. Vandergriff  notes, the Individual Replace-
ment System “disregards the power of  unit cohesion, the strength of
teams, and trust built up through shared, common experiences.”136
Notably, the once-in-vogue derogatory views of  assembly-line workers
have been replaced in more successful businesses with systems that
empower and value the individual worker and often use less-specialized
team systems.137
Reforms
The Individual Replacement System should be replaced by a regimental “unit
replacement” system in which regimental headquarters would manage bat-
talions whose personnel stayed together to a much higher degree, rotating
through training and missions as a group. Although in high-casualty combat
the size of a unit in a unit replacement model decreases more than a unit in an
individual replacement system, superior cohesion usually produces a more
effective unit. The phenomenon has been noted as far back as the American
Civil War: “During the war, units at 30 percent of  their original strength of
1000 officers and men were very effective, even more so with their wealth of
experience.”138  The “maneuver warfare” required to win in third- and fourth-
generation warfare, and the particularly difficult urban combat that is more
likely in the future, will require an especially high degree of  unit cohesion.
Maneuver warfare has been characterized as:
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... high tempo war; fluid war that has no defined fronts or forma-
tions; decentralized armies where troops act on their own with high
initiative as opposed to centralized command structures where troops
ask permission and wait for orders; ... war where soldiers act on judg-
ment not on rules; war without rules; war that seeks to penetrate the
enemy rather than push opposing lines backwards and forwards; war
waged by a cohesive team that is like a family or tribe with a common
culture and common outlook.139
Benefits of  a unit replacement system would include:
• greater cohesion from working together longer as a unit;
• greater ability to conduct urban combat and maneuver warfare using
agility and high tempo instead of mass;
• reduced problems from high personnel turnover; and
• net increase in ready units available for immediate deployment.
Up-or-Out
Origins
The “up-or-out” policy forces officers out of  the active services if  they are
not continually promoted. This policy again fit with the mobilization scheme
of bringing in large numbers of lightly trained personnel to be officers in
time of  major war. The up-or-out system sends more individuals through the
military, at the cost of  greater experience. Again the system has democratic
overtones in allowing larger numbers to enter the officer corps and compete
for promotion longer. The system was codified in the 1947 Officer Personnel
Act under the influence of  George Marshall, but it had antecedents in the
Navy as early as World War I.
Problems
• The obvious drawback is that an officer may be very good at one rank,
but his or her talents at that occupation are lost as soon as the officer
(appropriately) is not promoted and is forced out. Similarly, officers may
seek and be granted promotion higher than their interests or capabili-
ties warrant in order to continue their military careers.
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• The system encourages a bloated officer corps to provide a large pool for
promotion. Even after the end of the Cold War, the share of officers in the
force has been rising and is far higher than the officer ratio in other effective
military forces. For example, in 1945, the number of  Army generals per
active Army division was 14. In 1986, during the Cold War, the Army had
24 generals per division. In 1998, there were 30 generals per division. In the
Navy, there were 130 Navy ships per admiral at the end of WWII. In
1998, there was an average of  only three ships for every two admirals.140
• In combination with the “all or nothing” retirement system which pro-
vided no benefits unless 20 years’ service was achieved, the up-or-out
system created a cut throat competition, and a “zero defect” mentality
that has discouraged initiative and corroded cohesion.141
Reforms
The officer promotion system should no longer force out competent officers solely
because they have not been or do not wish to be promoted on a rigid schedule.142  To
reduce career anxiety and excessive competition, partial retirement benefits should
be available prior to the end of a service career, rather than “all-or-nothing” at 20
years. Without the need to shuttle through large numbers of officers, the officer
corps can be substantially reduced in size. Complex new combat and non-combat
missions require new emphases in selection and preparation of officers:
Making military education relevant to future war, with its myriad of
changes and challenges, will not be easy. Already, the missions of  mili-
tary operations other than war (MOOTW) and its equally difficult
adjunct, peacekeeping, demand an officer who understands the po-
litical and strategic implications of  his actions (particularly in light
of  the impact of  real-time media). With rules of  engagement (ROE)
that impose limitations on his operational and tactical capabilities,
the officer of  the next century faces unique challenges.143
Promotion and training should be revised to focus less on centralized re-
views of  checked boxes on evaluation forms and more on first-hand supervisor
evaluations and force-on-force “free-play” exercises.144  The Marine Corps has
led the way with its revision of  officer education and training in the late 1980s.
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Benefits of  the changes would include:
• more time in jobs, enabling officers to establish better cohesion and
trust with subordinates, gain more experience in particular roles, and
have more time to learn the art of  war;
• reduction of cutthroat career competition, allowing officers to focus more
on war-fighting and less on career advancement;
• improved development of  officers suited to maneuver warfare;
• increased support for innovators and warrior leaders;
• improved morale, less career anxiety; and
• reduced make-work, less centralization, smaller staffs, and smaller sup-
port bureaucracies as the result of  a smaller officer corps.
In addition to these systemic problems, frustration with poor readiness,
quality of  life problems, and lack of  confidence in the leadership has led to
well-publicized difficulties with retention of  personnel, and presumably re-
cruitment. These morale-affecting issues are examined at greater length in a
background paper, Assessment of  Key Military Personnel and Mobility Issues.145
Transforming the personnel system in ways such as these so that it im-
proves unit cohesion and promotes officers best able to conduct new, more
complex and subtle operations will best prepare the military to meet the third-
and fourth-generation warfare challenges of  the 21st century.
Having put personnel issues at the forefront of  the proposed force structure,
what forces – types and numbers of  units and weaponry – might be the best
tools for a force composed of  such cohesive, bold, and innovative personnel?
UNITS
Forces for the Future
The following chart indicates directions for transformation for types of  forces.
The “Current” column does not indicate that a type of  unit or its capa-
bilities listed there would be eliminated from the force, merely that some
portion of  the units would be transformed. These capabilities continue to
deter would-be aggressors. The suggestion is that the United States enjoys such
“overmatch” in these areas, and the potential exists for increased allied effort,
that deterrence can continue with moderately lower levels of force in these strong
suits and a slower pace of  technology development. “Current” and “Future”
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PRIORITIES FOR FORCE TRANSFORMATION
Strategic Principle or Threat Assessment Current Strengths Future Emphases
Low incidence of intense combat threat. heavy ground forces medium ground
Potential for increased use of  allies. forces
Improved mobility.
Low open-ocean threat. blue-water sea forces littoral sea forces
Interventions likely close to coasts.
Provides access without relying on bases.
Focus on lower-intensity operations, heavy ground forces medium and light
peace enforcement, humanitarian ground forces,
missions. special operations
forces
Improved mobility. nuclear bomber air airlift air forces
Trimmed forward deployment. forces
Reduced nuclear threat from Russia.
Higher threat to ground troops than to air superiority air close air support
U.S. air supremacy. forces and interdiction
Existing U.S. air superiority capabilities air forces
greatly overmatch others.
Increased warning time for “traditional heavy active forces at  reserve forces
conventional threat” after end of  Cold states of  very high
War. readiness
Greater threat from use of  weapons of offensive nuclear defensive units
mass destruction against U.S. troops forces against weapons of
intervening overseas than from deliberate mass destruction
major nuclear attack against the (WMD)
United States.
Threats more likely to be asymmetrical high-volume R&D of  new
than high-tech. production of  new high-end weapons
End of  the arms race means full fielding high-end weapons
of  new weapons not required.
Smaller force structure reduces numbers
of  weapons needed.
Absence of  high-tech arms race. high-volume production of
Advances in commercial electronics, production of  new existing weapons,
software, etc. far faster than in military high-end weapons with upgrades
hardware (aircraft, vehicle, ship
“platforms”).
U.S. forces still have “overmatch” with
potential opponents in symmetric war.
Improve joint capabilities. services’ decision- Joint Staff  &
making powers commander in
chief (CINC)
decision-making
powers
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are meant as a broad guide to forces and programs that would receive more, or
less, priority in attention, transformation, and usually, funding.
Force Enumeration
The following chart presents the proposed alterations to the force structure
of  the four services. As noted earlier, these changes envision a corresponding
change in war-fighting doctrine that moves away from the ponderous and
logistics-heavy formations of  the 20th century to a more mobile, agile, respon-
sive force. Such a force is made possible by incorporating lighter-weight equip-
ment; better command, control, and communications networks; and improved
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – all designed to allow U.S. com-
manders to get inside an opponent’s observation-orientation-decision-action
(OODA) cycle.146
Jointness. Another critical change required for these force structure changes
is less inter-service parochialism and more true jointness in thinking, plan-
ning, and executing missions, whether forward presence or contingency re-
sponse. For example, carrier battle groups and air expeditionary forces should
be regarded as essentially interchangeable for contingencies requiring air power.
Carrier battle groups or amphibious ready groups – or even naval surface
action groups – would suffice for the proposed irregularly conducted pres-
ence missions. With proper air transport, Army units could sometimes per-
form non-combatant evacuations in lieu of  always attempting to position
amphibious ready groups for this mission.
The Pentagon is relatively skilled at the basic task of  creating joint task
forces and force packaging – creating the right mix of  units to perform a given
mission. The proposed force structure changes would make this skill an even
greater asset by emphasizing the need to think more creatively and evaluate
better the capabilities each service contributes to joint operations.
A “Full-Spectrum” Force. The force proposed below maintains a U.S.
capability to conduct the full spectrum of  military operations.
• It maintains a substantial capability at the low end of  the spectrum with
ground forces and Special Operations Forces able to conduct a range of
missions starting with peacetime training and presence. Special Opera-
tions Forces would also strengthen their ability to supplement long-range
airpower in attacks on weapon development, deployment, or launch sites,
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and command structures if  necessary to prevent weapons of  mass de-
struction (WMD) attacks on the homeland or abroad.
• Somewhat heavier forces, including the mix of  ground, air, and sea ca-
pabilities in the Marine Corps, would cover smaller-scale contingen-
cies including humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement op-
erations.
• The proposed force continues the Army trend of  moving toward me-
dium-weight forces and away from light and heavy forces. Smaller but
still very powerful medium-weight forces for major theater wars would
remain, and a robust heavy capability would be maintained in a “strate-
gic reserve” comprised of  forces in the active and reserve components.
These forces would preserve combat skills in case of  possible future
peer challenges from a superpower able to conduct large force-on-
force armored combat operations. In addition, research and develop-
ment of  new weapon and equipment technology would continue, in
order to preserve a long-run defense industrial base capable of  match-
ing future challenges.
• The proposed force would maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter a
nuclear war in the invulnerable sea-based leg of  the nuclear triad, in
combination with renewed efforts to reduce stockpiles of  nuclear weap-
ons around the world.
The proposed reduction in ground forces in the Army is based not on a
preference for airpower as the chief  tool of  intervention – there is often no
substitute for “boots on the ground” – but primarily on an assessment of re-
duced need for heavy force-on-force units. (Note the proposed force preserves
most of  the Marine Corps’ extensive ground forces, and also calls for reduction
in air forces.) The proposed force does not abandon ground force engagement
or intervention in favor of  long-range bombing or cruise missile attacks.
The stress and strain on the force in executing today’s missions and de-
ployments is not uniform across types of  units, but is concentrated on certain
types of  forces, such as the reserve units that are called on to repeatedly de-
ploy to peacekeeping operations. This force proposal addresses readiness prob-
lems in part by reducing and transforming heavy units, which consume re-
sources that could be used for training, parts, fuel, and other components of
readiness in more frequently-used units.
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SUMMARY OF PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE
Existing Force
(end of Fiscal Proposed Proposed
Year 2001) Change Force
Active Corps 4 -1 3
Divisions (Active) 10 -3 7
active heavy divisions* 6 -2 4
active light divisions* 4 -1 3
Active Armored Cavalry Regiments 2 -2 0
Attack Aviation brigades 14 -4 10
National Guard Divisions
heavy 5 -3 2
light 1 -1 0
support 2 -2 0
Enhanced Separate 15 -7 8
Brigades (National Guard)
heavy 8 -0 8
light 7 -7 0
Separate Brigades (National Guard) 3 -0 3
Aircraft Carriers  12 -3 9
Air Wings (Active/Reserve)  10/1 -3/-0 7/1
Amphibious Ready Groups  12 -2 10
Attack Submarines  55 -6 49
Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve)  108/8 -9/-0 99/8
Active Fighter Wings  12.6 -3.6 9
Reserve Component Fighter Wings  7+ -0 7+
Reserve Component Air  4 [0.8 wings] -4 0
Defense Squadrons
Bombers (Total Inventory) 208 † (94 B-52, -12 B-52 196
93 B-1, 21 B-2)
Marine Expeditionary Forces  3 -0 3
Divisions (Active/Reserve)  3/1 -0 3/1
Air Wings (Active/Reserve)  3/1 -0 3/1
Land-based ICBMs  550 -550 0
Ballistic Missile Submarines/  18/432 -8/-192 10/240
Sub-launched Missiles
Nuclear Bombers  97 † -12 B-52† † 0† †
* These active divisions (except for the airborne / air assault) would eventually convert to medium-
weight.
† The 208 heavy bomber figure includes the 97 nuclear bombers.
† † 12 nuclear B-52s dropped, all others converted to conventional role.
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The strategy focuses on flexibility and joint international action, so the
proposed force is deliberately not described as being able to fight X number
of major theater wars and Y number of SSCs by itself. The point is to create
flexible force packages according to circumstances, such that with the pro-
posed increase in allied capabilities, a U.S. and multilateral force could con-
duct and win several engagements and deployments at once. If  necessary,
with increased mobility, forces could be redeployed from lower-priority con-
tingencies to higher-priority conflicts.
Rationales for Selected Forces
Aside from the strategic rationales outlined previously, other specific factors
affect some of  the force proposals discussed below.
Corps and Divisions
The strategy envisions eventually pulling the remaining two divisions out of
Europe and dropping them from the force, on the grounds of  the disappear-
ance of  the heavy force-on-force threat in Europe and a future improvement
in the capabilities of  NATO allies (see chart on European Rapid Reaction
Force plans, (p. 84). When the heavy divisions are gone, the corps headquar-
ters and associated units that support the divisions can be dropped.
If  the situation on the Korean peninsula continues to improve and South
Korea takes on a greater role in its own defense, withdrawing the division from
Korea can be pursued in consultation with the South Korean government.
The reduction of  the light division comes from merging the capabilities of
the airborne and air assault divisions. The full division (three brigades) of  air-
borne parachutists is currently based on a three-for-one rotation to keep one
brigade ready for rapid deployment at any one time. However, the need for
parachute drops in brigade strength is forecast as quite unlikely for peacekeep-
ing operations. More importantly, parachute drops in higher-intensity combat
scenarios on well-defended positions are far too vulnerable and casualties would
likely be at unacceptable levels.147  Airborne capability would not be eliminated,
however. One brigade of  airborne parachutists in the airborne division, plus
the airborne brigade that will absorb the battalion that is part of  the Southern
European Task Force (SETAF), plus the parachute-capable Rangers, would be
preserved. The airborne brigade would combine with the air assault (helicop-
ter-mobile infantry and attack helicopters) to provide a flexible, mixed force.
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Currently divisions are regarded as the smallest units that include all the
different elements of  a “combined arms” force. Combat support (e.g., artil-
lery) and combat service support (e.g., logistics) units are integral to a divi-
sion to support its brigades. The proposed force endorses the view that divi-
sions are too large and inflexible for modern war. Developments in technol-
ogy for weapons, communication, and intelligence equipment should permit
a move to more mobile, agile, smaller forces that can concentrate and disperse
more rapidly than before. A new brigade-centered force would permit sup-
port units to be moved up to corps headquarters and allocated more flexibly
in support of  brigades.
Given the greater distances over which combat service and especially com-
bat service support must be provided, it may well be necessary to move some
support units back into the active force structure. However, with greater reli-
ance on through-put to the maneuver units and a reduction in the need to
move and stockpile large quantities of  ammunition, fuel, and other supplies,
an opportunity exists to restructure and redirect active force support units to
correspond with the changes envisioned for the maneuver units.
Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs)
These brigades were tasked in the Cold War with armored combat reconnais-
sance. The planned medium-weight Army divisions, however, are designed
to handle more reconnaissance themselves. The Armored Cavalry Regiments
include a heavy armored component with M-1 tanks, which they would be
losing anyway as the Army moves to medium forces.
Attack Aviation Brigades
One each of  these formations of  attack helicopters were attached to divisions
and corps in Europe. The removal of  the two divisions and corps from Eu-
rope allows dropping three aviation brigades. An additional brigade is dropped
in accord with the other reductions to the heavy forces.
National Guard Divisions
These reserve forces are not integrated into the major war-fighting plans, so
several of  the heavy divisions can safely be dropped. The force would retain
two National Guard divisions (that would eventually convert to medium-weight
forces) and the eight heavy Enhanced Separate Brigades in a “strategic reserve.”
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The long duration of many peacekeeping operations and their occasional
rapid start suggests that light forces are better located in the active compo-
nent. Following the Vietnam War, reserve forces were deliberately integrated
into deployment plans with a goal of  making it more difficult to enter a major
war without mobilizing the reserves and hence winning (or losing) the ap-
proval of  the U.S. public. This model is no longer appropriate for the numer-
ous smaller peacekeeping and humanitarian operations the military is being
called on to perform.
Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs)
European allies are developing a more robust carrier capability. Britain plans
two new mid-size carriers, France has one nuclear-powered carrier with an
option on another, and Italy has a mid-size carrier under construction. (Italy
also has a smaller carrier, as does Spain.)148  Although not as capable as U.S.
supercarriers, these carriers would be able to handle a variety of  smaller-scale
operations in the Mediterranean, which would allow dropping the current
U.S. plans to always have a carrier operational there. The United States would
therefore not always have the capability to act unilaterally, but an emphasis of
this strategy is acting multilaterally and reducing divergence of  interests with
close allies so that the United States is forced to act alone as little as possible.
With the rotation used by the Navy to keep one carrier on station, this means
that a total of  three carriers would no longer be needed. A reduction of  three
carrier battle groups enables a concordant reduction of  three air wings, nine
surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers), and six attack submarines.
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs)
European allies are also developing an improved amphibious operation capa-
bility. The British and Dutch have worked particularly closely in this area,
and France, Italy, and Spain intend to increase their participation.149  This
would permit a reduction in the current requirement for one amphibious ready
group, and with rotation a total of  two. (A drop of  three might be feasible but
is not called for due to the general utility of these forces for likely contingen-
cies. For the same reason, no reduction in the number of  Marine divisions or
expeditionary forces is called for.)
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Fighter Wings
In accord with the reduction in divisions, the number of  active fighter wings is
cut from 12.6 equivalents to 9, with two removed from the force in Europe. Fighter
units are particularly well suited to reserve forces – many reserve pilots are com-
mercial pilots who can maintain the additional skills needed for combat profi-
ciency through reserve training, so all the reserve wings would be preserved.
Bombers
The 12 B-52s held ready for nuclear missions would be retired from the force.
Marine Corps
The Marine Corps maintains combined arms forces including infantry, heavy
armor, fixed-wing and helicopter attack aviation, transport helicopters, artil-
lery, and the ships in the Navy to deploy, supply, and provide combat support
for them. These flexible capabilities, in combination with the advanced state
of  their doctrine and thinking about new forms of  warfare, make them well-
suited for smaller-scale contingencies.
They are less appropriate for their former mission of  assaulting defended
beaches. The proliferation of  precision-guided munitions has made large am-
phibious assault ships crammed with fuel, explosives, and Marines vulnerable
when close to shore. With a few hits, an assault ship could be knocked out of  a
landing operation. Landing craft and helicopters up against modern firepower
are similarly vulnerable in an assault against well-defended positions.
Although the stereotypical across-the-beach Marine mission is less rel-
evant today, no reductions in Marine divisions are called for because of  their
utility for the more prevalent smaller-scale contingencies.
Nuclear Forces
As the most invulnerable leg of  the nuclear triad, a force of  ballistic missile
submarines, albeit at lower levels that today’s force, is all that is preserved of
nuclear forces. The large remaining force of  nuclear warheads atop sub-
launched missiles is judged sufficient to preserve nuclear deterrence against a
major nuclear attack. Once the United States and Russia reach levels of  nuclear
weapons in the low hundreds, further reductions may be possible after bring-
ing in the other major nuclear powers, Britain, France, and China.
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Can The Forces Get There? – Assessing Lift Requirements
New studies will need to be conducted to assess lift requirements for a much-
transformed military, particularly the Army. Reducing forward deployment will
require close attention to lift to make sure that U.S. – and allied – military forces
can get to where the action is – or better, where it might be before hostilities
commence – with enough speed and power to influence the course of  events.
The most recent test of this ability came in 1999 with Operation Allied
Force, the NATO air assault against the former Yugoslavia. In July 1999, just
after Operation Allied Force ended, the U.S. Air Force Mobility Command
said it was “confident that [its] forces remain adequate to meet the demands
of  two theater wars.”150
One year later, Gen. Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief  of  Staff, was saying
his service “will never have enough lift, ever to do two simultaneous major
theater wars. We can’t afford to go there.”151  At the time, a massive study of
airlift requirements was winding up and was expected to outline inter- and
intra-theater air- and sealift requirements to move the forces designated for
major theater wars. Indeed, Gen. Ryan’s statement seemed to be confirmed
by a General Accounting Office report, which estimated that the Pentagon’s
shortage in airlift capacity was 29 percent of  the total requirement and its
shortfall for refueling aircraft was 19 percent.152
Not until late January 2001 did the Defense Department release its long
awaited (and by then much leaked) Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-
05).153  The study determined that to meet the requirement to support two
MTWs being fought nearly simultaneously, plus move high priority assets
such as special forces and theater missile defenses to support regional com-
manders in chief, the Air Force would have to be able to move 54.5 million
ton-miles per day (MTM/D), and increase of  nearly five MTM/D over the
existing requirement. Moreover, MRS-05 concluded that “other” airlift re-
quirements could run the total requirement to 67 MTM/D.154  Shortages were
identified in transportation capacity within the United States (especially rail
cars for moving units to ports), in strategic lift, and in intra-theater lift to
transport prepositioned equipment and to relocate forces as needed once units
arrive on foreign shores.155
The study also reviewed sealift capacity. In general, sealift assets were deemed
sufficient as long as initiatives to increase the use of containers remained on course.
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However, a deficit in heavy-shipping capability (for transporting Coast Guard
cutters and mine countermeasure ships to a war theater) was identified.156  MRS-
05 also highlighted the importance of host-nation support and warned that the
use of  chemical agents by an opponent at air and sea ports of  entry would disrupt
operations and slow the delivery of personnel and equipment.
Unfortunately, MRS-05 was out of  date well before it was published. First,
it did not take into account the Army’s plan, announced in October 1999, to
transform itself  into a predominantly “medium-weight force” by gradually
replacing the equipment in its heavy armor units with lighter, more mobile
weapons and transportation platforms.157  Such a change will not only dra-
matically reduce the weight of  the force (an M-1 tank weighs 70 tons whereas
the target weight for the proposed future combat system is 20 tons) but will
decrease the amount of  over-sized and out-sized cargo that must be moved.
Conversely, the Army’s new vision proposes the ability to deploy one bri-
gade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, one division in five days, and
five divisions in 30 days. This goal will place a premium on strategic lift assets
in the early days of  a crisis.
The study’s findings will be even more dated if, as expected, the two war
scenario that has been the main justification for the current Pentagon force struc-
ture is jettisoned as a result of  the ongoing top-down review ordered by Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld. However, since current two war plans rely on the use of
civilian aircraft and ships to move forces and equipment, the actual capability of
the Air Force and Navy may be closer to a one major war scenario.158
In effect, another study that incorporates the Army’s changing structure
and any changes in national military strategy is needed before the Pentagon
can be sure it can meet mobility time line requirements.
WEAPONS
The following chart provides brief  indications of  which types of  weapons
and equipment would be most suited to the strategy and threat assessment
suggested here. The substantial technical problems and cost overruns that
many of  the complex weapon systems initially conceived during the Cold
War have suffered are not the primary focus here. For extensive information
on the testing problems of  forthcoming weapon systems, see the excellent
Annual Reports from the DoD Operational Test and Evaluation Office.159
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Equipment Factors Recommendation
Light Armored Improves mobility. Suitable for lower Continue planned
Vehicle (LAV) intensity operations. Army purchase.
Crusader howitzer28 Overweight; not very strategically Cancel. Apply
mobile. Less suitable for SSCs. subsystem technology
to existing platforms.
V-22 Osprey-like Useful for special operations including Continue (if  current
fixed+rotary wing long-range insertion/extraction/ technical problems can
aircraft29 evacuation. Improves mobility. be solved, otherwise
develop a new program
or upgraded helicopter).
RAH-66 Comanche Threat to helicopters is not primarily the Cancel. Upgrade
scout/attack helicopter radar-guided weapons that Comanche is Apaches.
designed to elude. Lower-tech threats
common in SSCs. Capability overlap
with Longbow Apache.
C-5, C-17, commercial, Improves strategic mobility. Increase airlift
or new airlifter purchases.
B-2 Spirit bombers Improved ground, close air support, Do not restart
air interdiction, and transport production.
capabilities would have higher priority
than costly B-2s.
Communications and Improves multinational Expand programs.
other equipment for operations capabilities.
better interoperability
with allies and partners
More numerous, Improves littoral, SSC capabilities. Expand programs.
smaller vessels
Large new carrier CVX vulnerable in littoral SSC “Skip a generation.”
(CVX); new destroyer operations. DD-21 not fully
(DD-21)30 transformational.
“Low-density, high- Frequent deployments are overtaxing exi- Increase purchases of
demand” aircraft and sting suppression of enemy air defenses replacement platforms.
tanker aircraft (SEAD) and electronic warfare (EW)
assets (e.g., EA-6B). Tanker fleet is aging.
FACTORS FOR PRIORITIZING WEAPONS
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Equipment Factors Recommendation
Virginia-class New Open-ocean Russian threat is gone. Continue research.
Attack Submarine
(NSSN)
Existing weapon Procurement of existing/upgraded Increase purchases to
procurement (e.g. F-16, platforms would address the problem prevent an increased
F/A-18C/D) and up- of aging aircraft and vehicle fleets. average age of  the
grades (e.g. electronics, fleets.
avionics) to existing
weapons31
F/A-18E/F Super Marginal additional capabilities of E/F Purchase upgraded
Hornet version over upgraded C/D version, for C/D versions.
the cost.
F-22 Raptor32 High threat in SSCs is not enemy air-to-air Continue but reduce
capabilities, permitting a smaller purchase. the purchase.
Joint Strike Fighter Vertical/short takeoff  version may improve Continue research and
tactical flexibility. development.
National Missile Ballistic missiles are least likely delivery Continue research.
Defense device for weapons of  mass destruction.
Higher priority for NBC defensive equip-
ment (e.g. improved soldier protective gear)
and theater ballistic missile defense for
troops in SSCs.
Existing & new nuclear Nuclear reductions help preserve good Fund nuclear
weapons (e.g. Trident II relations with Russia & China. Destruction threat reduction in
ballistic missile) & safeguarding of Russian nuclear Russia.
weapons and materials higher priority than
additional/new U.S. weapons.
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Unfolding Technologies
As noted repeatedly in this study, what people do with technologies is more
important than the technologies themselves. In this regard, the ability to vi-
sualize the uses of  new systems – including the ability to visualize current
capabilities and platforms as “systems of  systems” – broadens the range of
possible applications of  scientific advances.
Two technologies that are opening new dimensions are unmanned vehicles
and space-based assets. While unattended sensors (of  vehicles, ships, person-
nel) have been used for decades, unmanned vehicles are just now proliferating
in terms of  capabilities and endurance. Aerial unmanned vehicles that were
developed initially for reconnaissance and surveillance are mutating into un-
manned combat aerial vehicles. Ground and underwater unmanned vehicles
are under development. Micro- and nano-technologies are being developed
for dangerous missions such as searching rooms and whole buildings. While
often directed to military applications, such technologies have uses in law
enforcement, fire, and general search and rescue scenarios.
Space will continue to be used for a range of  new sensors and communications
purposes. This is one area in which the United States will endeavor to maintain
and, if  possible, extend its lead. This will become more and more challenging as
other nations develop the ability to devise and launch (or have launched) their
own satellites. In particular, the sharing of the available communications spec-
trum looms as a significant issue for the international community to resolve not
just among nations but between military and civilian applications.
Acquisition Reform
The frustration associated with trying to solve the problem of  enhancing the
effectiveness of  the commander’s decision cycle almost pales by comparison
to the Pentagon’s inability to streamline the equipment acquisition process.
The Bush administration’s approach to this problem is the creation of  two
high-level committees. A Senior Executive Committee would consist of  the
secretary and deputy secretary of  defense, the under secretary for Acquisi-
tion, and the three service secretaries. The latter four individuals will also
comprise the Business Initiative Council. The thrust of  the new approach
mirrors what is occurring in the force components – decentralize processes.
In this instance, the anticipated outcome is not greater lethality with lower
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risk but greater efficiency through better business practices. The Pentagon
hopes eventually to reap between $15-$30 billion through improved contracting
and related business practices168  and another $15-$30 billion from a new fi-
nancial management system169  that goes in the other direction by consolidat-
ing all DoD financial operations into one system.
STRUCTURE
The Joint Inter-Service Imperative
Underpinning any analysis of  national security are the identification of  the
U.S. vital interests that must be preserved and the part in safeguarding those
interests the American public wants the military to play (the “ready for what?”
question). The latter consideration leads directly to the 50 year-old, inside-
the-Pentagon wrangling about which service will provide what capabilities so
that the force is “ready for whatever” – the roles and missions debate.170
Military roles and missions for the modern military were allocated among
the four services by the March 1948 Key West Agreement, a “truce” ending
a bitter feud among the three service Chiefs. (The Chiefs had earlier won a
battle against President Harry Truman who wanted a unified military estab-
lishment.) What emerged was a division of  roles and missions into what was
unique to each service – such as sailing ships on the open oceans – and what
was (or could be) a shared function – flying machines – but was a claimed
prerogative of  one service.
To this day Key West still dominates the Pentagon’s make-up and is the
source of  continued inter-service rivalry. For example:
• each service has its own air arm with the Air Force and Navy having
multirole aircraft with essentially the same missions;
• both the Air Force and Navy operate nuclear-tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles as well as conventional warhead cruise missiles;
• each service has its own maintenance depots, schools, laboratories, weap-
ons testing organizations, ranges, chaplains, medics, lawyers, public af-
fairs and congressional liaison offices;
• the Army, Navy, and Air Force are vying for the upper hand in theater
missile defense and, increasingly, in national missile defense. Each also
has a “space” organization to ensure its interests in the exploitation of
space assets are not overlooked;
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• the problem extends to cutting-edge technology development: “In what
several military and defence officials cite as evidence that the uniformed
services in the US Department of  Defence still do not adequately co-
operate, the US Air Force and US Navy are each independently devel-
oping new surveillance and reconnaissance systems’ architectures, de-
spite large degrees of  similarity.”171
The last 50 years have seen huge changes in the technology for warfare but
not much change in developing modern approaches to a very basic military
question: “What should each service be able to do separately and in conjunc-
tion with other armed services, and within what time frame, to provide usable
combat power?” Answering this question for the forces of  the 21st century
should involve reviewing both the current allocation of  responsibilities, and
revisions and additions to roles, missions, and functions. New roles that need
to be reviewed include redefining “homeland defense,” determining the uses
of  space, and defining in whose domain protection of  cyberspace falls. Mis-
sions that might need to be revised include ensuring freedom of  the seas and
commerce thereon, assisting allies in resisting aggression or intimidation by
“presence,” and evacuating Americans abroad who become caught in civil
disturbances/wars. Functions to look at include close air support, deep strike,
sustained land combat, air and space defense, and power projection.172
The process for allocating and rationalizing roles, missions, and functions
has to be centralized under strong leadership. It must also be developed in a
manner that makes military advice from the field and Joint Staff  paramount –
as opposed to service parochialism. Four key guidelines should shape deci-
sions over roles and missions:
1. The allocation should be considered an on-going process, to preclude
locking the services into a new “Key West” system of  rigid and often
mutually exclusive roles and functions that persist for the next 50 years.
2. Some duplication of  capabilities and roles among the services is desir-
able, as is healthy competition to perform specific roles.
3. More important than establishing ahead of  time which service should
do what is making sure that different services, roles, and functions op-
erate jointly and in harmony to achieve broader goals.
4. The universe of  possibilities is opened up greatly if  the concept of  “ser-
vices” is broadened to include those of  close allies.
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If  strategy is, above all, to adapt as the environment evolves, as called for
by Sun Tzu and John Boyd, it is important to decrease rigidity in service
roles. Similarly, if  the strategy used in conflicts is to rely more on flexibility,
then a measured amount of  duplication provides more options. Boyd sug-
gested that strategy should:
• Establish the focus of  the main effort together with other efforts and
pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches,
and threaten alternative objectives.
• Move along paths of  least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
• Employ a variety of  measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mis-
trust with tangles of  ambiguity-deception-novelty as a basis to sever
the adversary’s moral ties and disorient him.173
Sun Tzu’s strategic insight has been described as:
True war-winning effectiveness comes from the force’s ability to play
the cheng/ch’i game, that is, to set up the opponent, then quickly shift
to something he does not anticipate, and then to exploit to the fullest
the resulting confusion.174
Hence, the important concept in allocating roles and missions is to make sure
that forces offer variety, present a wide range of  options to commanders, permit
rapid shifts in focus when required, and operate in harmony with each other.175
The Unified Command Plan
In undertaking to revisit service roles and missions, careful consideration ought
to be given to the Unified Command Plan and the role that the regional CINCs
play (or don’t play) in setting requirements and defining capabilities for their
theaters. Moreover, the increasing importance of  efficient and effective joint
war-fighting, with its need to integrate better the capabilities of  the U.S. mili-
tary services with each other and with allies, suggests the wisdom of  further
realignment of  the allocation of  geographical responsibilities of  the five war-
fighting CINCs. In short, the Joint Forces Command should be totally ori-
ented toward joint training and multi-service matters, and its remaining geo-
graphical responsibilities (most of  the North Atlantic) be divided between
U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command. This would leave
four geographically oriented joint commands – European, Pacific, Central,
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and Southern – and five functional unified commands: Transportation, Stra-
tegic, Space, Special Operations, and Joint Forces.
Jointness in Planning and Budgeting
At the same time, efficient allocation of  resources suggests the need to reallo-
cate budgetary power within the Pentagon. Currently, the vast bulk of  the
defense budget is still controlled by the individual services. The CINCs do
get some funds directly, and through the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of
Staff  they can influence the overall budget formulation process. But the real
key to improving equipment compatibility (“interoperability”) while mini-
mizing unnecessary redundancy is a strengthened role for the Joint Require-
ments Oversight Council (JROC) in setting joint priorities and evaluating
cost, schedule, and performance criteria for major weapons programs. (The
JROC, normally consisting of  the deputy chiefs of  staff  of  the services and
the vice-chairman of  the Joint Chiefs, was originally charged with validating
the need for and monitoring “big ticket” procurement programs.176 ) The com-
mander in chief  of  Joint Forces Command should also be designated a full
member of  the JROC so that his insights are reflected in JROC deliberations
and decisions. The new missions the military faces also suggest that the role
of  the CINCs in joint planning should be strengthened in additional ways, as
discussed at length in a background paper, An Assessment of  Joint Doctrine.177
Current “Joint Doctrine” has proven effective and reliable in planning and
managing major force projections for own-force combined, allied, and coalition
operations wherever called for.178  But it has also proven to be inflexible and inef-
ficient in planning and managing the kinds of military missions that are likely to
be the principal job of  the U.S. military for at least the next two decades.
As the last remaining military superpower, the United States will certainly
be moved to protect the assets and interests of  its citizens and friends in con-
flicts and controversies that were not anticipated by the framers of  the body of
treaties, domestic laws, doctrine, and practices that constitute the received struc-
ture for conducting military operations.179  Humanitarian interventions, responses
to natural and man-made disasters, limiting civil strife in other nations, and
controlling armed conflicts not legally constituting acts of  aggression180  are dif-
ferent in kind and character from the tasks the United States traditionally has
assigned as primarily military concerns. These missions have been considered
secondary or “special,” and were dealt with either as a diversion from the main
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purposes of  manning, training, and equipping the armed forces, or by assign-
ment to units with limited resources and range of potential action.
Efforts underway aimed at modern joint doctrines for Special Operations
and Operations Other Than War may provide mechanisms for mounting
and managing such missions. However, fundamental changes remain neces-
sary in how the “Joint Establishment”181  works with the other agencies charged
with developing and prosecuting U.S. security policy to ensure a higher prob-
ability of  success.
Insufficient Joint Staff  and CINC Input
In Goldwater-Nichols, Congress properly included language intended to
clarify the command relationship among the members of  the National Com-
mand Authority (NCA).182  That language has, however, been interpreted in
a way that marginalizes the role of  the Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff  in acting
on behalf of the war-fighters in the unified theater and area combatant com-
mands to affect the organization, training and equipping of  forces.
The combatant commanders in chief  (CINCs) are clearly responsible for
the performance of  their assigned missions, and they are given all the neces-
sary operational authority and control over forces assigned pursuant to those
missions. Their ability to affect how those forces are trained and equipped is
truncated, however, because the Joint Establishment has little real authority
to direct how funding for force generation will be allocated and spent. Various
“Joint Publications” and other guidance documents express the intent that
the development of  an objective force be a collaborative process among all
interested parties. The process of  “Planning, Programming, and Budgeting,”
used by the Pentagon to develop its annual and six-year budget proposals,
offers the CINCs only one chance to affect the design and capabilities of the
forces that will be assigned to them. This “once or never” process creates
problems for force structure development, among other areas.183
The services assign the forces that support the CINCs. The size of  the
total force is limited, and many service-component units are assigned to more
than one CINC. As this support to a CINC must compete with other service
objectives, there may not be an exact fit between the mission and the capabili-
ties of  the forces assigned. (The structure of  units within each service is the
prerogative of  the individual service chief.) Programmatic and institutional
loyalty may drive service decision-making as to force structure in a direction
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not supportive of  Joint objectives. Battles over air superiority vs. airlift, sea-
based fires vs. land-based artillery, strategic vs. tactical capabilities, and the
importance of  technical intelligence capabilities versus human intelligence
capabilities are an inevitable consequence of  limiting the voice of  the war-
fighters in force design and development.
Boosting the CINCs Roles
It is essential, therefore, that new effective mechanisms be created that will
ensure that the best collective thinking among members of  the Joint Estab-
lishment will prevail over the inter-service politics about roles and missions,
which currently are the ultimate drivers of  decisions about budgets and ex-
penditures. Success in meeting and overcoming the threats to U.S. national
interests in the next two decades requires redesigning that role, and empow-
ering the Joint Establishment to act promptly on behalf  of  the war-fighters.
While the Joint Chiefs have no direct command authority to direct the
preparation or assignment of  forces, experience has proven that only the Joint
Establishment can effectively function as the cross-service arbiter in the de-
velopment of  national strategy, and the corollary service roles and missions to
implement that strategy. It is this role that must be extended and expanded to
enable the military to adequately prepare for, and prosecute, the missions
that it will be expected to assume in the next two decades. This is no mere
organizational task. Developing the most effective and efficient solution will
require changing attitudes, not just titles.
The needs of  the war-fighters must dominate budgetary, procurement,
and manpower discussions. Also, the Joint Establishment must be actively
involved in designing, establishing, and helping manage alliances and other
mechanisms for ensuring that the U.S. military can act surely and swiftly
with allies and partners.
The desired modifications in the planning process utilized to arrive at avail-
able forces do not require scrapping the entire existing structure. What is
needed is a greater role for the CINCs in the Joint planning process, so that
the actors most likely to be in a position to recognize an emerging threat or
opportunity can better affect the definition of  the force likely to be available
to respond. The necessary changes include creation of  an additional process
in the existing cycle of  estimates, budgeting, and force development. This
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additional process would be focused on the immediate short-term and on
eliciting a statement of capabilities required to prosecute non-traditional mis-
sions unique to each of  the areas of  concern of  the combatant CINCs. Pro-
posed modifications to the complex Joint planning process are spelled out in
the background paper An Assessment of  Joint Doctrine.
INDUSTRY
From the perspective of  soldiers on the front lines and the taxpayer, the de-
fense industry is not performing well.184  Weapon systems are taking a human
generation to develop. Each new weapon is doubling or tripling the cost of  its
predecessor, and many are beset by performance and reliability issues. It is
difficult to change or stop programs once they get started, regardless of  what
has happened elsewhere in the world. To cite one example, just to bring the
F-22 program in under congressional cost ceilings, contractors must identify
and successfully implement cost reductions that are greater on a per-unit ba-
sis than the total cost of  the aircraft it replaces.185  And even if  the U.S. Air
Force tactical air modernization plan is executed perfectly – no cost increases
and Congress provides 100 percent of  the planned funding every year – the
average age of  all USAF aircraft will increase roughly 60 percent over the
next 15 years.186
It is especially critical to improve the health, and performance, of  the de-
fense industry because it serves as a key hedge against the possibility of  the
emergence of  a new military superpower challenge to the United States in the
next 25 years. A robust, competitive defense industry – one that is able to
rapidly adopt successful commercial technology where possible – will be the
key underlying capability needed to respond to such a challenge. Since de-
fense contractors and commercial industry have evolved along different paths
since the World War II, the key to restoring defense industry health will be to
restore, to the extent possible, some of  the competitive dynamics of  the com-
mercial sector.
Defense contractors have developed a variety of  “power games” and politi-
cal strategies – such as “front-loading,” “political engineering,” and the “re-
volving door” – to survive in the defense sector. In contrast, many successful
commercial companies have focused on what is called “lean production” to
foster innovation, reduce costs, and improve quality.187  The different evolu-
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tionary paths of  the defense and commercial industries will make it difficult to
apply lean production fully to weapon production. Nevertheless, there are some
reforms that can improve the competitiveness, health, and performance of  the
defense industry, and make it more like the commercial sector again.
It is important, when considering ways to improve the development and
production of  major weapon systems, to keep in mind that the strongest influ-
ences on the current system, that is, the factors that most account for the stabil-
ity of  the present military-industrial-congressional complex (MICC), are:
• Lack of  market forces to spur innovation and control costs; and equally
important,
• The fact that the United States funds major weapons programs as much
on their political utility (via “power games”) as for their effectiveness
on the battlefield.
In the commercial world, the marketplace appears to be the most effective
mechanism for fostering evolution in the direction of  better products and
services for the consumer. In the defense sector, market forces are limited,
but it may still be possible to inject them to a larger degree than is the case
today, especially if  the government establishes clear policies to do so. That is,
when making decisions, the policy should be to move towards the direction of
increased competition and market forces, rather than directly towards some
other goal, such as “efficiency,” regardless of  how desirable that goal might
appear. Some recommendations along these lines follow. The issue of  pre-
serving a healthy defense industry is explored at greater length in the back-
ground paper Reforming the Marketplace – The Industrial Component of  Na-
tional Defense.188
Keep More Competition
For any particular program, having a large number of  competitors does not
appear to be the most important factor, although this is an area that could
benefit from careful research, but having more than one competitor is key.
In the retail marketplace the answer does appear to be “the more the bet-
ter.” Japan, for example, during its period of  greatest inroad into the United
States, harbored nine companies that exported automobiles to the United States.
The commercial marketplace, however, represents an aggregate of  millions
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of  customers and so can benefit from a multiplicity of  competitors. In the
U.S. defense marketplace, there is only one primary customer capable of  pay-
ing for the development of  major weapon systems. In this environment, it is
important to keep at least two real competitors.
Foster New Entrants
A more important factor in shaping the evolution of  the defense industry is
preserving the possibility of  new entrants to the defense marketplace. If  the
defense industry should evolve into something different than it is, the Pentagon
must reinforce incentives for new companies to form, perhaps virtually, for es-
tablished companies in other sectors to enter the defense marketplace, and for
poor performers to be selected out. This mechanism cannot work in the current
defense environment where each of  the two major primes is too big to fail.
Although it is unlikely that a totally brand new aircraft, armored vehicle,
or ship building company will form over the next few years, new entrants
could come from companies in related commercial fields. The notion of  new
entrants is not as far fetched as it may sound. Until its design was selected as
one of  the two finalists for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), Lockheed
Martin Corp. had been out of  the fighter business for more than 30 years.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., which had built the two previous Air Force fight-
ers, was on the team that eventually lost.
Keep Competition Open Longer
It does no good to have a vigorous competition for weapon design and devel-
opment, and then revert to monopoly status for spending the real money on
actual production. All this practice (which characterizes the majority of  U.S.
weapon programs) does is reward the more convincing bureaucratic game-
player. At the minimum, competition should be maintained up to the point
where the government and the contractors are comfortable with commercial-
type (i.e., fixed-price / guaranteed performance) contracts. This point is cer-
tainly through preparation for production and perhaps even to initial operat-
ing capability.
However, given the magnitude of  savings that competition often produces,
most weapon systems would benefit from preserving it throughout the life of
the program. These benefits often include costs reduced by 25 percent, defect
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rates lowered by 90 percent, and much more rapid incorporation of  new fea-
tures, technologies, and upgrades. It does not take a very large production run
for these advantages to amortize the cost of  developing a competitor system.
The more rapid delivery of  effective and supportable combat systems to troops
in the field could be considered a bonus.
Investigate Whether There Are Ways to Close the Revolving Door
The three most common political power games used by the defense indus-
try are front-loading (to get programs started), political engineering (to keep
them funded, independent of  changing requirements), and the revolving door
(to weaken the resolve of  government employees to make difficult decisions).
“Front-loading” is giving a rosy picture of  a future program, such as provid-
ing unrealistically low cost estimates. “Political engineering” is working the
political system to build strong support for a program among elected leaders,
for example by spreading subcontracts on a program to numerous Congres-
sional districts. The “revolving door” is the legal but ripe-for-abuse practice
of  individuals leaving government service to work in the defense industry
Since front-loading hides in the legitimate uncertainty inherent in any new
program, and since political engineering dwells at the heart of  the U.S. repre-
sentative democratic system, these two power tools will likely always be avail-
able in some form.189  It might be possible, however, to reduce the most perni-
cious effects of  the revolving door – such as confronting serving officials with
great temptation to avoid playing hardball with contractors.
The U.S. government needs to find some way to close, or at least slow, the
revolving door. This gets into an area of  individual liberties and runs into the
problem of  defining “defense contractor.” But the fact is that so long as large
defense contractors can influence the actions of  government officials through
the hope or expectation of  lucrative future employment, then the United States
truly is basing its national security around the convenience of  the contractors,
not the troops in the field or the people.
Ultimately, Industry Will Mirror Weapon Systems
To be realistic, as long as the services insist on weapons to counter Cold War-
era threats, the government will be buying ever more complex and expensive
aircraft, ships, and fighting vehicles. Developing and building such behemoths
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will probably require contractors in its own image, that is, organizations ca-
pable of  managing multi-year, multi-billion dollar contracts. Such organiza-
tions will employ the same tools of  lobbying, front-loading, and political engi-
neering available to all companies whose primary customer is the government.
So the problem of  fostering competition and new entrants may be simpli-
fied if  the weapons themselves are simplified. If, in fact, the world is moving
towards an asymmetric “fourth-generation of  warfare,” as typified by Viet-
nam, Somalia, the recent Middle East (excluding Desert Storm), terrorism,
and counter-narcotics, then perhaps the era of  the mega-prime will naturally
come to an end.
BUDGET RAMIFICATIONS
The approach taken in this study was to develop a strategy and force proposal
independent of  budget considerations. The strategy proposed here suggests a
smaller, albeit transformed, U.S. military force. As a result, after a period of
transformation that would require additional funding, military spending would
be somewhat lower than today. The report calls for additional funding in ar-
eas such as airlift, equipping the Navy with some smaller, more numerous
vessels and supporting Army transformation. Such programs would partially
offset the reduced spending on a force with fewer units, personnel, and cur-
tailed production of  selected weapons and national missile defense.
This report has also suggested that non-military components of  national
security could use additional attention, so all of  the funds would not necessarily
be returned to the Treasury. Some of  the freed resources could be transferred to
other national security programs, such as economic assistance, if  so desired.
Transformation from the current force structure to that proposed here – or
any other transformed force, for that matter – would not be without cost.
Significant short term expenditures would be involved. Yet the national secu-
rity strategy and military force structure presented here would result in con-
siderable savings in the long term.
Although a detailed budget analysis and breakdown is beyond the scope
of  this report, estimated savings, once a steady-state budget were achieved,
would be a minimum of  15-20 percent below Fiscal Year 2001 levels, ad-
justed for inflation. Hence the estimated steady-state budget range for the
proposed force is $250-265 billion per year in Fiscal Year 2001 dollars.
140   |   Reforging the Sword
Additional savings might be achieved through implementation of  a broad
range of  initiatives not directly related to the proposed strategy or force struc-
ture, many of  which are already under consideration by the Defense Depart-
ment. Additional military base closures, greater privatization of  non-combat
functions, and adoption of  a “just in time” logistical support system are ex-
amples of  such initiatives.
This report has attempted to point the way towards new directionsfor military strategy, personnel, equipment, and organizations. Ithas raised a variety of  salient issues but did not have the space to
explore them at the length and detail they deserve. The strategy and force
structure approach taken in this report suggests that the following topics are
worthy of  reports themselves.
• How can other U.S. government agencies and non-government organi-
zations be better integrated into military interventions and operations?
What modifications need to be made to the interagency process? Can
U.S. military engagement produce even better results if  it is undertaken
with regular strategic forethought, planning, and funding rather than
on an ad hoc basis as it is now?
• What are the concepts, thought processes, procedures, and hardware that
will provide the United States with “decision superiority” – the ability to
win by making strategic decisions in quicker and more veiled cycles than
an opponent? How can extensive U.S. information gathering and produc-
tion be turned more effectively into knowledge and understanding?
• Is jointness no longer adequately served by the current structure of  the
Joint Chiefs of  Staff, composed primarily of  service heads? How can
joint structures, thinking, and processes move beyond integration of
services and of  components (e.g. land forces, space forces) to integra-
tion of  functions and effects (e.g. fires, sustainment, operational and
information security)?
• What will fourth-generation warfare really look like in the future and
how can the U.S. military – and U.S. society – transform its vulnerabil-
V. Next Steps
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ity to fourth-generation threats into dominance? How can deploying
forces be protected from anti-access attacks on infrastructure within the
United States? Can asymmetric threats be channeled and transformed
into symmetric threats? How can intelligence operations and organiza-
tions be structured to keep abreast of  ever-changing threats and oppor-
tunities in the future?
Many of these topics are beginning to be studied in greater depth, but
much more needs to be done to assist and accelerate U.S. military transforma-
tion so that change is brought on not by disaster, but by forethought.
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